Changes

During the early war years, Service and Adler wrote favorable reports on the [[Kuomintang]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]], which were keeping the Japanese busy, so they could not attack the Soviet Union. But once the defeat of Japan became likely, Soviet policy shifted to hostility toward the Chinese government, and support for the Communist rebels seeking to overthrow it. Service began an increasingly harsh series of attacks on the Nationalist government as "fascist," "undemocratic," and "feudal,"<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 577, 592, 1015</ref> while praising the Communists as "progressive" and "democratic."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', January 26, 1970, pp. 406, 410, 577, 579, 589, 1014</ref> In one memo, he called the government "politically bankrupt" and wrote, "The Communists are in China to stay and China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs."<ref>''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', pp. 113, 112</ref>

During the early war years, Service and Adler wrote favorable reports on the [[Kuomintang]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]], which were keeping the Japanese busy, so they could not attack the Soviet Union. But once the defeat of Japan became likely, Soviet policy shifted to hostility toward the Chinese government, and support for the Communist rebels seeking to overthrow it. Service began an increasingly harsh series of attacks on the Nationalist government as "fascist," "undemocratic," and "feudal,"<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 577, 592, 1015</ref> while praising the Communists as "progressive" and "democratic."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', January 26, 1970, pp. 406, 410, 577, 579, 589, 1014</ref> In one memo, he called the government "politically bankrupt" and wrote, "The Communists are in China to stay and China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs."<ref>''[http://books.google.com/books?id=FK8iAAAAMAAJ The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China]'', pp. 113, 112</ref>

Service and his Soviet agent roommate Adler wrote that the Communists were doing most of the fighting against the Japanese, while the Nationalists were sitting out the war or actually collaborating.<ref>Edward M. Collins, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YRa3Y2m_wrwC Myth, Manifesto, Meltdown: Communist Strategy, 1848-1991]'' (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998) ISBN 0275959384, p. 93</ref> For example, Adler reported (attributing information to Service): "The Communists have successfully resisted the Japanese for seven years... with no active support from Chungking."<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, pp. 99-106</ref> In contrast, General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China] reported: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war.... Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat."<ref>Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' (Holt, 1958), p. 285</ref> "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," agreed Jung Chang, a former member of Mao's Red Guards. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line."<ref>Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' (Jonathan Cape, 2005) ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211</ref> Indeed, in May 1945, an [[OSS]] team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..."<ref>Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' (Yale University Press, 1997) ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223</ref> Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White<ref>[[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]], head of the [[Communist front]] [[American Russian Institute]] confided to White&mdash;in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]&mdash;"A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles." (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])</ref> would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died."<ref>Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

Service and his Soviet agent roommate Adler wrote that the Communists were doing most of the fighting against the Japanese, while the Nationalists were sitting out the war or actually collaborating.<ref>Edward M. Collins, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YRa3Y2m_wrwC Myth, Manifesto, Meltdown: Communist Strategy, 1848-1991]'' (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998) ISBN 0275959384, p. 93</ref> For example, Adler reported (attributing information to Service): "The Communists have successfully resisted the Japanese for seven years... with no active support from Chungking."<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tQt3AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9, pp. 99-106</ref> In contrast, General Albert Wedemeyer, [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html commander of American forces in China] reported: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war.... Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat."<ref>Albert C. Wedemeyer, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=64s_HgAACAAJ Wedemeyer Reports]'' (Holt, 1958), p. 285</ref> "[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," agreed Jung Chang, a former member of Mao's Red Guards. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line."<ref>Jung Chang, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3EZwAAAAMAAJ Mao: The Unknown Story]'' (Jonathan Cape, 2005) ISBN 0-224-07126-2, p. 211</ref> Indeed, in May 1945, an [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..."<ref>Maochun Yu, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=NJcolGHWfzoC OSS in China]'' (Yale University Press, 1997) ISBN 0300066988, pp. 220-223</ref> Even so [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0508&week=b&msg=TnHrvJBDZ3%2buWcV2D1Mwgw&user=&pw= ardent a pro-Communist] as Theodore White<ref>[[Edward C. Carter|Edward Carter]], head of the [[Communist front]] [[American Russian Institute]] confided to White&mdash;in the midst of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]&mdash;"A trusted member of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in [[Wall Street]] or in [[Jewish]] circles." (Edward C. Carter to Theodore H. White, January 8, 1940 [FBI file: [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR54.11.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol. 54, Sec. 11], PDF p. 120])</ref> would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died."<ref>Theodore Harold White, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=ipdPd6kY7XwC Thunder out of China]'' [Da Capo Press, 1980] ISBN 0306801280, p. 210)</ref>

On July 30, 1944 Service wrote, "...the [[Communist]]s base their policy toward the [[Kuomintang]] on a real desire for democracy in [[China]] under which there can be orderly [[economic]] growth through a stage of private enterprise to eventual [[socialism]] without the need of [[violent]] social upheaval and [[revolution]]." <ref>E. J. Kahn, Jr., ''The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them'', New York, 1972, pg. 118.</ref>

