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→Mediator: Korea
Typical of his eagerness for closer cooperation with London was Washington's support for Britain in the [[Boer War]], despite public opinion that favored the underdog Boers. the British reciprocated, so that in settling the boundary despute between Canada (controlled by Britain) and Alaska, the British sold out the Canadians to gain American favor--a stunning shock to the Canadians.
Typical of his eagerness for closer cooperation with London was Washington's support for Britain in the [[Boer War]], despite public opinion that favored the underdog Boers. the British reciprocated, so that in settling the boundary despute between Canada (controlled by Britain) and Alaska, the British sold out the Canadians to gain American favor--a stunning shock to the Canadians.
====Mediator====
====Mediator====
Balance of power considerations shaped Roosevelt's role as the successful mediator who ended the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. Japan had clearly won, but was not allowed to grab too much, thus allowing Russia to keep a certain power base in the region. Roosevelt justified his actions as consistent with American interests and American values. Moral principles in politics and diplomacy, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because diplomacy involves choices often obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals.<ref>Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2008 38(3): 433-455 </ref>
Balance of power considerations shaped Roosevelt's role as the successful mediator who ended the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. Japan had clearly won, but was not allowed to grab too much, thus allowing Russia to keep a certain power base in the region. Roosevelt justified his actions as consistent with American interests and American values. Moral principles in politics and diplomacy, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because diplomacy involves choices often obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals.<ref>Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2008 38(3): 433-455 </ref>
At the time Japan was consolidating its colonial rule over Korea. Roosevelt supported Japan because he viewed Korea as an backward nation fit to be a protectorate of Japan, which he hoped would protect American economic interests in Manchuria, where Japan was largely in control.<ref> Ki-jung Kim, "Theodore Roosevelt's Image of the World and United States Foreign Policy Toward Korea, 1901-1905." ''Korea Journal'' 1995 35(4): 39-53 1</ref>
====Roosevelt Corollary ====
====Roosevelt Corollary ====
The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers. The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay. The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902-03. The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants. The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online </ref>
The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers. The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay. The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902-03. The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants. The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online </ref>