Changes

'''Nikita Khrushchev''' (1894 - 1971) was a Russian Communist who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953, and lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

'''Nikita Khrushchev''' (1894 - 1971) was a Russian Communist who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953, and lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

[[File:Khrush-1961.jpg|thumb|290px|Khrushchev liked to threaten and bully; ''Time'' Sept. 8, 1961]]

[[File:Khrush-1961.jpg|thumb|290px|Khrushchev liked to threaten and bully, often using "brinkmanship" (the threat of nuclear weapons); ''Time'' Sept. 8, 1961]]

==Career==

==Career==

Born to a poor peasant family, he left school at 14 and followed his father to work in distant mines. He was an ambitious working-class youth during an era of dramatic industrial growth, world war and civil war; he watched closely, met everyone of importance, and moved ahead. Joining the Communist Party in 1918 (rather late compared to other leaders) he rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming party boss first of Moscow then of all Ukraine. He played a major role in building the Moscow subway--one system that works well in Russia to this day--and in starving the kulaks who owned a few acres. Returning in 1938 to Ukraine, he was regional boss for twelve years. The Ukraine was a main theater of war and he was political commissar at the front 1941-45. He returned to Stalin's side in Moscow in 1949 in charge of agriculture, always the most essential and backward part of the economy.

Born to a poor peasant family, he left school at 14 and followed his father to work in distant mines. He was an ambitious working-class youth during an era of dramatic industrial growth, world war and civil war; he watched closely, met everyone of importance, and displayed organizational skills that moved him ahead. Joining the Communist Party in 1918 (rather late compared to other leaders) he rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming party boss first of Moscow then of all Ukraine. He played a major role in building the Moscow subway--one system that works well in Russia to this day--and in starving the kulaks who owned a few acres. Returning in 1938 to Ukraine, he was regional boss for twelve years. The Ukraine was a main theater of war and he was political commissar at the front 1941-45. He returned to Stalin's side in Moscow in 1949 in charge of agriculture, always the most essential and backward part of the economy.

==Coming to Power, 1953==

==Coming to Power, 1953==

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev and premier Georgi Malenkov united their networks against Soviet security chief Lavrenti Beria. The defection of two of Beria's deputy ministers allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria for Beria no longer had control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard. Beria was shot.  By 1957 Khrushchev had shoved Malenkov aside and had consolidated his dictatorship. His technique was to replace half the regional party leaders with his own network of loyalists, which gave him the votes to win victory in the Central Committee over the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], and Lazar Kaganovich. Officially he was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964. He lived modestly in a Kremlin apartment with his wife Nina and their children.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev and premier Georgi Malenkov united their networks against Soviet security chief Lavrenti Beria. The defection of two of Beria's deputy ministers allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria for Beria no longer had control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard. Beria was shot.  By 1957 Khrushchev had shoved Malenkov aside and had consolidated his dictatorship. His technique was to replace half the regional party leaders with his own network of loyalists, which gave him the votes to win victory in the Central Committee over the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], and Lazar Kaganovich. Officially he was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964. He lived modestly in a Kremlin apartment with his wife Nina and their children.

==Foreign policy==

==Foreign policy==

Khrushchev handled foreign policy poorly.  He had to preserve control of Eastern Europe--persuasion failed and he sent in his army. Second, he had to maintain the unity of the world Communist movement, which turned above all on relations with China. He failed and turned his most important ally into his most implacable foe.  Finally he had to de-escalate tensions and reach equilibrium with the United States.  He instead tried confrontation, leading to near disaster in 1964 until he drew back at the last second over Cuba.  More successful was his quest for prestige which centered on the [[Space Race]]--where the Soviets astonished the world by taking a clear lead over the U.S. for a few years.   

Khrushchev handled foreign policy poorly.  He had to preserve control of Eastern Europe--but persuasion failed and he sent in his army to suppress Hungary. Second, he had to maintain the unity of the world Communist movement, which turned above all on relations with China. Despite massive amounts of aid to China, he failed and made his most important ally into his most implacable foe.  Finally he had to de-escalate tensions and reach equilibrium with the United States.  He instead tried nuclear confrontation, leading to near disaster in 1962 until he drew back at the last second over Cuba.  More successful was his quest for prestige which centered on the Space Race--where the Soviets astonished the world by taking a clear lead over the U.S. for a few years.   

 

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

===Third World===

===Third World===

[[File:Khrush-chef.jpg|thumb|260px|Khrushchev cooks up trouble for the West by turning up the heat and watching to see where unrest will boil over]]

[[File:Khrush-chef.jpg|thumb|260px|Khrushchev cooks up trouble for the West by turning up the heat and watching to see where unrest will boil over]]

Seeing Kennedy's indecisiveness, he ordered the building of the [[Berlin Wall]] in 1962 to stop the exodus of talent from East Germany to freedom.  Kennedy made some speeches then accommodated to the new tyranny.  Emboldened, the Soviets expanded their subversion in weak nations, knowing that the American [[containment]] policy would force the West to defend itself under the most adverse conditions, as selected by the Kremlin.  Sums were spread widely to see where trouble would best brew.

Seeing Kennedy's indecisiveness, he ordered the building of the [[Berlin Wall]] in 1962 to stop the exodus of talent from East Germany to freedom.  Kennedy made some speeches then accommodated to the new tyranny.<ref> Petr Lunák, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside," ''Cold War History'' 2003 3(2): 53-82, </ref> Emboldened, the Soviets expanded their subversion in weak nations, knowing that the American [[containment]] policy would force the West to defend itself under the most adverse conditions, as selected by the Kremlin.  Sums were spread widely to see where trouble would best brew.

Soviet interest in the Third World grew with the aim of weakening the United States.  

Soviet interest in the Third World grew with the aim of weakening the United States.  

The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote Communist foreign policies and undercut capitalism. African leaders, however, were more interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, and carefully sidestepped the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in English and French (the former colonial languages), it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of Patrice Lumumba University (now called "Peoples' Friendship University) in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War.  Setting up Patrice Lumumba University for African students in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63.  The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref>

The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote Communist foreign policies and undercut capitalism. African leaders, however, were more interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, and carefully sidestepped the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in English and French (the former colonial languages), it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of Patrice Lumumba University (now called "Peoples' Friendship University) in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War.  Setting up Patrice Lumumba University for African students in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63.  The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref>

Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in [[Cuba]] in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets, and counted on the Kremlin to back him in direct confrontations with the U.S. Castro sponsored guerrilla movements in the region, and later in Africa, that the Russians avoided. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy.  Khrushchev blundered by allowing Casto to take the initiative, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in [[Cuba]] in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets, and counted on the Kremlin to back him in direct confrontations with the U.S. Castro sponsored guerrilla movements in the region, and later in Africa, that the Russians avoided. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy.  Khrushchev blundered by allowing Castro to take the initiative, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

===Cuban Missile Crisis===

===Cuban Missile Crisis===

===Test Ban Treaty===

===Test Ban Treaty===

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Detente?" ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Détente?" ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

==Communist lands==

==Communist lands==

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin allowed Poland to move from Stalinist rule to a more moderate regime in a relatively nonviolent manner. Khrushchev's secret speech intensified the tensions between Communist reformers and Stalinists as well as the population's disaffection with the Stalinist regime, caused by its interference in personal freedom and unlawful imprisonments, as well as economic hardships. The brutal suppression in 1956 of the Poznan uprising, a spontaneous workers' demonstration, and the election in 1956 of [[Władysław Gomulka]] (1905-82) to head of the Polish United Workers' Party helped move Poland from Stalinist rule to a more moderate regime.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin allowed Poland to move from Stalinist rule to a more moderate regime in a relatively nonviolent manner. Khrushchev's secret speech intensified the tensions between Communist reformers and Stalinists as well as the population's disaffection with the Stalinist regime, caused by its interference in personal freedom and unlawful imprisonments, as well as economic hardships. The brutal suppression in 1956 of the Poznan uprising, a spontaneous workers' demonstration, and the election in 1956 of [[Władysław Gomulka]] (1905-82) to head of the Polish United Workers' Party helped move Poland from Stalinist rule to a more moderate regime.

