| Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | | | |
| | ==Career== | | ==Career== |
| − | Born to a poor peasant family, he left school at 14 and followed his father to work in a distant mines. He was a working-class youth during an era of dramatic industrial growth, world war and civil war. Joining the Communist Party in 1918 (rather late compared to other leaders) he rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming boss first of Moscow then of all Ukraine. He played a major role in building the Moscow subway--one system that works well in Russia to this day--and in starving the kulaks who owned a few acres. Returning in 1938 to Ukraine, he was regional boss for twelve years. The Ukraine was a main theater of war and he was political commissar at the front 1941-45. He return to Stalin's side in Moscow in 1949 in charge of agriculture, always the most essential and backward part of the economy. | + | Born to a poor peasant family, he left school at 14 and followed his father to work in a distant mines. He was a working-class youth during an era of dramatic industrial growth, world war and civil war. Joining the Communist Party in 1918 (rather late compared to other leaders) he rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming boss first of Moscow then of all Ukraine. He played a major role in building the Moscow subway--one system that works well in Russia to this day--and in starving the kulaks who owned a few acres. Returning in 1938 to Ukraine, he was regional boss for twelve years. The Ukraine was a main theater of war and he was political commissar at the front 1941-45. He returned to Stalin's side in Moscow in 1949 in charge of agriculture, always the most essential and backward part of the economy. |
| | | | |
| | ==Coming to Power, 1953== | | ==Coming to Power, 1953== |
| − | After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev and premier Georgi Malenkov united their networks against Soviet security chief Lavrenti Beria. The defection of two of Beria's deputy ministers, Sergei Kruglov and Ivan Serov, allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria for Beria no longer had control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard. Beria was shot. By 1957 he had consolidated his dictatorship by replacing half the local party leaders with his own network of loyalists, which enabled him to win victory in the Central Committee over the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich. Officially he was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964. He lived in a Kremlin apartment with his wife Nina and their children. | + | After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev and premier Georgi Malenkov united their networks against Soviet security chief Lavrenti Beria. The defection of two of Beria's deputy ministers allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria for Beria no longer had control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard. Beria was shot. By 1957 Khrushchev had shoved Malenkov aside and had consolidated his dictatorship. His technique was to replace half the regional party leaders with his own network of loyalists, which gave him the votes to win victory in the Central Committee over the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], and Lazar Kaganovich. Officially he was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964. He lived modestly in a Kremlin apartment with his wife Nina and their children. |
| | | | |
| | ==Foreign policy== | | ==Foreign policy== |
| − | Khrushchev handled foreign policy poorly. He had to preserve control of Eastern Europe--persuasion failed and he sent in his army. Second, he had to maintain the unity of the world Communist movement, which turned above all on relations with China. He failed and made his most important ally into his most implacable foe. Finally he had to de-escalate tensions and reach equilibrium with the United States. He instead tried confrontation, leading to near disaster in 1964 until he drew back at the last second over Cuba. More successful was his quest for prestige which centered on the Space Race--where the Soviets astonished the world by taking a clear lead over the U.S. for a few years. Sputnik--the first earth satellite--was a propagandist's dream come true. The image of Yuri Gagarin, who became in 1961 the first man to orbit the earth, was made a central theme in Soviet propaganda, used to encourage the young to contribute to the building of communism as well as to enhance Khrushchev's legitimacy as he sought to distance himself from the legacy of the Stalinist past. | + | Khrushchev handled foreign policy poorly. He had to preserve control of Eastern Europe--persuasion failed and he sent in his army. Second, he had to maintain the unity of the world Communist movement, which turned above all on relations with China. He failed and turned his most important ally into his most implacable foe. Finally he had to de-escalate tensions and reach equilibrium with the United States. He instead tried confrontation, leading to near disaster in 1964 until he drew back at the last second over Cuba. More successful was his quest for prestige which centered on the [[Space Race]]--where the Soviets astonished the world by taking a clear lead over the U.S. for a few years. |
| − | | |
| | [[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]] | | [[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]] |
| | | | |
| Line 22: |
Line 21: |
| | Soviet interest in the Third World grew with the aim of weakening the United States. | | Soviet interest in the Third World grew with the aim of weakening the United States. |
| | | | |
| − | The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote their political ideals. African leaders, however, interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, were careful to avoid the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in the former colonial languages, it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency in French and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of their Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War. Setting up Patrice Lumumba university for African students in Moscow in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63. The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref> | + | The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote Communist foreign policies and undercut capitalism. African leaders, however, were more interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, and carefully sidestepped the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in English and French (the former colonial languages), it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of Patrice Lumumba University (now called "Peoples' Friendship University) in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War. Setting up Patrice Lumumba University for African students in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63. The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref> |
