17,394
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Line 55:
Line 55: − + Line 61:
Line 61: − + + + +
→Foreign Policy
[[Image:Tr2006.jpg|thumb|290px|''Time'' July 3, 2006]]
[[Image:Tr2006.jpg|thumb|290px|''Time'' July 3, 2006]]
===Foreign Policy===
===Foreign Policy===
Roosevelt's administration was marked by an active approach to foreign policy. He followed four basic principles: 1) promoting broadly defined American interests worldwide, 2) building American military and naval power and control over strategic points (especially the Panama canal and its approaches), 3) cooperation with the British, and 4) there was a social contract between the nation's citizens and its government, such that civilized nations had a right of intervention in cases in which such a contract had been broken. His foreign policy was well suited for the challenges of the world; he anticipated later attitudes and developments well into the 20th century and even the 21st century. He combined a credible realist and internationalist approach with great attention to detail and full appreciation of the importance of diplomatic finesse.
Roosevelt's administration was marked by an active approach to foreign policy. He followed four basic principles: 1) promoting broadly defined American interests worldwide, 2) building American military and naval power and control over strategic points (especially the Panama canal and its approaches), 3) cooperation with the British, and 4) there was a social contract between the nation's citizens and its government, such that civilized nations had a right of intervention in cases in which such a contract had been broken. His foreign policy was well suited for the challenges of the world; he anticipated later attitudes and developments well into the 20th century and even the 21st century, as exemplified by [[John McCain]] in 2008.<ref> M. Patrick Cullinane, "Invoking Teddy: the Inspiration of John Mccain's Foreign Policy." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2008 19(4): 767-786 </ref> He combined a credible realist and internationalist approach with great attention to detail and full appreciation of the importance of diplomatic finesse.
[[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal—and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]]
[[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal—and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]]
Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>See Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref>
Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese, and even more to motivate Americans to support naval power and be aware of the new role in the Pacific. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>See Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref>
Typical of his eagerness for closer cooperation with London was Washington's support for Britain in the [[Boer War]], despite public opinion that favored the underdog Boers. the British reciprocated, so that in settling the boundary despute between Canada (controlled by Britain) and Alaska, the British sold out the Canadians to gain American favor--a stunning shock to the Canadians.
Balance of power considerations shaped Roosevelt's role as the successful mediator who ended the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. Japan had clearly won, but was not allowed to grab too much, thus allowing Russia to keep a certain power base in the region. Roosevelt justified his actions as consistent with American interests and American values. Moral principles in politics and diplomacy, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because diplomacy involves choices often obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals.<ref>Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2008 38(3): 433-455 </ref>
====Roosevelt Corollary ====
====Roosevelt Corollary ====
The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers. The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay. The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902-03. The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants. The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online </ref>
The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers. The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay. The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902-03. The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants. The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online </ref>