===China===

===China===

Khrushchev badly mishandled China--first delivering generous aid, far beyond what his colleagues wanted or he had budgeted, even promising a transfer of a nuclear bomb; then swinging to the opposite extreme, suddenly withdrawing all Soviet technicians and canceling works in progress.  The issue however was deeper than the foolish diplomacy of two rival dictators.  China was bigger, older, more cultured and resented the upstart Russians who flaunted their greater wealth and more powerful weapons. Relations drastically worsened from Khrushchev's September 1959 visit to Beijing through the breakdown of compromise in October 1961. Each party sought to appeal to the world as the legitimate party of proletarian internationalism and anti-capitalist revolution. Specific areas of disagreement included the Moscow's refusal to support China in its border conflict with India, which was becoming a Soviet ally. Beijing worried about of Moscow's willingness to talk disarmament with the United States, with the possible threat of a Soviet-American alliance against China. Mao had aggressive plans for advancing Marxist-Leninist goals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and conflict with Soviet agents in those places was inevitable.  Indeed, after 1960 the pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions emerged in most Communist parties and sharply weakened them.<ref> Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, "Competing for Leadership: Split or Detente in the Sino-soviet Bloc, 1959-1961," ''International History Review,'' 2008 30(3): 545-574, </ref>   

Khrushchev badly mishandled China--first delivering generous aid, far beyond what his colleagues wanted or he had budgeted, amounting to 7% of Soviet GDP. He sent in the best technicians and the latest equipment, and helped China design its own nuclear weapons. Then Khrushchev swung to the opposite extreme, suddenly withdrawing all Soviet technicians and canceling works in progress.  The issue however was deeper than the foolish diplomacy of two rival dictators.  The Chinese resented being treated as second class Communists. China was bigger, older, more cultured and resented the upstart Russians who flaunted their greater wealth and more powerful weapons. Most important, China resented Russia's willingness to compromise with capitalism in "peaceful coexistence."  Relations drastically worsened from Khrushchev's September 1959 visit to Beijing through the breakdown of compromise in October 1961. Each party sought to appeal to the world as the legitimate party of proletarian internationalism, but China appealed more to the younger, more violent anti-capitalist fanatics. Specific areas of disagreement included the Moscow's refusal to support China in its border conflict with India, which was becoming a Soviet ally. Beijing worried about of Moscow's willingness to talk disarmament with the United States, with the possible threat of a Soviet-American alliance against China. Mao had aggressive plans for advancing Marxist-Leninist goals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and conflict with Soviet agents in those places was inevitable.  Indeed, after 1960 the pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions emerged in most Communist parties and sharply weakened them.<ref> Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, "Competing for Leadership: Split or Detente in the Sino-soviet Bloc, 1959-1961," ''International History Review,'' 2008 30(3): 545-574, </ref>   

==Domestic issues==

==Domestic issues==

Khrushchev's years of power were marked by strong economic growth, especially in industry; agriculture lagged behind. This was the setting fro the growing confidence in the long-term success of scientific socialism, buttressed by public opinion that was grateful for the slowly rising standard higher standard of living after so many decades of privation.  The growth rate was slowing down by 1964, but the Soviets--who lacked accurate statistical measures of their own economy, did not yet realize the sclerosis that was to emerge a decade after Khrushchev was forced into retirement.<ref> Historians use data by the American [[CIA]], which had much better estimates of Soviet economic performance.</ref>

Khrushchev's years of power were marked by strong economic growth, especially in industry; agriculture lagged behind. This was the setting fro the growing confidence in the long-term success of scientific socialism, buttressed by public opinion that was grateful for the slowly rising standard higher standard of living after so many decades of privation.  The growth rate was slowing down by 1964, but the Soviets--who lacked accurate statistical measures of their own economy, did not yet realize the sclerosis that was to emerge a decade after Khrushchev was forced into retirement.<ref> Historians use data by the American [[CIA]], which had much better estimates of Soviet economic performance.</ref>

===Agricultural reform===

===Agricultural reform===

The space industry demonstrated that modern management could be applied in Russia; it was much applauded but seldom emulated.  There was little reform in heavy industry. Instead of adopting modern principles of management as practiced in other industrialized countries, from the 1950s to the 1990s there was a continuation of the old Soviet pattern of inner-circle intrigues, shuffling the same old bureaucrats and functionaries around the same old posts and flailing around from one set of measures to another. The military carved out its own industrial sector, where productivity was somewhat higher.

The space industry demonstrated that modern management could be applied in Russia; it was much applauded but seldom emulated.  There was little reform in heavy industry. Instead of adopting modern principles of management as practiced in other industrialized countries, from the 1950s to the 1990s there was a continuation of the old Soviet pattern of inner-circle intrigues, shuffling the same old bureaucrats and functionaries around the same old posts and flailing around from one set of measures to another. The military carved out its own industrial sector, where productivity was somewhat higher.

