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→Navy
====Civilization and modernization====
====Civilization and modernization====
Roosevelt saw it as the duty of more developed ("civilized") nations to help the underdeveloped ("uncivilized") world move forward. In [[Cuba]], the [[Philippines]], [[Puerto Rico]], and the [[Panama Canal Zone]], he used the Army's medical service, under [[Walter Reed]] and [[William C. Gorgas]], to eliminate the [[yellow fever]] menace and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure of the new possessions, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities.
Roosevelt saw it as the duty of more developed ("civilized") nations to help the underdeveloped ("uncivilized") world move forward. In [[Cuba]], the [[Philippines]], [[Puerto Rico]], and the [[Panama Canal Zone]], he used the Army's medical service, under [[Walter Reed]] and [[William C. Gorgas]], to eliminate the [[yellow fever]] menace and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure of the new possessions, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities.
====Navy====
====Army and Navy====
Roosevelt and his Secretary of War [[Elihu Root]] modernized the Army by creating a general staff system and structuring the military away from small frontier forts to modern combat roles.
Roosevelt, convinced that American military preparedness hinged on the nation's ability to develop and exploit new technologies, worked to make the technology of the army and navy as modern as possible. Among other things, he took an active interest in the army's consideration of the role of the machine gun and the airplane and in the navy's development of both the submarine and a new and more powerful type of battleship.<ref>Matthew M. Oyos, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War." ''Journal of Military History'' 1996 60(4): 631-655 25p </ref>
Roosevelt, convinced that American military preparedness hinged on the nation's ability to develop and exploit new technologies, worked to make the technology of the army and navy as modern as possible. Among other things, he took an active interest in the army's consideration of the role of the machine gun and the airplane and in the navy's development of both the submarine and a new and more powerful type of battleship.<ref>Matthew M. Oyos, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War." ''Journal of Military History'' 1996 60(4): 631-655 25p </ref>
Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese, and even more to motivate Americans to support naval power and be aware of the new role in the Pacific. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>James R. Reckner, "The Rebirth of the Fleet." ''Naval History'' 2007 21(6): 16-25 online at [[EBSCO]]; Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref> The President annoyed his admirals by micromanaging their responsibilities.
By identifying and working with two talented junior officers in the Navy Department, Albert Lenoir Key and [[William S. Sims]], Roosevelt assembled an ad hoc staff on naval policy. This staff funneled technical information to Roosevelt that allowed him to dominate policy discussions with Congress and the senior Navy staff. The President annoyed his admirals by micromanaging their responsibilities and ignoring the chain of command.<ref>Peri E. Arnold, "Policy Leadership in the Progressive Presidency: the Case of Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Policy and His Search for Strategic Resources". ''Studies in American Political Development'' 1996 10(2): 333-359 </ref>
Roosevelt dramatically increased the size of the navy, forming the new warships into a "Great White Fleet" for display purposes and sending it on a world tour in 1907. This display was designed as a show of force to impress the Japanese, and even more to motivate Americans to support naval power and be aware of the new role in the Pacific. Yet, the ships were almost forced to return because of the inadequacy of American ports in the Pacific.<ref>James R. Reckner, "The Rebirth of the Fleet." ''Naval History'' 2007 21(6): 16-25 online at [[EBSCO]]; Edward S Miller,''War Plan Orange'' (1991) </ref>
====Britain====
====Britain====