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A report by the CIA of the critical domestic economic problems and social discontent Soviet [[CPSU]] General Secretary Gorbachev provided a look what the sources of his principal dilemma-the very reforms needed to deal with the problems would threaten preservation of the [[nomenklatura]] and put at risk Gorbachev’s ability to maintain the power to bring about [[Perestroika]].<ref>CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: [https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/russia/enter.html Chapter 5, Enter Gorbachev ], Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Publications, 1996.</ref> Gorbachev requested a Summit with Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986 to discuss the stresses competition from the Reagan’s defense posture was having on Soviet military spending and economy, and Gorbachev’s ability to carryout his plans of restructuring Communist control. Gorbachev told the [[Politburo]] in preparation for the Summit, "Our goal is to prevent the next round of arms race. If we do not do this ... will pulled into an arms race beyond our power, and we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit of out capabilities."<ref>Notes of Politburo Meeting 4 October 1986, [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/ Gorbachev's instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik]</ref>
A report by the CIA of the critical domestic economic problems and social discontent Soviet [[CPSU]] General Secretary Gorbachev provided a look what the sources of his principal dilemma-the very reforms needed to deal with the problems would threaten preservation of the [[nomenklatura]] and put at risk Gorbachev’s ability to maintain the power to bring about [[Perestroika]].<ref>CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: [https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/russia/enter.html Chapter 5, Enter Gorbachev ], Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Publications, 1996.</ref> Gorbachev requested a Summit with Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986 to discuss the stresses competition from the Reagan’s defense posture was having on Soviet military spending and economy, and Gorbachev’s ability to carryout his plans of restructuring Communist control. Gorbachev told the [[Politburo]] in preparation for the Summit, "Our goal is to prevent the next round of arms race. If we do not do this ... will pulled into an arms race beyond our power, and we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit of out capabilities."<ref>Notes of Politburo Meeting 4 October 1986, [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/ Gorbachev's instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik]</ref>
===Dealing with the Soviets===
Gorbachev, weakened by his nation's economic malaise, frightened by SDI, and committed to reforming the Soviet system before it collapsed, realized he had to end the Cold War to save Communism. Reagan proved willing to deal, but had to face three sources of criticism inside the U.S. The political right represented by the ''[[National Review]]'' and columnists such as [[George F. Will]] feared it was all a Soviet trap. Reagan used his enormous influence within the conservative movement to disarm these critics before disarming the Russians. Second were the "realists", led by Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who thought Reagan was going too far. The third group comprised segments of the intelligence community and military; they did not believe that the Soviet Union was as weak as Reagan and secretary of state, George P. Shultz, believed. Reagan, reelected in a landslide and at the peak of his power, pushed ahead with a series of agreements that effectively weakened the Soviet Empire and made it clear America had the initiative.<ref>James Mann, ''The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan'' (2009)</ref>
By the late 80s, the Soviet Union began unilateral force cuts and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and by May 1989 an unprecedented series of disclosures by senior Soviet officials revealed actual reductions in defense spending for the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 Five Year Plan periods.<ref> Christopher Wilkinson NATO Review, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-4.htm Soviet Defense Spending], NATO's Economics Directorate No. 2 - April 1991, Vol. 39 p. 16-22</ref> Genrikh Grofimenko, a former adviser to [[Leonid Brezhnev]], said "Ninety-nine percent of the Russian people believe that [the US] won the Cold War because of your president's insistence on SDI".<ref>Peter Schweizer, ''Reagan’s War''.</ref>
By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union began unilateral force cuts and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and by May 1989 an unprecedented series of disclosures by senior Soviet officials revealed actual reductions in defense spending for the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 Five Year Plan periods.<ref> Christopher Wilkinson NATO Review, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-4.htm Soviet Defense Spending], NATO's Economics Directorate No. 2 - April 1991, Vol. 39 p. 16-22</ref> Genrikh Grofimenko, a former adviser to [[Leonid Brezhnev]], said "Ninety-nine percent of the Russian people believe that [the US] won the Cold War because of your president's insistence on SDI".<ref>Peter Schweizer, ''Reagan’s War''.</ref>
===[[Containment]] and the Iranian initiative===
===[[Containment]] and the Iranian initiative===