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| | ==Presidency== | | ==Presidency== |
| | + | ===Organizer=== |
| | Journalists in the 1950s depicted Eisenhower as a laid-back "chairman of the board" who let his subordinates run the government. The opening of Eisenhower's papers surprised scholars, who discovered that behind the scenes Eisenhower was a hands-on leader. He ran the show in his White House, not Sherman Adams or John Foster Dulles. He was well informed, on top of the issues, and possessed of an impressively analytic mind and a formidable capacity for clear, incisive expression in literate prose that is worlds apart from his opaque press conference locutions. He emphatically was the engine of his presidency who watched details and made all the major decisions. As a consequence Eisenhower's ratings by historians and political scientists rose from 22nd place in the 1962 Schlesinger poll to 12th place in the 1981 David Porter poll to 9th in Steve Neal's 1996 poll.<ref> Fred I. Greenstein, "The Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. A 1994 Perspective." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 233-241; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 1997 112(2): 179-190. Issn: 0032-3195 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195(199722)112%3A2%3C179%3ARTPWTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 in Jstor] </ref> | | Journalists in the 1950s depicted Eisenhower as a laid-back "chairman of the board" who let his subordinates run the government. The opening of Eisenhower's papers surprised scholars, who discovered that behind the scenes Eisenhower was a hands-on leader. He ran the show in his White House, not Sherman Adams or John Foster Dulles. He was well informed, on top of the issues, and possessed of an impressively analytic mind and a formidable capacity for clear, incisive expression in literate prose that is worlds apart from his opaque press conference locutions. He emphatically was the engine of his presidency who watched details and made all the major decisions. As a consequence Eisenhower's ratings by historians and political scientists rose from 22nd place in the 1962 Schlesinger poll to 12th place in the 1981 David Porter poll to 9th in Steve Neal's 1996 poll.<ref> Fred I. Greenstein, "The Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. A 1994 Perspective." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 233-241; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 1997 112(2): 179-190. Issn: 0032-3195 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195(199722)112%3A2%3C179%3ARTPWTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 in Jstor] </ref> |
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| | Truman, bitterly unhappy with his own White House staff, joked that when Ike became president he would push a button and nothing will happen. Truman was wrong, for Eisenhower was the best organizer in the Army, and he redesigned the White House staff and the executive departments so he had clear control at all times, and brought on board talented senior staff to oversee the process, such as former New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams, his chief assistant from 1953 to 1958.<ref> Alfred D. Sander, ''Eisenhower's Executive Office'' (1999); Charles Walcott and Karen M. Hult, "White House Organization as a Problem of Governance: the Eisenhower System." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 327-339. Issn: 0360-4918 </ref> | | Truman, bitterly unhappy with his own White House staff, joked that when Ike became president he would push a button and nothing will happen. Truman was wrong, for Eisenhower was the best organizer in the Army, and he redesigned the White House staff and the executive departments so he had clear control at all times, and brought on board talented senior staff to oversee the process, such as former New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams, his chief assistant from 1953 to 1958.<ref> Alfred D. Sander, ''Eisenhower's Executive Office'' (1999); Charles Walcott and Karen M. Hult, "White House Organization as a Problem of Governance: the Eisenhower System." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 327-339. Issn: 0360-4918 </ref> |
| | + | ===New Deal=== |
| | + | Eisenhower did not have the votes in Congress to dismantle the New Deal. In general he did stop their expansion. He expanded [[Social Security]]coverage, allowing Republicans to claim some credit for a very popular program. |
| | + | ===Civil rights=== |
| | + | Civil rights for blacks had appeared on the national agenda, but Eisenhower did not give enthusiastic support to the [[Warren Court]] decision in the Brown case in 1954 which outlawed school segregation. Eisenhower did approve a weak Civil Rights bill in 1957. When Governor Orval Faubus defied a federal court order regarding school integration in Little Rock in 1957, Eisenhower nationalized the state National Guard and sent in elite Army combat troops to enforce the court orders. Eisenhower successfully integrated the military during his first term (a process begun by Truman in 1948), and integrated the public schools in the District of Columbia.<ref>David A. Nichols, ''A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution'' (2007)</ref> |
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| | + | Eisenhower tried to privatize federally provided electric power, which he viewed as inefficient and as a form of 'creeping socialism.' Eisenhower, however, had a difficult time dismantling public energy services due to the New Deal legacies of the [[Tennessee Valley Authority]] (TVA) and the [[Rural Electrification Administration]] (REA), which provided cheap power to millions of people and had bipartisan support. Eisenhower did not completely destroy public energy utilities; rather, he contained them, limiting the geographical expansion and funding of the TVA and allowing private investors access to new sources of hydroelectric power, as well as the development of nuclear power.<ref> Wyatt Wells, "Public Power in the Eisenhower Administration" ''Journal of Policy History'' 2008 20(2): 227-262 in [[EBSCO]] </ref> |
| | ===McCarthy=== | | ===McCarthy=== |
| | Republican Senator [[Joe McCarthy]] transformed the national discourse to a focus on internal treason by charging in 1950 that Roosevelt had allowed Soviet spies into the government (such as [[Alger Hiss]]), and that by protecting them Truman was guilty of "20 years of treason." When Eisenhower was elected McCarthy turned his attention to Eisenhower's administration and hinted at "21 years of treason." His main case was a reserve dentist who was recalled to active duty and promoted to major, even though he was a member of the Communist party. "Who promoted Major Peress??" he shouted. Eisenhower would not tolerate government employees who failed loyalty or security standards, but stressed his support for civil liberties and proper procedures. He succeeded in using behind-the-scenes tactics to undermine McCarthy, particularly after January 1954 when the senator took on the US Army. Eisenhower's shrewd plan included making political speeches about what his administration had done to remove Communists from the executive branch. Among other things, the president denied McCarthy access to certain White House documents, supported anti-McCarthy Republicans in the Senate, and publicly denounced McCarthy's methods without naming the senator. In October, 1954, the Senate censured McCarthy for bringing disgrace on that body, and he disappeared from the scene.<ref> Michael J. Birkner, "Eisenhower and the Red Menace." ''Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration'' (2001) 33(3): 196-207. Issn: 0033-1031 </ref> | | Republican Senator [[Joe McCarthy]] transformed the national discourse to a focus on internal treason by charging in 1950 that Roosevelt had allowed Soviet spies into the government (such as [[Alger Hiss]]), and that by protecting them Truman was guilty of "20 years of treason." When Eisenhower was elected McCarthy turned his attention to Eisenhower's administration and hinted at "21 years of treason." His main case was a reserve dentist who was recalled to active duty and promoted to major, even though he was a member of the Communist party. "Who promoted Major Peress??" he shouted. Eisenhower would not tolerate government employees who failed loyalty or security standards, but stressed his support for civil liberties and proper procedures. He succeeded in using behind-the-scenes tactics to undermine McCarthy, particularly after January 1954 when the senator took on the US Army. Eisenhower's shrewd plan included making political speeches about what his administration had done to remove Communists from the executive branch. Among other things, the president denied McCarthy access to certain White House documents, supported anti-McCarthy Republicans in the Senate, and publicly denounced McCarthy's methods without naming the senator. In October, 1954, the Senate censured McCarthy for bringing disgrace on that body, and he disappeared from the scene.<ref> Michael J. Birkner, "Eisenhower and the Red Menace." ''Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration'' (2001) 33(3): 196-207. Issn: 0033-1031 </ref> |