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Line 39: − ===India=== − A raging debate continues regarding the good-or-bad economic impact of British imperialism on India. The issue was raised by conservative leader [[Edmund Burke]] who in the 1780s vehemently attacked the East India Company, claiming that Warren Hastings and other top officials had ruined the Indian economy and society. Indian historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) continues this attack, saying the new economy brought by the British in the 18th century was a form of "plunder" and a catastrophe for the traditional economy of Mughal India. Ray accuses the British of depleting the food and money stocks and imposing high taxes that helped cause the terrible famine of 1770, which killed a third of the people of Bengal.<ref>Rajat Kanta Ray, "Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818," in ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century" ed. by P. J. Marshall, (1998), pp 508-29</ref> − − On the other hand, P. J. Marshall shows that recent scholarship has reinterpreted the received view that the prosperity of the formerly benign Mughal rule gave way to poverty, and anarchy. Marshall argues the British takeover did not make any sharp break with the past. British control was delegated largely through regional Mughal rulers and was sustained by a generally prosperous economy for the rest of the 18th century. Marshall notes the British went into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators, and kept the old Mughal rates of taxation.<ref>Professor Ray agrees that the East India Company inherited an onerous taxation system that took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators.</ref> Instead of the Indian nationalist account of the British as alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force and impoverishing all of India, Marshall presents the interpretation, supported by many scholars in both India and the West, in which the British were not in full control but instead were players in what was primarily an Indian play and in which their rise to power depended upon excellent cooperation with Indian elites. Marshall admits that much of his interpretation is still rejected by many historians working in India today, who prefer to bash the British.<ref>P.J. Marshall, "The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700-1765," in ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century" ed. by P. J. Marshall, (1998), pp 487-507</ref>
→Historic regions: slavery is not a region
===United States===
===United States===
Although American historians have always paid attention to the negative causes of the revolt by which the 13 colonies broke away from the Empire, in the early 20th century the "Imperial School," including [[Herbert L. Osgood]], [[George Louis Beer]], [[Charles M. Andrews]] and [[Lawrence Gipson]] took a highly favorable view of the benefits achieved by the economic integration of the Empire.<ref>Ian Tyrrell, "Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of Empire," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 86, No. 3, (Dec., 1999), pp. 1015-1044 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2568604 in JSTOR]</ref> For a good sample of the school see George Louis Beer, ''The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754'' (1913) [http://books.google.com/books?id=2KkJAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:george+inauthor:beer&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 full text online].
Although American historians have always paid attention to the negative causes of the revolt by which the 13 colonies broke away from the Empire, in the early 20th century the "Imperial School," including [[Herbert L. Osgood]], [[George Louis Beer]], [[Charles M. Andrews]] and [[Lawrence Gipson]] took a highly favorable view of the benefits achieved by the economic integration of the Empire.<ref>Ian Tyrrell, "Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of Empire," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 86, No. 3, (Dec., 1999), pp. 1015-1044 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2568604 in JSTOR]</ref> For a good sample of the school see George Louis Beer, ''The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754'' (1913) [http://books.google.com/books?id=2KkJAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:george+inauthor:beer&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 full text online].
