| | As historian Gerhard Ritter has argued, the East German state was historically defined by two dominant forces - Soviet Communism and German traditions filtered through the interwar experiences of German Communists - always constrained by the magnet of the increasingly prosperous West. The Communist transformation was strongest in industry, agriculture, the militarization of society, and most of the educational system, while the science-engineering professions, the churches, and even petty-bourgeois traditions preserved niches. Social policy, which became a critical legitimization tool in the last decades, mixed Communist and traditional elements about equally. | | As historian Gerhard Ritter has argued, the East German state was historically defined by two dominant forces - Soviet Communism and German traditions filtered through the interwar experiences of German Communists - always constrained by the magnet of the increasingly prosperous West. The Communist transformation was strongest in industry, agriculture, the militarization of society, and most of the educational system, while the science-engineering professions, the churches, and even petty-bourgeois traditions preserved niches. Social policy, which became a critical legitimization tool in the last decades, mixed Communist and traditional elements about equally. |
| | + | Danish historian Feiwel Kupferberg (2002) shows the rigid communist system in the GDR inculcated passivity, helplessness, and amoral pragmatism in its citizens. By depriving them of individual freedoms--such as freedom of creative expression and freedom to travel and to learn-- the Communist system relieved citizens of individual responsibility and necessary risk-taking. They were trained to look to external sources for cradle-to-grave security. Indeed, many came to think of their narrow security blanket as a better system. |