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'''Nikita Khruschev''' (1894 - 1971) was a Russian Communist who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953, and lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United Sattes and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

'''Nikita Khruschev''' (1894 - 1971) was a Russian Communist who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953, and lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United Sattes and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|350px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|340px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

{{Cquote|Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev.... I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time...Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.}}

{{Cquote|Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev.... I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time...Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.}}

[[File|Khrush-chef.jpg|thumb|220px|Khrushchev cooks up trouble for the West, looking to see where unrest will boil over]]

[[File|Khrush-chef.jpg|thumb|260px|Khrushchev cooks up trouble for the West, looking to see where unrest will boil over]]

Seeing Kennedy's indecisiveness, he ordered the building of the [[Berlin Wall]] in 1962 to stop the exodus of talent from East Germany to freedom.  Kennedy made some speeches then accommodated to the new tyranny.  Emboldened, the Soviets expanded their subversion in weak nations, knowing that the American [[containment]] policy would force the West to defend itself under the most adverse conditions, as selected by the Kremlin.  Sums were spread widely to see where trouble would best brew.

Seeing Kennedy's indecisiveness, he ordered the building of the [[Berlin Wall]] in 1962 to stop the exodus of talent from East Germany to freedom.  Kennedy made some speeches then accommodated to the new tyranny.  Emboldened, the Soviets expanded their subversion in weak nations, knowing that the American [[containment]] policy would force the West to defend itself under the most adverse conditions, as selected by the Kremlin.  Sums were spread widely to see where trouble would best brew.

===Test Ban Treaty===

===Test Ban Treaty===

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Detente? Journal of Cold War Studies; 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Detente?" ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

 

 

===China===

===China===

Khrushchev badly mishandled China--first delivering generous aid, far beyond what his colleagues wanted or he had budgeted, even promising a transfer of a nuclear bomb; then swinging to the opposite extreme, suddenly withdrawing all Soviet technicians and canceling works in progress.  The issue however was deeper than the foolish diplomacy of two rival dictators.  China was bigger, older, more cultured and resented the upstart Russians who flaunted their greater wealth and more powerful weapons.  Relations drastically worsened from Khrushchev's September 1959 visit to Beijing through the breakdown of compromise in October 1961. Each party sought to appeal to the world as the legitimate party of proletarian internationalism and anti-capitalist revolution. Specific areas of disagreement included the Moscow's refusal to support China in its border conflict with India, which was becoming a Soviet ally. Beijing worried about of Moscow's willingness to talk disarmament with the United States, with the possible threat of a Soviet-American alliance against China. Mao had aggressive plans for advancing Marxist-Leninist goals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and conflict with Soviet agents in those places was inevitable.  Indeed, after 1960 the pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions emerged in most Communist parties and sharply weakened them.<ref> Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, "Competing for Leadership: Split or Detente in the Sino-soviet Bloc, 1959-1961," ''International History Review,'' 2008 30(3): 545-574, </ref>   

Khrushchev badly mishandled China--first delivering generous aid, far beyond what his colleagues wanted or he had budgeted, even promising a transfer of a nuclear bomb; then swinging to the opposite extreme, suddenly withdrawing all Soviet technicians and canceling works in progress.  The issue however was deeper than the foolish diplomacy of two rival dictators.  China was bigger, older, more cultured and resented the upstart Russians who flaunted their greater wealth and more powerful weapons.  Relations drastically worsened from Khrushchev's September 1959 visit to Beijing through the breakdown of compromise in October 1961. Each party sought to appeal to the world as the legitimate party of proletarian internationalism and anti-capitalist revolution. Specific areas of disagreement included the Moscow's refusal to support China in its border conflict with India, which was becoming a Soviet ally. Beijing worried about of Moscow's willingness to talk disarmament with the United States, with the possible threat of a Soviet-American alliance against China. Mao had aggressive plans for advancing Marxist-Leninist goals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and conflict with Soviet agents in those places was inevitable.  Indeed, after 1960 the pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions emerged in most Communist parties and sharply weakened them.<ref> Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, "Competing for Leadership: Split or Detente in the Sino-soviet Bloc, 1959-1961," ''International History Review,'' 2008 30(3): 545-574, </ref>   

==Domestic issues==

==Domestic issues==

===Destalinization===

===Destalinization===

Khrushchev denounced Stalin as soon as he died and tried to purge all memory ofDétente Stalin (“destaDétentelinization”).  The glasnost had to be controlled lest it get out of hand.  By blaming his predecessor for all of Russia's ills Khrushchev bought time to reform the system.  He ended the worst features of the Gulag and mass executions, while maintaining a high enough fear level in people's minds to keep the wheels turning.

Khrushchev denounced Stalin as soon as he died and tried to purge all memory ofDétente Stalin (“destaDétentelinization”).  The glasnost had to be controlled lest it get out of hand.  By blaming his predecessor for all of Russia's ills Khrushchev bought time to reform the system.  He ended the worst features of the Gulag and mass executions, while maintaining a high enough fear level in people's minds to keep the wheels turning.

===Agricultural reform===

===Agricultural reform===

[[File:Red-farms.jpg|thumb|210px|Herblock laughs at the hair growers]]

[[File:Red-farms.jpg|thumb|260px|Herblock laughs at the hair growers]]

Khrushchev's favorite project was to till the virgin and long-fallow lands of Kazakhstan and nearby Soviet republics in order to increase the USSR's agricultural production, especially of grain. Despite his belief that scientific socialism could overcome all obstacles, the task proved far more immense and complex than the authorities had anticipated; the results were mostly failures, although some local achievements were attained.<ref> Taubman (2003) p 305-6</ref>

Khrushchev's favorite project was to till the virgin and long-fallow lands of Kazakhstan and nearby Soviet republics in order to increase the USSR's agricultural production, especially of grain. Despite his belief that scientific socialism could overcome all obstacles, the task proved far more immense and complex than the authorities had anticipated; the results were mostly failures, although some local achievements were attained.<ref> Taubman (2003) p 305-6</ref>

===Space race===

===Space race===

* Khrushchev, Nikita. ''Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev'', edited by his son Sergei N. Khrushchev

* Khrushchev, Nikita. ''Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev'', edited by his son Sergei N. Khrushchev

** ''Volume 1: Commissar, 1918–1945'' (2004) 1004pp [http://www.psupress.psu.edu/books/titles/0-271-02332-5.html contents]  

** ''Volume 1: Commissar, 1918–1945'' (2004) 1004pp [http://www.psupress.psu.edu/books/titles/0-271-02332-5.html contents]  

* * ''Volume 2: Reformer, 1945–1964'' (2006) 896pp [http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-02861-0.html contents]

** ''Volume 2: Reformer, 1945–1964'' (2006) 896pp [http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-02861-0.html contents]

*** ''Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964'' (2007), 1176pp [http://www.psupress.psu.edu/books/titles/978-0-271-02935-1.html contents]

** ''Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964'' (2007), 1176pp [http://www.psupress.psu.edu/books/titles/978-0-271-02935-1.html contents]

* ''Khrushchev Remembers'' (1970), ed. by Talbot, Strobe, very candid interviews.

* ''Khrushchev Remembers'' (1970), ed. by Talbot, Strobe, very candid interviews.