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| | ==Civil War== | | ==Civil War== |
| − | * [[American Civil War]] | + | * [[American Civil War homefront]] |
| | * [[Confederate States of America]] | | * [[Confederate States of America]] |
| − | * [[William Seward]]
| + | The only hope for Confederate victory in the [[American Civil War homefront|Civil War]] was military intervention by Britain and France. It was a serious possibility if British or French leaders thought it was to their long-term advantage to have two antagonistic powers in North America to neutralize each other. |
| | + | ===France=== |
| | + | Paris was building an empire in Mexico, with its puppet "Emperor" Maximilian propped up by French bayonets. Washington saw this as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but avoided any confrontation until the war was over.<ref> After Appomattox, Washington sent tens of thousands of battle-hardened troops to the Mexican border. Paris finally pulled out; the Mexicans shot Maximilian. Richmond tolerated the French aggression. If somehow the Confederacy had become independent, it would have faced powerful enemies to its north and its south. </ref> The French navy was building up ironclad strength, but not as fast as the US Navy. Furthermore, the French people would never support such a war with the US, and if one broke out France might be attacked by Prussia (as happened in 1870). France would not move alone, but it would join Britain in a war. London, however, realized that the British people would never support such a war. Furthermore, the long-term economic prosperity of Britain depended on friendly commercial and financial ties with the US. Idle speculation about intervention always came crashing into the bottom line: Washington would declare war immediately on any nation that so much as exchanged ambassadors with Richmond. Not one nation did so; Confederate diplomats had only deuces to play.<ref> Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, ''The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy'' (1970)</ref> |
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| | + | ===Crisis with Britain: the Trent Affair=== |
| | + | A grave blunder by the United States almost precipitated war with Britain in late 1861. On November 7, a US Navy warship under command of hotheaded Captain Charles Wilkes, intercepted on the high seas the "Trent," a British merchant ship steam making a routine run from Havana. After firing a shot across the bow, Wilkes sent heavily armed Marines aboard and seized two passengers aboard, James Mason and John Slidell, the Confederate ambassadors to London and Paris. Wilkes released the ship but took the prisoners to Boston, where he received a jubilant welcome as the hero of the hour. The seizure was a clear violation of Britain's rights as a neutral, and London protested vehemently. More practically, it drew up war plans, mobilized the Royal Navy, and sent 13,000 regulars to Canada. British strategists realized that in a war with the US, Canada would be quickly captured. The regiments were sent as a gesture, and as an indication Britain would win Canada back at the peace conference. The large, well-trained Royal Navy, now being rebuilt around heavily armed ironclads, was ready for a major fleet battle, as the American blockade squadrons were not. Should war break out, the British fleet would swoop down on the blockaders and sink or capture them. After that the fleet would sail into New York harbor and either capture Manhattan or at least close down the leading American city. New York could then be traded for Canada at the peace conference. The British war plans had a reasonable chance of success, especially if the French joined in.<ref> |
| | + | Kenneth Bourne, "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862," ''English Historical Review'', Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/558199 in JSTOR]</ref> Their capabilities made known, the British invited Washington to negotiate the release of Mason and Slidell. Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward saw the danger. Thanks to the intervention of Queen Victoria's husband, a showdown was avoided. Although the seizure of the rebel diplomats had been wildly hailed in the States as a naval triumph and a tweak of the lion's tail, they were released and an apology was given London. The war scare passed.<ref> Howard Jones, ''Union in Peril: The Crisis Over British Intervention in the Civil War'' (1992); Charles Francis Adams, "The Trent Affair," ''American Historical Review'', Vol. 17, No. 3 (Apr., 1912), pp. 540-562 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1834388 in JSTOR] </ref> |
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| | + | By 1862 it was clear that the Confederates were on the defensive. The announcement of the "Emancipation Proclamation" by Lincoln in September, 1862, made the end of slavery an explicit war goal, and ruined any Confederate hopes of intervention from Europe. |
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| | + | The Confederates did manage to purchase warships from neutral Britain and use them to destroy much of the U.S. merchant marine. Britain violated its neutrality in so doing. The US held Britain accountable after the war, and arbitration gave the US a large cash award of $15 million for the damage done. |
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| | ==Late 19th Century== | | ==Late 19th Century== |