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Line 146: + + − − During pre-conference preparations, according to Stettinius, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," stressing the U.S. wanted the Chinese government to reach an accommodation with the [[USSR|Soviet]]-backed [[Communist]] rebels in that country.<ref> Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229.</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in the secret Yalta agreement giving Stalin control of the Southern Manchurian Railroad, or the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but testified that after "about February 1944, I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html that field thereafter]." In the end, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving the Soviets Japanese territory, as well as economic rights in Manchuria.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref>
→Yalta: moved paragraph
According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>Anatoli Sudoplatov, Pavel Sudoplatov, Leona P. Schecter and Jerrold L. Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=lt8FHQAACAAJ Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster]'' (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995) ISBN 0316821152, p. 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M2pbieYYHrYC Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History]''(Washington: Potomac Books Inc., 2002) ISBN 1574883275, p. 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:
According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>Anatoli Sudoplatov, Pavel Sudoplatov, Leona P. Schecter and Jerrold L. Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=lt8FHQAACAAJ Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster]'' (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995) ISBN 0316821152, p. 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M2pbieYYHrYC Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History]''(Washington: Potomac Books Inc., 2002) ISBN 1574883275, p. 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:
{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the revolution and the West: a political biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>Anatoli Sudoplatov, Pavel Sudoplatov, Leona P. Schecter and Jerrold L. Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=lt8FHQAACAAJ Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster]'' (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995) ISBN 0316821152, p. 227</ref>}}
{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the revolution and the West: a political biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>Anatoli Sudoplatov, Pavel Sudoplatov, Leona P. Schecter and Jerrold L. Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=lt8FHQAACAAJ Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster]'' (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995) ISBN 0316821152, p. 227</ref>}}
During pre-conference preparations, according to Stettinius, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," stressing the U.S. wanted the Chinese government to reach an accommodation with the [[USSR|Soviet]]-backed [[Communist]] rebels in that country.<ref> Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229.</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in the secret Yalta agreement giving Stalin control of the Southern Manchurian Railroad, or the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but testified that after "about February 1944, I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html that field thereafter]." In the end, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving the Soviets Japanese territory, as well as economic rights in Manchuria.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref>
When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>Gregor Dallas, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=LXdVF6LmTa8C 1945: The War That Never Ended]'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) ISBN 0300109806, p. 557</ref> essentially ratifying the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/NonAggressionPact.pdf secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56</ref>
When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>Gregor Dallas, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=LXdVF6LmTa8C 1945: The War That Never Ended]'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) ISBN 0300109806, p. 557</ref> essentially ratifying the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/NonAggressionPact.pdf secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56</ref>
Another [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/mar/24/yalta-and-potsdam-agreements-publication secret agreement]<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the communiqué" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would being their two delegations [''Sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unationsday/docs/hiss13february11october90.pdf Alger Hiss on the Founding of the UN] (Yale UN Oral History Project), p. 18 (PDF p. 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S., and [http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp forced "repatriation"] of refugees for [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lubini.htm slave] [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf labor] or death in the [[Soviet]] [[Gulag]].<ref>Nikolai Tolstoy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=u-dvAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 The Secret Betrayal]'' (New York: Scribner, 1978) ISBN 0684156350; Julius Epstein, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=_3kNAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present]'' (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair Co., 1973) ISBN 978-0815964070</ref> The complete text of all the agreements was [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not disclosed] until 1947. Asked if he had "drafted or participated in the drafting" of parts of the Yalta agreement, Hiss would testify, "I think it is accurate and not an immodest statement to say that [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html I did to some extent, yes]."
Another [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/mar/24/yalta-and-potsdam-agreements-publication secret agreement]<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the communiqué" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would being their two delegations [''Sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unationsday/docs/hiss13february11october90.pdf Alger Hiss on the Founding of the UN] (Yale UN Oral History Project), p. 18 (PDF p. 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S., and [http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp forced "repatriation"] of refugees for [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lubini.htm slave] [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf labor] or death in the [[Soviet]] [[Gulag]].<ref>Nikolai Tolstoy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=u-dvAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 The Secret Betrayal]'' (New York: Scribner, 1978) ISBN 0684156350; Julius Epstein, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=_3kNAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present]'' (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair Co., 1973) ISBN 978-0815964070</ref> The complete text of all the agreements was [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not disclosed] until 1947. Asked if he had "drafted or participated in the drafting" of parts of the Yalta agreement, Hiss would testify, "I think it is accurate and not an immodest statement to say that [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html I did to some extent, yes]."