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Line 19: |
| | !rowspan=2 style="padding:6px 6px 6px 30px"|''A'' | | !rowspan=2 style="padding:6px 6px 6px 30px"|''A'' |
| | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|not confess | | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|not confess |
| − | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px; background:#999999"|A: good / B: good | + | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px; background:#00FF33"|A: good / B: good |
| | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|A: bad / B: very good | | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|A: bad / B: very good |
| | |- | | |- |
| | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|confess | | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|confess |
| | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|A: very good / B: bad | | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|A: very good / B: bad |
| − | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px"|A: OK / B: OK | + | |style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:6px; background:#FF3300"|A: OK / B: OK |
| | |} | | |} |
| | </div> | | </div> |
| | In the one-stage game shown at the right side, prisoners A and B can concurrently choose between "not confess" and "confess". The result can either be "very good", "good", "OK", or "bad". | | In the one-stage game shown at the right side, prisoners A and B can concurrently choose between "not confess" and "confess". The result can either be "very good", "good", "OK", or "bad". |
| | | | |
| − | The highlighted field ("not confess/not confess") is the Pareto optimal situation. | + | The green field ("not confess/not confess") is the Pareto optimal situation. However, the red field in the [[Nash equilibrium]] solution. |
| | | | |
| | However, the Pareto optimal solution is not the equilibrium solution. For example, in "not confess/confess" ("bad" for A, "very good" for B), A could switch to "confess". The result improves A's result to "OK" while changing B's result also to "OK". However now at "confess/confess", if B changes to "not confess", his result becomes "bad". Thus, "confess/confess" would be the equilibrium outcome. | | However, the Pareto optimal solution is not the equilibrium solution. For example, in "not confess/confess" ("bad" for A, "very good" for B), A could switch to "confess". The result improves A's result to "OK" while changing B's result also to "OK". However now at "confess/confess", if B changes to "not confess", his result becomes "bad". Thus, "confess/confess" would be the equilibrium outcome. |