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==Pragmatism==

==Pragmatism==

Peirce was the creator if "Pragmatism;" it emerged from his many discussions in Cambridge at a "metaphysical club" founded in the 1870s. Most influential on peirce were [[Chauncey Wright]], a philosopher; [[William James]], Peirce's lifelong friend and benefactor; and Nicholas St. John Green, a lawyer and follower of utilitarian philosopher [[Jeremy Bentham]] who interpreted doctrines in terms of their effect upon social life. Peirce began reading philosophy and by 1871 he was converted to the version of realism originally propounded by medieval philosopher [[Duns Scotus]]. Peirce remained a realist in philosophy all his life. His first major statement appeared in ''Popular Science Monthly'' in January 1878, under the title "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."<ref> see [http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," by Charles S. Peirce; ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (January 1878), 286-302]</ref>

Peirce was the creator if "Pragmatism;" it emerged from his many discussions in Cambridge at a "metaphysical club" founded in the 1870s. Most influential on peirce were [[Chauncey Wright]], a philosopher; [[William James]], Peirce's lifelong friend and benefactor; and Nicholas St. John Green, a lawyer and follower of utilitarian philosopher [[Jeremy Bentham]] who interpreted doctrines in terms of their effect upon social life. Peirce began reading philosophy and by 1871 he was converted to the version of realism originally propounded by medieval philosopher [[Duns Scotus]]. Peirce remained a realist in philosophy all his life, eventually embracing realism not only about generals or universals but also about modalities such as possibility and necessity. His first major statement of Pragmatism appeared in ''Popular Science Monthly'' in January 1878, under the title "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."<ref> see [http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," by Charles S. Peirce; ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (January 1878), 286-302]</ref>

In 1898 William James first publicly used the term "pragmatism" and acknowledged Peirce's priority. Peirce's pragmatism, however, is not the same as James's; it has more in common with the somewhat independently developed idealism of [[Josiah Royce]] and the later views of John Dewey. Peirce shared many of the views characteristic of the pragmatic school, developing them in his own fashion. He belived in the dependence of logic on ethics, argued as early as 1868 against individualism and egoism, and developed social theories of reality and logic.  

In 1898 William James first publicly used the term "pragmatism" and acknowledged Peirce's priority. Peirce's pragmatism, however, is not the same as James's; it has more in common with the somewhat independently developed idealism of [[Josiah Royce]] and the later views of John Dewey. Peirce shared many of the views characteristic of the pragmatic school, developing them in his own fashion. He believed in the dependence of logic on ethics, argued as early as 1868 against individualism and egoism, and developed social theories of reality and logic. At the same time he believed that the development of business methods should be left to business without law's interference.<ref>See the 1910 quote from Peirce in the third section of "Pragmatism and American Democracy: An Elective Affinity Analysis" by Norbert Wiley, presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings, 2003, [http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/pragmatism/wiley_pragma_demo.html online edition].</ref> He believed and argued that logic precedes metaphysics, and that metaphysicians failing to appreciate that precedence have always barred the way to inquiry.<ref>See for example "F.R.L." (First Rule of Logic), 1899 manuscript, not to be confused with another piece given that title. Published in ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'' vol. 1, paragraphs 135-140, [http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm online edition].</ref>

Peirce held that a conception's meaning is general and does not boil down to its actual consequences (or "cash value") but consists in the conceived object's ''conceivable'' practical consequences. He disagreed with other Pragmatists over what he called their "angry hatred of strict logic" and their views that, among other things, "truth is mutable" and "infinity is unreal".<ref>Peirce, C.S. (1908), "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", ''Hibbert Journal'' vol. 7, pp. 90-112. Reprinted in ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'' vol. 6, paragraphs 452-485 and ''The Essential Peirce'' vol. 2, pp.434-450.</ref>.  

Peirce held that a conception's meaning is general and does not boil down to its actual consequences (or "cash value") but consists in the conceived object's ''conceivable'' practical consequences. He disagreed with other Pragmatists over what he called their "angry hatred of strict logic" and their views that, among other things, "truth is mutable" and "infinity is unreal".<ref>Peirce, C.S. (1908), "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", ''Hibbert Journal'' vol. 7, pp. 90-112. Reprinted in ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'' vol. 6, paragraphs 452-485 and ''The Essential Peirce'' vol. 2, pp.434-450.</ref>.

Pragmatism allows ideas to have any origin; what matters is not where we got an idea from but where we can go with it. In the case of science the usefulness of an idea includes reliability and fruitfulness. "Fruitfulness" does not mean practical utility but, rather, the opening up of original lines of successful research.As reliability is to truth, so fruitfulness is to depth and breadth of understanding. The test of truth and fruitfulness lies in the future. Truth, for the pragmatist, depends on our developing the implications of ideas so that we can find ways of applying them experimentally.<ref> See Short (2001)</ref>

Pragmatism allows ideas to have any origin; what matters is not where we got an idea from but where we can go with it. In the case of science the usefulness of an idea includes reliability and fruitfulness. "Fruitfulness" does not mean practical utility but, rather, the opening up of original lines of successful research, what mathematicians nowadays call fecundity. As reliability is to truth, so fruitfulness is to depth and breadth of understanding. The test of truth and fruitfulness lies in the future. Truth, for the pragmatist, depends on our developing the implications of ideas so that we can find ways of applying them experimentally.<ref> See Short (2001)</ref>

==Further reading==

==Further reading==