Changes

World War II (1939-45) was fought on land sea and air across the globe. This article concerns the war waged by the major air forces.

World War II (1939-45) was fought on land, sea and air across the globe. This article concerns the war waged by the major air forces.

[[File:B-29.jpg|thumb|300px|The B-29 en route to Japan]]

[[File:B-29.jpg|thumb|300px|A B-29 en route to Japan]]

[[Image:Ww2-stuka.jpg|thumb|left|250px|Ju-87, the Junkers 87 (Stuka) Dive Bomber; Germany built 5800 of them]]

[[Image:Ww2-stuka.jpg|thumb|left|250px|Ju-87, the Junkers 87 (Stuka) Dive Bomber; Germany built 5800 of them]]

The '''[[Luftwaffe]]''' was the German Air Force, 1933-45. The pride of [[Nazi Germany]] under its bombastic leader Hermann Goering, it learned new combat techniques in the Spanish Civil War and appealed to Hitler as the decisive strategic weapon he needed. Its high technology and rapid growth led to exaggerated fears in the 1930s that cowed the British and French into appeasement. In the war the Luftwaffe performed well in 1939-41, as its Stuka dive bombers terrified enemy infantry units. But the Luftwaffe was poorly coordinated with overall German strategy, and never ramped up to the size and scope needed in a total war. It never built large bombers, was deficient in [[radar]], and could not deal with the faster, more agile [[P-51 Mustang]] pursuit planes after 1943. The Luftwaffe was narrowly defeated in the great [[Battle of Britain]] (1940), and reached maximum size pf 1.9 million airmen in 1942. Grueling operations wasted it away on the eastern front after 1942. It lost most of its fighter planes to Mustangs in 1944 while trying to defend against massive American and British air raids.  

The '''[[Luftwaffe]]''' was the name of the German Air Force during the Nazi era (1933-45). The pride of [[Nazi Germany]] under its bombastic leader Hermann Goering, it learned new combat techniques in the Spanish Civil War and was seen by Hitler as the decisive strategic weapon he needed. Its advanced technology and rapid growth led to exaggerated fears in the 1930s that cowed the British and French into appeasement. In the war the Luftwaffe performed well in 1939-41, as its Stuka dive bombers terrified enemy infantry units. But the Luftwaffe was poorly coordinated with overall German strategy, and never ramped up to the size and scope needed in a total war. It never built large bombers, was deficient in [[radar]], and could not deal with the faster, more agile [[P-51 Mustang]] pursuit planes after 1943. The Luftwaffe was narrowly defeated in the great [[Battle of Britain]] (1940), and reached maximum size pf 1.9 million airmen in 1942. Grueling operations wasted it away on the eastern front after 1942. It lost most of its fighter planes to Mustangs in 1944 while trying to defend against massive American and British air raids.  

When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.  By 1944 it operated 39,000 flak batteries staffed with a million people in uniform, both men and women.

When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.  By 1944 it operated 39,000 flak batteries staffed with a million people in uniform, both men and women.

The Luftwaffe lacked the bomber forces for strategic bombing, because it did not think such bombing was worth it.  They did attempt some startegic bombing in the east.  Their one success was destroying an airbase at Poltava, Russia, which housed 43 new B-17 bombers and a million tons of aviation fuel.<ref> Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich at War'' (2009) 436-7</ref>

The Luftwaffe lacked the bomber forces for strategic bombing, because it did not think such bombing was worth it.  They did attempt some strategic bombing in the east.  Their one success was destroying an airbase at Poltava, Russia, which housed 43 new B-17 bombers and a million tons of aviation fuel.<ref> Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich at War'' (2009) 436-7</ref>

==Air Power and Britain==

==Air Power and Britain==

===Strategic bombing===

===Strategic bombing===

The British had their own very well developed theory of strategic bombing, and built the long-range bombers to implement it. Before 1944, however, the main German industrial targets were out of range, so the RAF bombers concentrated on military and transportation targets in France and Belgium.

The British had their own very well-developed theory of strategic bombing, and built the long-range bombers to implement it. Before 1944, however, the main German industrial targets were out of range, so the RAF bombers concentrated on military and transportation targets in France and Belgium.

===The Invasion of Britain===

===The Invasion of Britain===

The [[Battle of Britain]] was not the totality of German air operations against Britain, but it was of utter strategic significance after the fall of France. Germany believed that it could defeat Britain only by physical invasion, codenamed [[Operation Sea Lion]].  The British Army rescued its soldiers at Dunkink but lost most of its equipment and weapons, and was no match for the fully equipped German army.