On July 30, 1944 Service wrote, "...the [[Communist]]s base their policy toward the [[Kuomintang]] on a real desire for democracy in [[China]] under which there can be orderly [[economic]] growth through a stage of private enterprise to eventual [[socialism]] without the need of [[violent]] social upheaval and [[revolution]]." <ref>E. J. Kahn, Jr., ''The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them'', New York, 1972, pg. 118.</ref>

He also visited the Washington headquarters of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]], which would be identified by the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] as "a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives."<ref>Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, [http://ia360610.us.archive.org/0/items/instituteofpacif1952unit/instituteofpacif1952unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 225</ref> FBI surveillance recorded that Service then met with the [[Communist]]<ref>Philip Jaffe, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YTUPGQAACAAJ The Amerasia Case from 1945 to the Present]'' (New York: Philip J. Jaffe, 1979), p. 1</ref> Philip Jaffe on April 19, 1945 at D.C.'s Statler Hotel, reporting: "Service, according to the microphone surveillance, apparently gave Jaffe a document which dealt with matters the Chinese had furnished to the United States government in confidence."<ref>Report of the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, 1950, appendix, p. 2051</ref>

He also visited the Washington headquarters of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]], which would be identified by the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] as "a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives."<ref>Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, [http://ia360610.us.archive.org/0/items/instituteofpacif1952unit/instituteofpacif1952unit_bw.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 225</ref> FBI surveillance recorded that Service then met with the [[Communist]]<ref>Philip Jaffe, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=YTUPGQAACAAJ The Amerasia Case from 1945 to the Present]'' (New York: Philip J. Jaffe, 1979), p. 1</ref> Philip Jaffe on April 19, 1945 at D.C.'s Statler Hotel, reporting: "Service, according to the microphone surveillance, apparently gave Jaffe a document which dealt with matters the Chinese had furnished to the United States government in confidence."<ref>Report of the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, 1950, appendix, p. 2051</ref>

After [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) and FBI investigators broke into in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'', finding hundreds of government documents, many labeled "secret," "top secret," or "confidential,"<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 131</ref> Service was arrested as a suspect. FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] later wrote, "in the event I had been asked at the time the arrests were made whether I thought we had an airtight case, I would have stated that I thought we had. Further, if I were asked today, I would have to so state."<ref>FBI Director J. Edgar [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Hoover%20to%20Ford%20-%2005.4.50.pdf Hoover to Peyton Ford], Assistant to the Attorney General, re Philip Jacob Jaffe, was., et al., Espionage, May 4, 1950 (FBI file: Amerasia, Section 54)</ref>

After [[OSS]] and FBI investigators broke into in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'', finding hundreds of government documents, many labeled "secret," "top secret," or "confidential,"<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 131</ref> Service was arrested as a suspect. FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] later wrote, "in the event I had been asked at the time the arrests were made whether I thought we had an airtight case, I would have stated that I thought we had. Further, if I were asked today, I would have to so state."<ref>FBI Director J. Edgar [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Hoover%20to%20Ford%20-%2005.4.50.pdf Hoover to Peyton Ford], Assistant to the Attorney General, re Philip Jacob Jaffe, was., et al., Espionage, May 4, 1950 (FBI file: Amerasia, Section 54)</ref>

In the wake of the arrests, the Soviet agent [[Lauchlin Currie|Currie]] told New Deal "fixer" [[Thomas Corcoran]] he wanted the charges against Service dropped.<ref>Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=mVpWH51F7toC The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors]'' (Regnery Publishing, 2001) ISBN 0895262258, p. 168</ref> An FBI wire tap then caught "[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_v19/ai_4696995/ Tommy the Cork]"<ref>David McKean, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=RlV3AAAAMAAJ Tommy the Cork: Washington's Ultimate Insider from Roosevelt to Reagan]'' (Steerforth Press, 2004) ISBN 1586420682</ref> trying to "throw a monkey wrench into the ''Amerasia'' prosecution,"<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 112</ref> in the form of a "political fix."<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 125</ref> One FBI memorandum, under the heading "Political Manipulations," citing "technical surveillance on the offices of Thomas J. Corcoran," reported:

In the wake of the arrests, the Soviet agent [[Lauchlin Currie|Currie]] told New Deal "fixer" [[Thomas Corcoran]] he wanted the charges against Service dropped.<ref>Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=mVpWH51F7toC The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors]'' (Regnery Publishing, 2001) ISBN 0895262258, p. 168</ref> An FBI wire tap then caught "[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_v19/ai_4696995/ Tommy the Cork]"<ref>David McKean, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=RlV3AAAAMAAJ Tommy the Cork: Washington's Ultimate Insider from Roosevelt to Reagan]'' (Steerforth Press, 2004) ISBN 1586420682</ref> trying to "throw a monkey wrench into the ''Amerasia'' prosecution,"<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 112</ref> in the form of a "political fix."<ref>Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tfrTpBLdl50C The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism]'' (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996) ISBN 0-8078-2245-0, p. 125</ref> One FBI memorandum, under the heading "Political Manipulations," citing "technical surveillance on the offices of Thomas J. Corcoran," reported: