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===Great Wall of China===

===Great Wall of China===

The '''[[Great Wall of China]]''' was designed to keep enemies out and protect their country. Construction took centuries, and was begun during the Qin dynasty, 221-206B.C. In 246B.C. the emperor Qin Shi Huang Di, whose original name was Ying Zheng, came to power in the state of Qin.  By 221 B.C, he had unified China using the Legalist philosophy of his state to encourage colonization and to build up the military in what was previously a minor desert state.   

The '''[[Great Wall of China]]''' was designed to keep enemies out and protect their country. Construction took centuries, and was begun during the Qin dynasty, 221-206B.C. In 246B.C. the emperor Qin Shi Huang Di, whose original name was Ying Zheng, came to power in the state of Qin.  By 221 B.C, he had unified China using the Legalistic philosophy of his state to encourage colonization and to build up the military in what was previously a minor desert state.   

The Great Wall winds some 2,400 km (1,500 mi) along the edge of the Mongolian plateau from Gansu (Kansu) province in the west to the Yellow Sea in the east.  Its width ranges from 4 to 12 m (12 to 40 ft) and its height from 6 to 15 m (20 to 50 ft). It makes possible much more effective military defense of China from invaders.

The Great Wall winds some 2,400 km (1,500 mi) along the edge of the Mongolian plateau from Gansu (Kansu) province in the west to the Yellow Sea in the east.  Its width ranges from 4 to 12 m (12 to 40 ft) and its height from 6 to 15 m (20 to 50 ft). It makes possible much more effective military defense of China from invaders.

[[Image:16th century East Asia.png|thumb|310px]]

[[Image:16th century East Asia.png|thumb|310px]]

All the counties in China had a county government, a Confucian school, and the standard Chinese family system. Typically the dominant local elite comprised high status families comprised of the gentry owners and managers of land and of other forms of wealth, as well as smaller groups that were subject to elite domination and protection. Much attention was paid to genealogy to prove that high status was inherited from generations back.  Substantial land holdings were directly managed by the owning families in the early Ming period, but toward the end of the era marketing and ownership were depersonalized by the increased circulation of silver as money, and estate management gravitated into the hands of hired bailiffs. Together with  the departure of the most talented youth into the imperial service, the result was direct contacts between the elite and subject groups were disrupted, and romantic images of country life disappeared from the literature.  In villages across China elite families participated in the life of the empire by sending their sons into the very high status imperial civil service. Most of the successful sons had a common education in the county and prefectural schools, had been recruited by competitive examination, and were posted to offices that might be anywhere in the empire, including the imperial capital. At first the recommendation of an elite local sponsor was important; increasing the imperial government relied more on merit exams, and thus entry into the national ruling class became more difficult. Downward social mobility into the peasantry was possible for less successful sons; upward mobility from the peasant class was unheard of.  <ref> Dardess, ''A Ming Society'' (1996)</ref>

All the counties in China had a county government, a Confucian school, and the standard Chinese family system. Typically the dominant local elite comprised high status families comprised of the gentry owners and managers of land and of other forms of wealth, as well as smaller groups that were subject to elite domination and protection. Much attention was paid to genealogy to prove that high status was inherited from generations back.  Substantial land holdings were directly managed by the owning families in the early Ming period, but toward the end of the era marketing and ownership were depersonalized by the increased circulation of silver as money, and estate management gravitated into the hands of hired bailiffs. Together with  the departure of the most talented youth into the imperial service, the result was direct contacts between the elite and subject groups were disrupted, and romantic images of country life disappeared from the literature.  In villages across China elite families participated in the life of the empire by sending their sons into the very high status imperial civil service. Most of the successful sons had a common education in the county and prefecture schools, had been recruited by competitive examination, and were posted to offices that might be anywhere in the empire, including the imperial capital. At first the recommendation of an elite local sponsor was important; increasing the imperial government relied more on merit exams, and thus entry into the national ruling class became more difficult. Downward social mobility into the peasantry was possible for less successful sons; upward mobility from the peasant class was unheard of.  <ref> Dardess, ''A Ming Society'' (1996)</ref>

