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During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. United States Department of State, ''[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 p. 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interest in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present. The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 3) "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war," reported General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China]. "Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' [Holt, 1958], p. 285) "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese.... He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line." (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211) Indeed, in May 1945, an OSS team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..." (Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' [Yale University Press, 1997] ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223) Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White&mdash;to whom [[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]] confided (in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]): "A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles" (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])&mdash;would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died." (Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=v9N3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 The Diaries of Edward R Stettinius Jr , 1943-1946]'', edited by Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), ISBN 0531055701, p. 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss' role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. United States Department of State, ''[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 p. 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interest in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present. The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?1c1d76bb-290c-447b-82dd-e295ff0d3d59 catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://www.harpercollins.com/harperimages/ommoverride/teacher_guide_wild_swans.pdf member of Mao's Red Guards]. (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 3) "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war," reported General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China]. "Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' [Holt, 1958], p. 285) "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese.... He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line." (Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' [Jonathan Cape, 2005] ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211) Indeed, in May 1945, an OSS team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..." (Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' [Yale University Press, 1997] ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223) Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White&mdash;to whom [[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]] confided (in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]): "A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles" (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])&mdash;would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died." (Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html specialized entirely] in that field thereafter."

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html specialized entirely] in that field thereafter."

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. He served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page63.html aide], the [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/pumpkinp.html brilliant] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, June 25, 1953 [http://ia311318.us.archive.org/0/items/interlockingsubv13unit/interlockingsubv13unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Part 13] (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 853. (Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287) Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. (Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate [http://ia360635.us.archive.org/3/items/interlockingsubv1953unit/interlockingsubv1953unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments] [Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953], pp. 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss] not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, United States Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945.p0124&isize=XL&q1=January%2010,%201945 p. 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441] (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections)</ref>

On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. He served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page63.html aide], the [http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/pumpkinp.html brilliant] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, June 25, 1953 [http://ia311318.us.archive.org/0/items/interlockingsubv13unit/interlockingsubv13unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Part 13] (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 853. (Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287) Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. (Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate [http://ia360635.us.archive.org/3/items/interlockingsubv1953unit/interlockingsubv1953unit_bw.pdf Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments] [Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953], pp. 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss] not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, United States Department of State, ''[http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1945 Foreign Relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945]'' (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945.p0124&isize=XL&q1=January%2010,%201945 p. 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441] (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections)</ref>