Changes

::*''"...I have here in my hand a list of 205 – a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party "''

::*''"...I have here in my hand a list of 205 – a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party "''

Venona now makes it known (a) the 205 number came Hoover; (b) Hoover did on earlier occasions similarly manipulate the source of his information (Venona) by adding '''other''' names [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html] which were not implicated in Venona, to wit,  

Venona now makes it known (a) the 205 number came Hoover; (b) Hoover did on earlier occasions similarly manipulate the source of his information (Venona) by adding '''other''' names [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html] which were not implicated in Venona, to wit,  

::"on May 29, 1946, [Hoover] sent George E. Allen, a confidant of the President and head of the [[Reconstruction Finance Corporation]], a four-page letter... The Director reported that [Venona] had revealed “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington.” Of some fourteen names listed, [[Alger Hiss]] was there, as was [[Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]]]. But these names were well down the list. The name at the top was “Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson.” The third name was “Former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.” Further on was “Bureau of the Budget—Paul H. Appleby.” ...Further, that it automatically discredited the other accusations..." (Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Secrecy Commission Report [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html] ([http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html Hoover to Allen Letter, May 29, 1946], pages 1 and 2); [https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/preface.htm Benson and Warner] continue:

::"on May 29, 1946, [Hoover] sent George E. Allen, a confidant of the President and head of the [[Reconstruction Finance Corporation]], a four-page letter... The Director reported that [Venona] had revealed “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington.” Of some fourteen names listed, [[Alger Hiss]] was there, as was [[Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]]. But these names were well down the list. The name at the top was “Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson.” The third name was “Former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.” Further on was “Bureau of the Budget—Paul H. Appleby.” ...Further, that it automatically discredited the other accusations..." (Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Secrecy Commission Report [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html] ([http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html Hoover to Allen Letter, May 29, 1946], pages 1 and 2); [https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/preface.htm Benson and Warner] continue:

::"The tacit decision to keep the translated messages secret carried a political and social price for the country. Debates over the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States were polarized in the dearth of reliable information then in the public domain. Anti-Communists suspected that some spies—perhaps including a few who were known to the US Government—remained at large. Those who criticized the government’s loyalty campaign as an over-reaction, on the other hand, wondered if some defendants were being scapegoated; they seemed to sense that the public was not being told the whole truth about the investigations of such suspects as Julius Rosenberg and Judith Coplon. Given the dangerous international situation and what was known by the government at that time, however, continued secrecy was not illogical. With the Korean war raging and the prospect of war with the Soviet Union a real possibility, military and intelligence leaders almost certainly believed that any cryptologic edge that America gained over the Soviets was too valuable to concede—even if it was already known to Moscow.19

::"The tacit decision to keep the translated messages secret carried a political and social price for the country. Debates over the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States were polarized in the dearth of reliable information then in the public domain. Anti-Communists suspected that some spies—perhaps including a few who were known to the US Government—remained at large. Those who criticized the government’s loyalty campaign as an over-reaction, on the other hand, wondered if some defendants were being scapegoated; they seemed to sense that the public was not being told the whole truth about the investigations of such suspects as Julius Rosenberg and Judith Coplon. Given the dangerous international situation and what was known by the government at that time, however, continued secrecy was not illogical. With the Korean war raging and the prospect of war with the Soviet Union a real possibility, military and intelligence leaders almost certainly believed that any cryptologic edge that America gained over the Soviets was too valuable to concede—even if it was already known to Moscow.19