===India===
A raging debate continues regarding the good-or-bad economic impact of British imperialism on India. The issue was raised by conservative leader [[Edmund Burke]] who in the 1780s vehemently attacked the East India Company, claiming that Warren Hastings and other top officials had ruined the Indian economy and society. Indian historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) continues this attack, saying the new economy brought by the British in the 18th century was a form of "plunder" and a catastrophe for the traditional economy of Mughal India. Ray accuses the British of depleting the food and money stocks and imposing high taxes that helped cause the terrible famine of 1770, which killed a third of the people of Bengal.<ref>Rajat Kanta Ray, "Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818," in ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century" ed. by P. J. Marshall, (1998), pp 508-29</ref>
On the other hand, P. J. Marshall shows that recent scholarship has reinterpreted the received view that the prosperity of the formerly benign Mughal rule gave way to poverty, and anarchy. Marshall argues the British takeover did not make any sharp break with the past. British control was delegated largely through regional Mughal rulers and was sustained by a generally prosperous economy for the rest of the 18th century. Marshall notes the British went into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators, and kept the old Mughal rates of taxation.<ref>Professor Ray agrees that the East India Company inherited an onerous taxation system that took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators.</ref> Instead of the Indian nationalist account of the British as alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force and impoverishing all of India, Marshall presents the interpretation, supported by many scholars in both India and the West, in which the British were not in full control but instead were players in what was primarily an Indian play and in which their rise to power depended upon excellent cooperation with Indian elites. Marshall admits that much of his interpretation is still rejected by many historians working in India today, who prefer to bash the British.<ref>P.J. Marshall, "The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700-1765," in ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century" ed. by P. J. Marshall, (1998), pp 487-507</ref>
==Slavery==
One of the most controversial aspects of the Empire is its role in first promoting and then ending slavery. In the 18th century British merchant ships were the largest element in the "Middle Passage" which transported millions of slaves to the Western Hemisphere. Most wound up in the Caribbean, where the Empire had highly profitable sugar colonies, and the living conditions were bad. (The plantation owners lived in Britain.) Parliament ended the the international transportation of slaves in 1807, and used the Royal Navy to enforce that ban. In 1833 it bought out the plantation owners for cash and officially banned slavery. Historians before the 1940s argued that moralistic reformers such as [[William Wilberforce]] and the Evangelical Protestants (especially Methodists) were primarily responsible.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Empire is its role in first promoting and then ending slavery. In the 18th century British merchant ships were the largest element in the "Middle Passage" which transported millions of slaves to the Western Hemisphere. Most wound up in the Caribbean, where the Empire had highly profitable sugar colonies, and the living conditions were bad. (The plantation owners lived in Britain.) Parliament ended the the international transportation of slaves in 1807, and used the Royal Navy to enforce that ban. In 1833 it bought out the plantation owners for cash and officially banned slavery. Historians before the 1940s argued that moralistic reformers such as [[William Wilberforce]] and the Evangelical Protestants (especially Methodists) were primarily responsible.
More recently historians have challenged Williams. They have shown that slavery remained profitable in the 1830s because of innovations in agriculture, so the profit motive was not central to abolition.<ref> J.R. Ward, "The British West Indies in the Age of Abolition," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 415-39.</ref> Richardson (1998) finds Williams's claims regarding the Industrial Revolution are greatly exaggerated, for profits from the slave trade amounted to less than 1% of total domestic investment in Britain. Richardson further challenges claims (by African scholars) that the slave trade caused widespread depopulation and economic distress in Africa--indeed that it caused the "underdevelopment" of Africa. Admitting the horrible suffering of the slaves themselves, he notes that many Africans benefited directly, because the first stage of the trade was always firmly in the hands of Africans. European slave ships waited at ports to purchase cargoes of people who were captured in the hinterland by African dealers and tribal leaders. Richardson finds that the "terms of trade" (how much the ship owners paid for the slave cargo) moved heavily in favor of the Africans after about 1750. That is, indigenous elites inside West and Central Africa made large and growing profits from slavery, thus increasing their wealth and power.<ref> David Richardson, "The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 440-64.</ref>
More recently historians have challenged Williams. They have shown that slavery remained profitable in the 1830s because of innovations in agriculture, so the profit motive was not central to abolition.<ref> J.R. Ward, "The British West Indies in the Age of Abolition," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 415-39.</ref> Richardson (1998) finds Williams's claims regarding the Industrial Revolution are greatly exaggerated, for profits from the slave trade amounted to less than 1% of total domestic investment in Britain. Richardson further challenges claims (by African scholars) that the slave trade caused widespread depopulation and economic distress in Africa--indeed that it caused the "underdevelopment" of Africa. Admitting the horrible suffering of the slaves themselves, he notes that many Africans benefited directly, because the first stage of the trade was always firmly in the hands of Africans. European slave ships waited at ports to purchase cargoes of people who were captured in the hinterland by African dealers and tribal leaders. Richardson finds that the "terms of trade" (how much the ship owners paid for the slave cargo) moved heavily in favor of the Africans after about 1750. That is, indigenous elites inside West and Central Africa made large and growing profits from slavery, thus increasing their wealth and power.<ref> David Richardson, "The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 440-64.</ref>
==Further reading==
==Further reading==