==Qing (Manchu) Dynasty: 1644-1911==

==Qing (Manchu) Dynasty: 1644-1911==

===Reforms 1900-1908: too little, too late===

===Reforms 1900-1908: too little, too late===

The Boxer Rebellion was a humiliating fiasco for China; the Qing rulers proved visibly incompetent and lost prestige irreparably, while the foreign powers gained greater influence in Chinese affairs. The humiliation stimulated a second reform movement--this time sanctioned by the empress dowager Cixi herself. From 1901 to 1908, the dynasty announced a series of educational, military, and administrative reforms, many reminiscent of the "one hundreds days" of 1898. In 1905 the examination system itself was abolished and the entire Confucian tradition of merit entry into the elite collased. The abolition of the traditional civil service examination was itself a revolution of immense significance. After many centuries, the scholar's mind began to be liberated from the shackles of classical studies, and social mobility no longer depended chiefly on the writing of stereotyped and flowery prose.

The Boxer Rebellion was a humiliating fiasco for China; the Qing rulers proved visibly incompetent and lost prestige irreparably, while the foreign powers gained greater influence in Chinese affairs. The humiliation stimulated a second reform movement--this time sanctioned by the empress dowager Cixi herself. From 1901 to 1908, the dynasty announced a series of educational, military, and administrative reforms, many reminiscent of the "one hundreds days" of 1898. In 1905 the examination system itself was abolished and the entire Confucian tradition of merit entry into the elite collapsed. The abolition of the traditional civil service examination was itself a revolution of immense significance. After many centuries, the scholar's mind began to be liberated from the shackles of classical studies, and social mobility no longer depended chiefly on the writing of stereotyped and flowery prose.

New ministries were created in Beijing and revised law codes were drafted. Work began on a national budget--the national government had no idea how much taxes were collected in its name and spent by regional officials.  

New ministries were created in Beijing and revised law codes were drafted. Work began on a national budget--the national government had no idea how much taxes were collected in its name and spent by regional officials.  

New armies were raised and trained in European (and Japanese) fashion and plans for a national army were laid.  The creation of the "new army" reflected rising esteem for the military profession and the emergence of a new national elite that dominated China for much of the 20th century. . More officers and men were now literate, while patriotism and better pay served as an inducement for service.  

New armies were raised and trained in European (and Japanese) fashion and plans for a national army were laid.  The creation of the "new army" reflected rising esteem for the military profession and the emergence of a new national elite that dominated China for much of the 20th century. . More officers and men were now literate, while patriotism and better pay served as an inducement for service.  

The movement for constitutionalism gathered momentum following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, for Japan's victory signalled the triumph of constitutionalism over absolutism.  Under pressure from gentry and student groups, the Qing court in 1908 issued plans for the inauguration of consultative provincial assemblies in 1909, a consultative national assembly in 1910, and both a constitution and a parliament in 1917. The consultative assemblies were to play a pivotal role in the unfolding events, politicizing the provincial gentry and providing them with new leverage with which to protect their interests.

The movement for constitutionalism gathered momentum following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, for Japan's victory signaled the triumph of constitutionalism over absolutism.  Under pressure from gentry and student groups, the Qing court in 1908 issued plans for the inauguration of consultative provincial assemblies in 1909, a consultative national assembly in 1910, and both a constitution and a parliament in 1917. The consultative assemblies were to play a pivotal role in the unfolding events, politicizing the provincial gentry and providing them with new leverage with which to protect their interests.

===Revolution planned===

===Revolution planned===

The strength of the red army and the durability of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic were severely tested between 1931 and 1934, as the Kuomintang waged five successive military encirclement campaigns against the Communists. Confronted with a larger and better-equipped enemy, Mao and his chief military strategist, Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886-1976), refined the tactics of "people's war": enlist the support of local peasants through benevolent treatment of noncombatants; avoid conventional battles with superior enemy forces; isolate the enemy and overextend his supply lines; concentrate superior tactical forces to encircle and annihilate individual enemy units; and attack the enemy only under favorable conditions.

