| | Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in Cuba in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets. Castro was much more aggressive than Khrushchev and sponsored guerrilla movements in the region. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy. Khrushchev allowed [[Fidel Castro]] took the lead, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. | | Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in Cuba in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets. Castro was much more aggressive than Khrushchev and sponsored guerrilla movements in the region. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy. Khrushchev allowed [[Fidel Castro]] took the lead, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. |
| | Much more serious was his miscalculations on Cuba, which he feared would be invaded by Americans. As the Kennedy Administration developed a first-strike strategy and a nuclear superiority capable of delivering it, Khrushchev sought to parry the American advantage by installing short-range Soviet warheads in Cuba. Stunned to discover the missiles, Washington demanded their removal and through a naval blockade around the island. Khrushchev seems not to have consulted his advisors, and was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Cuba against invasion and to send four nuclear-armed submarines to Cuba. Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) calmed the emotional Khrushchev and got him to avoid such provocative acts. He at last relented and took out the missiles and nuclear weapons, winning a public promise that the U.S. would never invade Cuba. He also got the Americans to secretly remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy. His recklessness troubled other Kremlin leaders, who saw the Cuban episode as a fiasco that was all Khrushchev's fault.<ref> Michael Dobbs, ''One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War'' (2008).</ref> | | Much more serious was his miscalculations on Cuba, which he feared would be invaded by Americans. As the Kennedy Administration developed a first-strike strategy and a nuclear superiority capable of delivering it, Khrushchev sought to parry the American advantage by installing short-range Soviet warheads in Cuba. Stunned to discover the missiles, Washington demanded their removal and through a naval blockade around the island. Khrushchev seems not to have consulted his advisors, and was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Cuba against invasion and to send four nuclear-armed submarines to Cuba. Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) calmed the emotional Khrushchev and got him to avoid such provocative acts. He at last relented and took out the missiles and nuclear weapons, winning a public promise that the U.S. would never invade Cuba. He also got the Americans to secretly remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy. His recklessness troubled other Kremlin leaders, who saw the Cuban episode as a fiasco that was all Khrushchev's fault.<ref> Michael Dobbs, ''One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War'' (2008).</ref> |