The [[Battle of Britain]] was not the totality of German air operations against Britain, but it was of utter strategic significance after the fall of France. Germany believed that it could defeat Britain only by physical invasion, codenamed [[Operation Sea Lion]].  The British Army rescued its soldiers at Dunkink but lost most of its equipment and weapons, and was no match for the fully equipped German army.

:Never, in the course of human events, have so many, owed so much, to so few.

:Never, in the course of human events, have so many, owed so much, to so few.

But it was misleading. The Battle of Britain was won by hundreds of thousands of factors workers, mechanics, engineers. technicians, radar operators, generals and colonels, sergeants and privates, and not merely the heroic RAF pilots.

But it was misleading. The Battle of Britain was won by hundreds of thousands of factory workers, mechanics, engineers, technicians, radar operators, generals and colonels, sergeants and privates, and not merely the heroic RAF pilots.

==Air Power and U.S.==  

==Air Power and U.S.==  

The stunning success of the Luftwaffe's Stuka dive bombers in the blitzkriegs that shattered Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, proved to civilians that air power would dominate the battlefield, leaving the infantry far behind. The US Army was reluctant to draw that conclusion, but it was dumbfounded by the performance of the Stukas acting as a highly mobile, highly effective strike force--a super artillery. To defend against the Luftwaffe the Army decided to vastly expand the anti-aircraft units provided by the otherwise obsolete Coast Artillery branch. Airmen retorted the only solution was to build better planes that would shoot the Stukas down and gain control of the air. Airmen felt strongly that only they understood the enormous potential of air power, and that their vision was being held back. They dreamed of complete independence, noting that Germany's Luftwaffe and Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) had long been disentangled from the old-fashioned, narrow-minded mud soldiers. The American people, enthusiastic about aviation in exact proportion to their fear of high-casualty trench warfare, and their love affair with modern technology, had long been supportive of a well-funded, independent air force. President Roosevelt sided with public opinion and the aviators. In 1940 he vowed to build 50,000 airplanes a year, far more than the most starry-eyed aviator had ever imagined. He gave command of the Navy to an aviator, Admiral Ernest King, with a mandate for an aviation-oriented war in the Pacific.<ref> FDR allowed King to build up land-based naval and Marine aviation, and seize control of the long-range bombers used in antisubmarine patrols in the Atlantic. </ref> Roosevelt basically agreed with Robert Lovett, the civilian Assistant Secretary of War for Air, who argued, "While I don't go so far as to claim that air power alone will win the war, I do claim the war will not be won without it."<ref>  Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684837714/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=claim+that+air+power&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made'' (1997) p. 203 online] </ref>  

The stunning success of the Luftwaffe's Stuka dive bombers in the blitzkriegs that shattered Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, proved to civilians that air power would dominate the battlefield, leaving the infantry far behind. The US Army was reluctant to draw that conclusion, but it was dumbfounded by the performance of the Stukas acting as a highly mobile, highly effective strike force--a super artillery. To defend against the Luftwaffe the Army decided to vastly expand the anti-aircraft units provided by the otherwise obsolete Coast Artillery branch. Airmen retorted the only solution was to build better planes that would shoot the Stukas down and gain control of the air. Airmen felt strongly that only they understood the enormous potential of air power, and that their vision was being held back. They dreamed of complete independence, noting that Germany's Luftwaffe and Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) had long been disentangled from the old-fashioned, narrow-minded mud soldiers. The American people, enthusiastic about aviation in exact proportion to their fear of high-casualty trench warfare, and their love affair with modern technology, had long been supportive of a well-funded, independent air force. President Roosevelt sided with public opinion and the aviators. In 1940 he vowed to build 50,000 airplanes a year, far more than the most starry-eyed aviator had ever imagined. He gave command of the Navy to an aviator, Admiral Ernest King, with a mandate for an aviation-oriented war in the Pacific.<ref> FDR allowed King to build up land-based naval and Marine aviation, and seize control of the long-range bombers used in antisubmarine patrols in the Atlantic. </ref> Roosevelt basically agreed with Robert Lovett, the civilian Assistant Secretary of War for Air, who argued, "While I don't go so far as to claim that air power alone will win the war, I do claim the war will not be won without it."<ref>  Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684837714/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=claim+that+air+power&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made'' (1997) p. 203 online] </ref>