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In this context, piety and holiness are interchangable with virtue or goodness.

In this context, piety and holiness are interchangable with virtue or goodness.

Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the god's love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good because the gods love it.

Socrates is asking Euthyphro whether: (a) the gods love something because it is good, or (b) whether the object is good [[Divine command theory|because the gods love it]].

If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence.

If we take (a) to be true, then the gods are unnecessary, because the object would be good regardless of their existence.

If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity is what happens when the gods change their minds and then declare the opposite to be immoral: an exaggerated example is if murder was declared holy and just. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things, and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.

If we take (b) to be true, then we have two problems: that of continuity and that of arbitrariness. The problem of continuity is what happens when the gods change their minds and then declare the opposite to be immoral: an exaggerated example is if murder was declared holy and just. The problem of arbitrariness states that the gods just selected some random things, and then declared them holy for no real moral reason (as morality wouldn't exist until they did); this obviously raises the question about whether the random things they selected to be holy were really the best things for humanity.