| | | | |
| − | Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in Cuba in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets. Castro was much more aggressive than Khrushchev and sponsored guerrilla movements in the region. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy. Khrushchev allowed [[Fidel Castro]] to take the lead, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. | + | Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in [[Cuba]] in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets, and counted on the Kremlin to back him in direct confrontations with the U.S. Castro sponsored guerrilla movements in the region, and later in Africa, that the Russians avoided. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy. Khrushchev blundered by allowing Casto to take the initiative, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. |
| | | | |
| | ===Cuban Missile Crisis=== | | ===Cuban Missile Crisis=== |
| | see [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] [[File:Dobbs-Cuba.jpg|thumb|220px]] | | see [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] [[File:Dobbs-Cuba.jpg|thumb|220px]] |
| − | | + | Khrushchev badly miscalculated regarding Cuba, which he feared would be invaded by Americans. As the Kennedy Administration developed a first-strike military strategy and a nuclear superiority capable of delivering it, Khrushchev sought to parry the American advantage by installing short-range Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, supposedly under his control (not Castro's). Stunned to discover the missiles, Washington demanded their removal and through a naval blockade around the island. Khrushchev seems not to have consulted his advisors, and was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Cuba against invasion and to send four nuclear-armed submarines to Cuba. Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) calmed the emotional Khrushchev and got him to avoid such provocative acts. He at last relented and took out the missiles and nuclear weapons, winning a public promise that the U.S. would never invade Cuba. He also got the Americans to secretly remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy. His recklessness troubled other Kremlin leaders, who saw the Cuban episode as a fiasco that was all Khrushchev's fault.<ref> Michael Dobbs, ''One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War'' (2008).</ref> |
| − | Much more serious was his miscalculations on Cuba, which he feared would be invaded by Americans. As the Kennedy Administration developed a first-strike strategy and a nuclear superiority capable of delivering it, Khrushchev sought to parry the American advantage by installing short-range Soviet warheads in Cuba. Stunned to discover the missiles, Washington demanded their removal and through a naval blockade around the island. Khrushchev seems not to have consulted his advisors, and was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Cuba against invasion and to send four nuclear-armed submarines to Cuba. Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) calmed the emotional Khrushchev and got him to avoid such provocative acts. He at last relented and took out the missiles and nuclear weapons, winning a public promise that the U.S. would never invade Cuba. He also got the Americans to secretly remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy. His recklessness troubled other Kremlin leaders, who saw the Cuban episode as a fiasco that was all Khrushchev's fault.<ref> Michael Dobbs, ''One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War'' (2008).</ref>
| |
| | | | |
| | ===Test Ban Treaty=== | | ===Test Ban Treaty=== |
| Line 62: |
Line 60: |
| | A central feature of the new apartments was the kitchen--people no longer had to eat in cafeterias. The Soviet kitchen was presented as a model of efficiency where one could find a bit of privacy. The kitchen gained ideological importance and was viewed as a central element of the grand program of socialist modernization, further proof of the ultimate triumph of socialism through its superior living standards. Women were to play a special role, and a number of programs and courses offered them training in home economics. The new kitchen was, above all, to be efficient, and the media portrayed this penetration of technology into everyday life as a key element of socialist modernity. In practice, women found that the promised benefits did not materialize, and to the dismay of Soviet propagandists, American Vice president [[Richard Nixon]] came to Moscow in 1959 and in his "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev demonstrated how much superior were American kitchens.<ref> Susan E. Reid, ''The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 289-316, </ref> | | A central feature of the new apartments was the kitchen--people no longer had to eat in cafeterias. The Soviet kitchen was presented as a model of efficiency where one could find a bit of privacy. The kitchen gained ideological importance and was viewed as a central element of the grand program of socialist modernization, further proof of the ultimate triumph of socialism through its superior living standards. Women were to play a special role, and a number of programs and courses offered them training in home economics. The new kitchen was, above all, to be efficient, and the media portrayed this penetration of technology into everyday life as a key element of socialist modernity. In practice, women found that the promised benefits did not materialize, and to the dismay of Soviet propagandists, American Vice president [[Richard Nixon]] came to Moscow in 1959 and in his "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev demonstrated how much superior were American kitchens.<ref> Susan E. Reid, ''The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 289-316, </ref> |
| | ===Space race=== | | ===Space race=== |
| | + | Sputnik in 1957 was the first earth satellite. It proved a propagandist's dream come true. The image of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, who became in 1961 the first man to orbit the earth, was made a central theme in Soviet propaganda, used to encourage the young to contribute to the building of communism as well as to enhance Khrushchev's legitimacy as he sought to distance himself from the legacy of the Stalinist past. |
| | | | |
| | ===Religion=== | | ===Religion=== |