Changes

===Yalta===

===Yalta===

On New Year's Day, 1945, Stettinius told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=mVpWH51F7toC The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors]'' (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001) ISBN 0895262258, p. 212; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=9TWUAQ7Xof8C The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB'' (New York: Basic Books, 2000), ISBN 046500312, p. 111</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conference" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messers. Bowman and [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif Alger Hiss ought to go]." "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]] ("a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" according to the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]),<ref>Senate Judiciary Committee, Report: [http://ia360610.us.archive.org/0/items/instituteofpacif1952unit/instituteofpacif1952unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 214-218 (PDF pp. 222-226)</ref> whose "intimate friend and patron at the [[White House]]" was [http://www.salon.com/news/col/horo/1999/12/06/weisberg/index3.html Soviet spy] [[Lauchlin Currie]].

On New Year's Day, 1945, [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=mVpWH51F7toC The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors]'' (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001) ISBN 0895262258, p. 212; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=9TWUAQ7Xof8C The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB'' (New York: Basic Books, 2000), ISBN 046500312, p. 111</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conference" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messers. Bowman and [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif Alger Hiss ought to go]." "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]] ("a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" according to the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]),<ref>Senate Judiciary Committee, Report: [http://ia360610.us.archive.org/0/items/instituteofpacif1952unit/instituteofpacif1952unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 214-218 (PDF pp. 222-226)</ref> whose "intimate friend and patron at the [[White House]]" was [http://www.salon.com/news/col/horo/1999/12/06/weisberg/index3.html Soviet spy] [[Lauchlin Currie]].

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly]. With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/22491229/The-Yalta-Myth larger quarters].</ref>

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly]. With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/22491229/The-Yalta-Myth larger quarters].</ref>

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.], who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page63.html aide], the [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/pumpkinp.html brilliant] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, June 25, 1953 [http://ia311318.us.archive.org/0/items/interlockingsubv13unit/interlockingsubv13unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Part 13] (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 853. (Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287) Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. (Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate [http://ia360635.us.archive.org/3/items/interlockingsubv1953unit/interlockingsubv1953unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments] [Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953], pp. 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss] not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, United States Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945.p0124&isize=XL&q1=January%2010,%201945 p. 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441] (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections)</ref>

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page63.html aide], the [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/pumpkinp.html brilliant] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, June 25, 1953 [http://ia311318.us.archive.org/0/items/interlockingsubv13unit/interlockingsubv13unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Part 13] (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 853. (Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287) Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. (Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate [http://ia360635.us.archive.org/3/items/interlockingsubv1953unit/interlockingsubv1953unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments] [Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953], pp. 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss] not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, United States Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945.p0124&isize=XL&q1=January%2010,%201945 p. 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441] (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections)</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. United States Department of State, ''[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 p. 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interest in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present. The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>"No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war," reported General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China]. "Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' [Holt, 1958], p. 285) "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," writes Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line." (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211) Indeed, in May 1945, an OSS team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..." (Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' [Yale University Press, 1997] ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223) Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White&mdash;to whom [[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]] confided (in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]): "A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles" (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])&mdash;would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died." (Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. United States Department of State, ''[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 p. 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interest in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present. The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>"No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war," reported General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China]. "Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' [Holt, 1958], p. 285) "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," writes Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line." (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211) Indeed, in May 1945, an OSS team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..." (Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' [Yale University Press, 1997] ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223) Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White&mdash;to whom [[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]] confided (in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]): "A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles" (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])&mdash;would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died." (Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>