Changes

===Sending nuclear weapons===

===Sending nuclear weapons===

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref> James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions--including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.  

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref> James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions--including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]

 

 

Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.  

==Intelligence failure and response==

==Intelligence failure and response==

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles--and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles--and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>