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Brown now made even more gradiose plans and signed up famous men in Boston who gave him the necessary money.  They included Gerrit Smith, George L. Stearns, Theodore Parker, Frank B. Sanborn, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, S. G. Howe, Frederick Douglass, and others.  

Brown now made even more gradiose plans and signed up famous men in Boston who gave him the necessary money.  They included Gerrit Smith, George L. Stearns, Theodore Parker, Frank B. Sanborn, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, S. G. Howe, Frederick Douglass, and others.  

His plan was not a sudden raid and then escape to the mountains. Rather his plan was to use the 198 Sharps rifles and 950 pikes he brought along, and those captured ast the arsenal, to arm rebellious slaves, striking terror to the slaveholders in Virginia. Then he would send agents to nearby plantations, rallying the slaves; to hold Harper’s Ferry for a short time, expecting as many volunteers white and black would join him as would form against him. He then would make a rapid movement southward, along the way sending out armed bands, They would free more slaves, obtain food, horses and hostages, and destroy slaveholding morale. Brown planned to follow the Appalachian mountains south into Tennessee and even Alabama, the heart of the South, making forays into the plains on either side. He believed that on the first night of the stroke he thought he might get from two to five hundred black adherents. He ridiculed the militia and regular army that might oppose him.<ref> Nevins 4:72-73</ref>  

His plan was not a sudden raid and then escape to the mountains. Rather his plan was to use the rifles and pikes he brought along, and those captured at the arsenal, to arm rebellious slaves, striking terror to the slaveholders in Virginia. He believed that on the first night of the stroke he thought he might get from two to five hundred black adherents. He ridiculed the militia and regular army that might oppose him.  Then he would send agents to nearby plantations, rallying the slaves. He planned to hold Harper’s Ferry for a short time, expecting as many volunteers white and black would join him as would form against him. He then would make a rapid movement southward, along the way sending out armed bands. They would free more slaves, obtain food, horses and hostages, and destroy slaveholding morale. Brown planned to follow the Appalachian mountains south into Tennessee and even Alabama, the heart of the South, making forays into the plains on either side.<ref> Nevins 4:72-73</ref>  

 

 

In 1859, Brown led 21 men in an attack on a federal arsenal in [[Harper's Ferry]], [[Virginia]] (note: Harper's Ferry is now part of [[West Virginia]]), intending to arm slaves in [[slave revolt]]s. The raid failed, and Brown was hanged on December 2.

In 1859, Brown led 21 men in an attack on a federal arsenal in [[Harper's Ferry]], [[Virginia]] (note: Harper's Ferry is now part of [[West Virginia]]), intending to arm slaves in [[slave revolt]]s. The raid failed, and Brown was hanged on December 2.

"Bleeding Kansas" of 1851-64 has been a major topic of historical research and debate. In the first wave of 19th-century historiography, scholars included Kansas under the broader rubric of the "irrepressible" national conflict over slavery. Revisionist scholars in the early 20th century, led by Kansas historian James C. Malin, a conservative, denied the need for conflict, suggested that Kansas would have become a free state even without the effort of New England antislavery settlers, and debunked the legend of John Brown. New scholarship in the 1950s on the power dynamics of land settlement further displaced the issues of slavery and sectional conflict from the center of understanding of Bleeding Kansas.  

"Bleeding Kansas" of 1851-64 has been a major topic of historical research and debate. In the first wave of 19th-century historiography, scholars included Kansas under the broader rubric of the "irrepressible" national conflict over slavery. Revisionist scholars in the early 20th century, led by Kansas historian James C. Malin, a conservative, denied the need for conflict, suggested that Kansas would have become a free state even without the effort of New England antislavery settlers, and debunked the legend of John Brown. New scholarship in the 1950s on the power dynamics of land settlement further displaced the issues of slavery and sectional conflict from the center of understanding of Bleeding Kansas.  

In the 1970s-1980s, a new social and cultural history led by [[Neoabolitionist]] historians reappraised the antislavery movement - recognizing its complexity, its centrality to the creation of Kansas as a free state, and its moral concerns. Later historians have again shifted their interpretation away from issues of the Civil War toward the experience of frontier and questions of how gender and racial identities were enacted and negotiated in the process of settling Kansas.<ref> Gunja Sengupta, "Bleeding Kansas". ''Kansas History'' 2001-02 24(4): 318-341. [http://www.kshs.org/publicat/history/2001winter_sengupta.pdf online] </ref>  

In the 1970s-1980s, a new social and cultural history led by [[Neoabolitionist]] historians reappraised the antislavery movement - recognizing its complexity, its centrality to the creation of Kansas as a free state, and its moral concerns. Later historians have again shifted their interpretation away from issues of the Civil War toward the experience of frontier and questions of how gender and racial identities were enacted and negotiated in the process of settling Kansas.<ref> Gunja Sengupta, "Bleeding Kansas". ''Kansas History'' 2001-02 24(4): 318-341. [http://www.kshs.org/publicat/history/2001winter_sengupta.pdf online] </ref>

==Further reading==

==Further reading==