Changes

Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>  

Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>  

Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his  generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a [[combined arms]] formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for [[military synchronization|synchronizing]] operations, than had previous military commanders.

Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his  generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.

His failure in [[Russia]] was due primarily to his bad logistical planning, a blunder historians have been unable to explain. In battle he paid close attention to the overall picture, but left the critical decisions to his marshals. He rarely issued detailed guidance on corps level tactical employment; instead he devised the overall battle plans, and directed the combined attacks of infantry, cavalry reserves, and massed batteries of guns. Since he was simultaneously head of the government, he integrated the military, political and diplomatic dimensions. He was an accurate judge of his opponents, except that is for Britain and Russia. He could never be at peace with Britain; with Russia he let his need for diplomatic prestige overcome his military judgment.

His spectacular failure in [[Russia]] in 1812 was due primarily to his bad logistical planning, a blunder historians have been unable to explain. In battle he paid close attention to the overall picture, but left the critical decisions to his marshals. He rarely issued detailed guidance on corps level tactical employment; instead he devised the overall battle plans, and directed the combined attacks of infantry, cavalry reserves, and massed batteries of guns. Since he was simultaneously head of the government, he integrated the military, political and diplomatic dimensions. He was an accurate judge of his opponents, except that is for Britain and Russia. He could never be at peace with Britain; with Russia he let his need for diplomatic prestige overcome his military judgment.

===Austerlitz, 1805===

===Austerlitz, 1805===