Changes

==ExComm==

==ExComm==

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

Overall, the ExComm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''

==Soviet military doctrine==

==Soviet military doctrine==

In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.  

In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is composed of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.  

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.