| | [[Image:Newsweekcovermarch9.jpg|thumb| Front Cover, [[Newsweek]], 9th March]] | | [[Image:Newsweekcovermarch9.jpg|thumb| Front Cover, [[Newsweek]], 9th March]] |
| | In regards to the 9/11 attacks Zakaria has argued that Islamic extremism was the product of stagnation and the non-development of society in many parts of the Arab world. At the heart of Zakaria'a argument is that much of the extremism common to Islamic terrorists was that their ideals grew in states that had experienced decades of tyrannical and corrupt rule that had been marketed to its people as being a Western-style secular government through the use of misinformation and propaganda. The response to such forms of government saw the growth of an opposition that was religious, violent and, with the rise of global communication and the internet, increasingly organised, and increasingly willing to overthrow governments and replace them with violent, repressive theocracies, or at least a form of government that had deep similarities to a theocracy. Zakaria has also argued in a cover essay for the 9th March edition of Newsweek that ''"The groups that advocate these policies are ugly, reactionary forces that will stunt their countries and bring dishonor to their religion. But not all these Islamists advocate global jihad, host terrorists or launch operations against the outside world — in fact, most do not. Consider, for example, the most difficult example, the Taliban. The Taliban have done all kinds of terrible things in Afghanistan. But so far, no Afghan Taliban has participated at any significant level in a global terrorist attack over the past 10 years — including 9/11. There are certainly elements of the Taliban that are closely associated with Al Qaeda. But the Taliban is large, and many factions have little connection to Osama bin Laden. Most Taliban want Islamic rule locally, not violent jihad globally.'' | | In regards to the 9/11 attacks Zakaria has argued that Islamic extremism was the product of stagnation and the non-development of society in many parts of the Arab world. At the heart of Zakaria'a argument is that much of the extremism common to Islamic terrorists was that their ideals grew in states that had experienced decades of tyrannical and corrupt rule that had been marketed to its people as being a Western-style secular government through the use of misinformation and propaganda. The response to such forms of government saw the growth of an opposition that was religious, violent and, with the rise of global communication and the internet, increasingly organised, and increasingly willing to overthrow governments and replace them with violent, repressive theocracies, or at least a form of government that had deep similarities to a theocracy. Zakaria has also argued in a cover essay for the 9th March edition of Newsweek that ''"The groups that advocate these policies are ugly, reactionary forces that will stunt their countries and bring dishonor to their religion. But not all these Islamists advocate global jihad, host terrorists or launch operations against the outside world — in fact, most do not. Consider, for example, the most difficult example, the Taliban. The Taliban have done all kinds of terrible things in Afghanistan. But so far, no Afghan Taliban has participated at any significant level in a global terrorist attack over the past 10 years — including 9/11. There are certainly elements of the Taliban that are closely associated with Al Qaeda. But the Taliban is large, and many factions have little connection to Osama bin Laden. Most Taliban want Islamic rule locally, not violent jihad globally.'' |
| | ''How would you describe Faisal Ahmad Shinwari, a judge in Afghanistan? He has banned women from singing on television and called for an end to cable television altogether. He has spoken out against women and men being educated in the same schools at any age. He has upheld the death penalty for two journalists who were convicted of blasphemy. (Their crime: writing that Afghanistan’s turn toward Islam was “reactionary.”) Shinwari sounds like an Islamic militant, right? Actually, he was appointed chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court after the American invasion, administered Hamid Karzai’s oath of office and remained in his position until three years ago."''<ref>http://www.getreligion.org/?p=8607</ref> | | ''How would you describe Faisal Ahmad Shinwari, a judge in Afghanistan? He has banned women from singing on television and called for an end to cable television altogether. He has spoken out against women and men being educated in the same schools at any age. He has upheld the death penalty for two journalists who were convicted of blasphemy. (Their crime: writing that Afghanistan’s turn toward Islam was “reactionary.”) Shinwari sounds like an Islamic militant, right? Actually, he was appointed chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court after the American invasion, administered Hamid Karzai’s oath of office and remained in his position until three years ago."''<ref>http://www.getreligion.org/?p=8607</ref> |
| | Initialy supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Zakaria stated at the time, ''"The place is so dysfunctional... any stirring of the pot is good. America’s involvement in the region is for the good."''<ref>http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/national/features/n_8621/</ref>. Zakaria also argued for an operation sanctioned by the UN and using a force of 400 000 troops, a number that was higher than the number of troops actually deployed by the then administration. Zakaria also called for an international occupation force, similar to that of Kosova. | | Initialy supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Zakaria stated at the time, ''"The place is so dysfunctional... any stirring of the pot is good. America’s involvement in the region is for the good."''<ref>http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/national/features/n_8621/</ref>. Zakaria also argued for an operation sanctioned by the UN and using a force of 400 000 troops, a number that was higher than the number of troops actually deployed by the then administration. Zakaria also called for an international occupation force, similar to that of Kosova. |