===Housing===

===Housing===

Khrushchev presided over the construction of millions small drab, poorly built apartments for 108 million residents. Most were 5-story walkups (elevators were too expensive for the poor nation); people called them "Krushchoby" (combining his name with the word for slums). Typically there were three generations squeezed into a couple rooms--parents, children, and a widowed mother. (Because of the wars, the old people were mostly women.)  The apartments boosted his popularity because they marked a dramatic improvement over the horrid housing they previously enjoyed, and led to a form of "ownership" whereby tenants were locked into their specific apartment with very little opportunity to move around--rather like rent controlled apartments in New York at the same time.<ref>Taubman (2003), p 382;  Mark B.  Smith,  "Individual Forms of Ownership in the Urban Housing Fund of the USSR, 1944-64," ''Slavonic & East European Review'' 2008 86(2): 283-305; Steven E. Harris, "'We Too Want To Live in Normal Apartments': Soviet Mass Housing and the Marginalization of the Elderly Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev," ''The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review'', Volume 32, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 143-174 in Ingentia </ref>  

Khrushchev presided over the construction of millions small drab, poorly built apartments for 108 million residents. Most were 5-story walkups (elevators were too expensive for the poor nation). Techniques of prefabrication allowed cheap factory production with fewer skilled construction workers but minimized quality control; people called them "Krushchoby" (combining his name with the word for slums). Typically there were three generations squeezed into a couple rooms--parents, children, and a widowed mother. (Because of the wars, the old people were mostly women.)  The apartments boosted his popularity because they marked a dramatic improvement over the horrid housing they previously enjoyed, and led to a form of "ownership" whereby tenants were locked into their specific apartment with very little opportunity to move around--rather like rent controlled apartments in New York at the same time.<ref>Taubman (2003), p 382;  Mark B.  Smith,  "Individual Forms of Ownership in the Urban Housing Fund of the USSR, 1944-64," ''Slavonic & East European Review'' 2008 86(2): 283-305; Steven E. Harris, "'We Too Want To Live in Normal Apartments': Soviet Mass Housing and the Marginalization of the Elderly Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev," ''The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review'', Volume 32, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 143-174 in Ingentia </ref>  

[[File:Kitchen-debate.jpg|thumb|Vice President Nixon boasts to Khrushchev of the superiority of American kitchens; Leonid Brezhnev, who later overthrew Khrushchev, is on the right]]

[[File:Kitchen-debate.jpg|thumb|Vice President Nixon boasts to Khrushchev of the superiority of American kitchens; Leonid Brezhnev, who later overthrew Khrushchev, is on the right]]

A central feature of the new apartments was the kitchen--families no longer had to eat in communal settings. The Soviet kitchen was presented as a model of efficiency where one could find a bit of privacy. The kitchen gained ideological importance and was viewed as a central element of the grand program of socialist modernization, further proof of the ultimate triumph of socialism through its superior living standards. Women were to play a special role, and a number of programs and courses offered them training in home economics. The new kitchen was, above all, to be efficient, and the media portrayed this penetration of technology into everyday life as a key element of socialist modernity. In practice, women found that the promised benefits did not materialize, and to the dismay of Soviet propagandists, American Vice President [[Richard Nixon]] came to Moscow in 1959 and in his internationally publicized "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev demonstrated how much superior were American kitchens.<ref> Susan E. Reid, ''The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 289-316; Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,"  ''Slavic Review,'' Vol. 61, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 211-252  [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2697116 in JSTOR] </ref>

A central feature of the new apartments was the kitchen--families no longer had to eat in communal settings. The Soviet kitchen was presented as a model of efficiency where one could find a bit of privacy. The kitchen gained ideological importance and was viewed as a central element of the grand program of socialist modernization, further proof of the ultimate triumph of socialism through its superior living standards. Women were to play a special role, and a number of programs and courses offered them training in home economics. The new kitchen was, above all, to be efficient, and the media portrayed this penetration of technology into everyday life as a key element of socialist modernity. In practice, women found that the promised benefits did not materialize, and to the dismay of Soviet propagandists, American Vice President [[Richard Nixon]] came to Moscow in 1959 and in his internationally publicized "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev demonstrated how much superior were American kitchens.<ref> Susan E. Reid, ''The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 289-316; Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,"  ''Slavic Review,'' Vol. 61, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 211-252  [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2697116 in JSTOR] </ref>