The strength of the red army and the durability of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic were severely tested between 1931 and 1934, as the Kuomintang waged five successive military encirclement campaigns against the Communists. Confronted with a larger and better-equipped enemy, Mao and his chief military strategist, Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886-1976), refined the tactics of "people's war": enlist the support of local peasants through benevolent treatment of noncombatants; avoid conventional battles with superior enemy forces; isolate the enemy and overextend his supply lines; concentrate superior tactical forces to encircle and annihilate individual enemy units; and attack the enemy only under favorable conditions.

The essential preconditions for a successful people's war were the maintenance of high morale among red army soldiers and the securing of the widest possible base of civilian support. Without the latter, the guerrilla fighter was a "fish out of water." Without the former, a numerically and materially inferior force would be unable to maintain discipline and fighting effectiveness. Underlying both preconditions was the premise that a sense of purpose was vital to the success of the revolution. As Mao put it in 1936, "The contest of forces is [a contest] of the power and morale of men.... In war, it is man, not matériel, that counts." This voluntarist strain in Mao's thought, stressing the need to place "politics in command," is widely regarded as one of Mao's most important--and controversial--innovations in Marxist theory.<ref> Spence, ''Search for Modern China'' (1990) ch 15-16; Spence, ''Mao Zedong'' (2006); quote in Baum (1964)</ref>

The essential preconditions for a successful people's war were the maintenance of high morale among red army soldiers and the securing of the widest possible base of civilian support. Without the latter, the guerrilla fighter was a "fish out of water." Without the former, a numerically and materially inferior force would be unable to maintain discipline and fighting effectiveness. Underlying both preconditions was the premise that a sense of purpose was vital to the success of the revolution. As Mao put it in 1936, "The contest of forces is [a contest] of the power and morale of men.... In war, it is man, not matériel, that counts." This voluntarism strain in Mao's thought, stressing the need to place "politics in command," is widely regarded as one of Mao's most important--and controversial--innovations in Marxist theory.<ref> Spence, ''Search for Modern China'' (1990) ch 15-16; Spence, ''Mao Zedong'' (2006); quote in Baum (1964)</ref>

====The Long March: 1934-36 ====

====The Long March: 1934-36 ====

In 1934-35, the CCP fled the KMT with over 100,000 men and women. They divided into several armies, marched 6000 miles inland through a brutal terrain of frigid mountain passes, freezing rivers and marshes in search of a sanctuary to continue their revolution.  Desertion was common, local peasants refused to join, and local landlords raided the marchers. The army traded opium for supplies, and women were forced to leave their newborns behind with peasant families because a crying infant could endanger troops.  Critical tactical blunders led to the bloody sacrifice of soldiers in hopeless battles. Only 7000 survived the march.  Intraparty struggles and betrayal brought repeated rounds of purges, as Mao emerged as chairman of the Politburo and became the unchallenged leader of the CCP<ref>John M. Glionna, "China's reality check on Long March," [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-longmarch16jan16,0,3463382.story?coll=la-home-center ''Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 2008] </ref>

In 1934-35, the CCP fled the KMT with over 100,000 men and women. They divided into several armies, marched 6000 miles inland through a brutal terrain of frigid mountain passes, freezing rivers and marshes in search of a sanctuary to continue their revolution.  Desertion was common, local peasants refused to join, and local landlords raided the marchers. The army traded opium for supplies, and women were forced to leave their newborns behind with peasant families because a crying infant could endanger troops.  Critical tactical blunders led to the bloody sacrifice of soldiers in hopeless battles. Only 7000 survived the march.  Intra party struggles and betrayal brought repeated rounds of purges, as Mao emerged as chairman of the Politburo and became the unchallenged leader of the CCP<ref>John M. Glionna, "China's reality check on Long March," [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-longmarch16jan16,0,3463382.story?coll=la-home-center ''Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 2008] </ref>

