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| | Roosevelt's administration was marked by an active approach to foreign policy. He followed four basic principles: 1) promoting broadly defined American interests worldwide, 2) building American military and naval power and control over strategic points (especially the Panama canal and its approaches), 3) cooperation with the British, and 4) there was a social contract between the nation's citizens and its government, such that civilized nations had a right of intervention in cases in which such a contract had been broken. His foreign policy was well suited for the challenges of the world; he anticipated later attitudes and developments well into the 20th century and even the 21st century, as exemplified by [[John McCain]] in 2008.<ref> M. Patrick Cullinane, "Invoking Teddy: the Inspiration of John Mccain's Foreign Policy." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2008 19(4): 767-786 </ref> He combined a credible realist and internationalist approach with great attention to detail and full appreciation of the importance of diplomatic finesse. | | Roosevelt's administration was marked by an active approach to foreign policy. He followed four basic principles: 1) promoting broadly defined American interests worldwide, 2) building American military and naval power and control over strategic points (especially the Panama canal and its approaches), 3) cooperation with the British, and 4) there was a social contract between the nation's citizens and its government, such that civilized nations had a right of intervention in cases in which such a contract had been broken. His foreign policy was well suited for the challenges of the world; he anticipated later attitudes and developments well into the 20th century and even the 21st century, as exemplified by [[John McCain]] in 2008.<ref> M. Patrick Cullinane, "Invoking Teddy: the Inspiration of John Mccain's Foreign Policy." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2008 19(4): 767-786 </ref> He combined a credible realist and internationalist approach with great attention to detail and full appreciation of the importance of diplomatic finesse. |
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| − | | + | ====Civilization and modernization==== |
| | Roosevelt saw it as the duty of more developed ("civilized") nations to help the underdeveloped ("uncivilized") world move forward. In [[Cuba]], the [[Philippines]], [[Puerto Rico]], and the [[Panama Canal Zone]], he used the Army's medical service, under [[Walter Reed]] and [[William C. Gorgas]], to eliminate the [[yellow fever]] menace and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure of the new possessions, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities. | | Roosevelt saw it as the duty of more developed ("civilized") nations to help the underdeveloped ("uncivilized") world move forward. In [[Cuba]], the [[Philippines]], [[Puerto Rico]], and the [[Panama Canal Zone]], he used the Army's medical service, under [[Walter Reed]] and [[William C. Gorgas]], to eliminate the [[yellow fever]] menace and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure of the new possessions, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities. |
| − | | + | ====Navy==== |
| | Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese, and even more to motivate Americans to support naval power and be aware of the new role in the Pacific. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>James R. Reckner, "The Rebirth of the Fleet." ''Naval History'' 2007 21(6): 16-25 online at [[EBSCO]]; Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref> | | Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese, and even more to motivate Americans to support naval power and be aware of the new role in the Pacific. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>James R. Reckner, "The Rebirth of the Fleet." ''Naval History'' 2007 21(6): 16-25 online at [[EBSCO]]; Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref> |
| − | | + | ====Britain==== |
| | Typical of his eagerness for closer cooperation with London was Washington's support for Britain in the [[Boer War]], despite public opinion that favored the underdog Boers. the British reciprocated, so that in settling the boundary despute between Canada (controlled by Britain) and Alaska, the British sold out the Canadians to gain American favor--a stunning shock to the Canadians. | | Typical of his eagerness for closer cooperation with London was Washington's support for Britain in the [[Boer War]], despite public opinion that favored the underdog Boers. the British reciprocated, so that in settling the boundary despute between Canada (controlled by Britain) and Alaska, the British sold out the Canadians to gain American favor--a stunning shock to the Canadians. |
| − | | + | ====Mediator==== |
| | Balance of power considerations shaped Roosevelt's role as the successful mediator who ended the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. Japan had clearly won, but was not allowed to grab too much, thus allowing Russia to keep a certain power base in the region. Roosevelt justified his actions as consistent with American interests and American values. Moral principles in politics and diplomacy, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because diplomacy involves choices often obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals.<ref>Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2008 38(3): 433-455 </ref> | | Balance of power considerations shaped Roosevelt's role as the successful mediator who ended the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. Japan had clearly won, but was not allowed to grab too much, thus allowing Russia to keep a certain power base in the region. Roosevelt justified his actions as consistent with American interests and American values. Moral principles in politics and diplomacy, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because diplomacy involves choices often obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals.<ref>Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2008 38(3): 433-455 </ref> |
| | ====Roosevelt Corollary ==== | | ====Roosevelt Corollary ==== |
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| | ====Panama Canal==== | | ====Panama Canal==== |
| | [[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal—and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]] | | [[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal—and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]] |
| | + | Inspired by [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]'s extraordinarily influential book ''The Influence of Sea Power upon History'' (1890), Roosevelt believed that American security and geopolitical power could be secured only through naval supremacy. This was particularly important in the Caribbean because of its proximity to the United States, European interest in the area, and its status as a critical juncture of trade routes. Roosevelt was able to maintain US dominance of the Caribbean without resorting to major military action. |
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| | Roosevelt understood the strategic significance of the [[Panama Canal]], which opened up the Pacific Coast and Asia to cheap shipping, and made it possible for the Navy to move between the Atlamntic and Pacific rapidly. He negotiated for the U.S. to take control of its construction in 1904; he felt that the Canal's completion was his most important and historically significant international achievement. | | Roosevelt understood the strategic significance of the [[Panama Canal]], which opened up the Pacific Coast and Asia to cheap shipping, and made it possible for the Navy to move between the Atlamntic and Pacific rapidly. He negotiated for the U.S. to take control of its construction in 1904; he felt that the Canal's completion was his most important and historically significant international achievement. |
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| | Roosevelt was not sworn in on a Bible. He remains the only president in history to do so.<ref>[http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/pihtml/pinotable.html Library of Congress Presidential Inauguration Precedents and Notable Events]</ref> | | Roosevelt was not sworn in on a Bible. He remains the only president in history to do so.<ref>[http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/pihtml/pinotable.html Library of Congress Presidential Inauguration Precedents and Notable Events]</ref> |
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| − | == Notes ==
| |
| − | <references/>
| |
| | ==Bibliography== | | ==Bibliography== |
| | ===Surveys=== | | ===Surveys=== |
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| | * Roosevelt, Theodore. "Theodore Roosevelt on Motherhood and the Welfare of the State," ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 141-147 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972126 in JSTOR] | | * Roosevelt, Theodore. "Theodore Roosevelt on Motherhood and the Welfare of the State," ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 141-147 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972126 in JSTOR] |
| | * Shaw, Albert, ed. ''A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career'' (1910) [http://books.google.com/books?id=QEIOAAAAIAAJ full text and cartoons online] | | * Shaw, Albert, ed. ''A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career'' (1910) [http://books.google.com/books?id=QEIOAAAAIAAJ full text and cartoons online] |
| | + | |
| | + | == Notes == |
| | + | <references/> |
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| | {{USPresidents}} | | {{USPresidents}} |