===Religion===

===Religion===

Under Lenin and Stalin before 1939 all churches were persecuted and ridiculed; there was a pause during World War II. Khrushchev was no friend of the [[Orthodox Church]], and greatly increased persecution in the late 1950s because he identified it with old-fashioned superstitions that would slow his schemes for the rapid modernization of agriculture. Khrushchev had the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 issued a secret resolution, "On the Serious Defects in Scientific-Atheist Propaganda and Measures for the Improvement Thereof," which demanded new and more scientific standards of struggle against religion. An antireligious campaign, the exact causes and chain of command of which are still debatable, was launched in the second half of the 1950s, and systematic efforts were used to fight not just priests and churches but also to identify and track and isolate all Christians. Khrushchev wanted to reach the very essence of the people's religiousness in order to "cure" them.  Half the remaining churches were closed; the others were taxed. The campaign perhaps worked in Latvia, which did give up Lutheranism. In Russia, however, at the local level cures were few. More often, ways were found in which religion and the Soviet system could coexist. The Party found it expedient to ignore religious activity that did not interfere with technological improvements, and the peasants and workers found quiet ways to ensure their religious practices were compatible with participation in the new society. Outward repression like the closing of churches and the prohibition of pilgrimages occurred but were not enough to attain the primary goal of replacing the religious person in rural Russia with the Soviet person.  He predicted the end of Christianity in the Soviet Union and boasted that the last Christian would be paraded on Soviet television within a few years.<ref>http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=2462&cid=125&p=22.05.2006</ref> In fact, Christianity outlasted Khrushchev, and even outlived Communism in Russia.  He tried to change the soul of Russia and failed.<ref>Andrew B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': the Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union," ''Russian Review'' 2008 67(2): 296-320, </ref>  

Under Lenin and Stalin before 1939 all churches were persecuted and ridiculed; there was a pause during World War II. Khrushchev was no friend of the [[Orthodox Church]], and greatly increased persecution in the late 1950s because he identified it with old-fashioned superstitions that would slow his schemes for the rapid modernization of agriculture. Khrushchev had the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 issued a secret resolution, "On the Serious Defects in Scientific-Atheist Propaganda and Measures for the Improvement Thereof," which demanded new and more scientific standards of struggle against religion. An antireligious campaign, the exact causes and chain of command of which are still debatable, was launched in the second half of the 1950s, and systematic efforts were used to fight not just priests and churches but also to identify and track and isolate all Christians. Khrushchev wanted to reach the very essence of the people's religiousness in order to "cure" them.  Half the remaining churches were closed; the others were taxed. The campaign perhaps worked in Latvia, which did give up Lutheranism. In Russia, however, at the local level cures were few. More often, ways were found in which religion and the Soviet system could coexist. The Party found it expedient to ignore religious activity that did not interfere with technological improvements, and the peasants and workers found quiet ways to ensure their religious practices were compatible with participation in the new society. Outward repression like the closing of churches and the prohibition of pilgrimages occurred but were not enough to attain the primary goal of replacing the religious person in rural Russia with the Soviet person.  He predicted the end of Christianity in the Soviet Union and boasted that the last Christian would be paraded on Soviet television within a few years.<ref>http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=2462&cid=125&p=22.05.2006</ref> In fact, Christianity outlasted Khrushchev, and even outlived Communism in Russia.  He tried to change the soul of Russia and failed.<ref>Andrew B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': the Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union," ''Russian Review'' 2008 67(2): 296-320; Tatiana A. Chumachenko, ''Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years'' (2002).  [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Lwf0Qy3S5csC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Chumachenko+Roslof&ots=Nz9Ta44nxo&sig=PWspflHYPDkp4xu_fPVweCled2s#v=onepage&q=&f=false excerpt and text search]</ref>  

 

[[File:~nikita.jpg|thumb|310px]]

[[File:~nikita.jpg|thumb|310px]]

[[Category:Ukraine]]

[[Category:Ukraine]]

[[Category:1950s]]

[[Category:1950s]]

[[Category:1960s]]

[[Category:1960s]]