The Long March became the heroic memory of the CCP, and virtually all the Communist leaders of the next 70 years were marchers or their children.<ref>Sun Shuyun, ''The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth'' (2007)</ref>

The Long March became the heroic memory of the CCP, and virtually all the Communist leaders of the next 70 years were marchers or their children.<ref>Sun Shuyun, ''The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth'' (2007)</ref>

The Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) were the two worst periods of leftist domination in the history of China.  

The Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) were the two worst periods of leftist domination in the history of China.  

Mao's grand strategy for Cold War competition inflicted a catastrophic agricultural failure in China and victimized tens of millions of Chinese peasants. After [[Nikita Khrushchev]] boasted in 1957 that the Soviet Union would soon surpassing the United States in key economic outputs, Mao decided to launch an even faster industrialization program that would push China past Britain in some production categories within 15 years. Beginning in 1958, Mao imposed unrealistic targets on Chinese grain production to extract funds from agriculture for rapid industrial growth. Maoists placed relentless pressure on Communist cadres for ruthless implementation of the Great Leap Forward. Contrary to Maoist plans, China's grain output in 1959-60 declined sharply from 1957 levels and rural per capita grain retention decreased dramatically. Throughout China, party cadres' mismanagement of agricultural production was responsible for the decline in grain output, and the Communist state's excessive requisition of grain caused food shortages for the peasants. But the key factor determining the famine's uneven impact on the peasantry in the provinces was the degree to which provincial leaders genuinely and energetically embraced Maoist programs.<ref> Yixin Chen, "Cold War Competitition and Food Production in China, 1957-1962," ''Agricultural History'' 2009 83(1): 51-78, </ref>

Mao's grand strategy for Cold War competition inflicted a catastrophic agricultural failure in China and victimized tens of millions of Chinese peasants. After [[Nikita Khrushchev]] boasted in 1957 that the Soviet Union would soon surpassing the United States in key economic outputs, Mao decided to launch an even faster industrialization program that would push China past Britain in some production categories within 15 years. Beginning in 1958, Mao imposed unrealistic targets on Chinese grain production to extract funds from agriculture for rapid industrial growth. Maoists placed relentless pressure on Communist cadres for ruthless implementation of the Great Leap Forward. Contrary to Maoist plans, China's grain output in 1959-60 declined sharply from 1957 levels and rural per capita grain retention decreased dramatically. Throughout China, party cadres' mismanagement of agricultural production was responsible for the decline in grain output, and the Communist state's excessive requisition of grain caused food shortages for the peasants. But the key factor determining the famine's uneven impact on the peasantry in the provinces was the degree to which provincial leaders genuinely and energetically embraced Maoist programs.<ref> Yixin Chen, "Cold War Competition and Food Production in China, 1957-1962," ''Agricultural History'' 2009 83(1): 51-78, </ref>

Although the Great Leap Forward was much more disastrous in both human and economic terms, the Cultural Revolution receives the more negative assessment in China. This harsher review of the Cultural Revolution stems from the facts that it occurred more recently, was much longer in duration, and that many of its victims were cadres and intellectuals.<ref>  William A. Joseph,  "A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-mao Views of the Great Leap Forward." ''Modern China'' 1986 12(4): 419-457. Issn: 0097-7004 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/189257 in Jstor ]</ref>

Although the Great Leap Forward was much more disastrous in both human and economic terms, the Cultural Revolution receives the more negative assessment in China. This harsher review of the Cultural Revolution stems from the facts that it occurred more recently, was much longer in duration, and that many of its victims were cadres and intellectuals.<ref>  William A. Joseph,  "A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-mao Views of the Great Leap Forward." ''Modern China'' 1986 12(4): 419-457. Issn: 0097-7004 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/189257 in Jstor ]</ref>