Changes

===Yalta===

===Yalta===

On New Year's Day, 1945, [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>[[#refRomerstein01|Romerstein, Breindel 2001]]: 212-215; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; [[#refSword|Andrew, Mitrokin 2000]]: 111. Upon being “purged” from AAA, Communist ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2850 [PDF 16]) lawyer [[Lee Pressman]] was immediately hired back into the government by [[Harry Hopkins|Hopkins]] ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2849 [PDF 15]), who apparently had little regard for the law: According to Pressman, Hopkins told him, “The first time you tell me I can’t do what I want to do, you’re fired. I’m going to decide what I think has to be done and it’s up to you to see to it that it’s legal.” ([[#refGall99|Gall 1999]]: 32) After carefully examining [[Venona project|Venona]], the late U.S. Air Force historian Eduard Mark identified Hopkins as Soviet agent “19.” Edward Mark, "[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface?content=a789090332&rt=0&format=pdf Venona's Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?]" ''Intelligence and National Security'', Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp.1-31</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conferences" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messrs. Bowman and Alger Hiss ought to go."<ref>[[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif 439]</ref> "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]] ("a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" according to the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]),<ref>[[#refIPR52|S. Rept. 2050]]: 214-218 (PDF 222-226)</ref> whose intimate friend and patron at the [[White House]]<ref>[[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]] wrote that when in Washington, he used [[Lauchlin Currie|Currie]]’s office (“I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90”), and that when Currie was out, Lattimore handled his mail: “Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away.” ([[#refIPR9|IPR pt. 9]]: 3199-3200 [PDF 311-312]) While serving as [[FDR]]’s personal advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]], Lattimore was sending coded messages to the Communists, according to Chinese military intelligence. ([[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 395) According to Stanley Hornbeck, Currie admitted responsibility for Lattimore’s appointment: “I asked who had suggested to President Roosevelt the nomination of Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Currie replied that he, Currie, had.” ([[#refIPR9|IPR pt. 9]]: 3209-3210 [PDF 321-322])</ref> was [http://www.salon.com/news/col/horo/1999/12/06/weisberg/print.html Soviet spy] [[Lauchlin Currie]].<ref>Currie was [[#refBerle|identified by Chambers]] and [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=9906&week=b&msg=QzpZF2kgcbL8dEBvU%2BfyYw&user=&pw= independently by Bentley], as well as [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=9906&week=d&msg=lPD3vPuXuLZMFEHUHuo%2B5w&user=&pw= Soviet archives]; [[Anatoly Gorsky|Gorsky]] identified [[Lauchlin Currie|Currie]] as the Soviet agent code-named "PAZh/Page" ([[#refVasBlack|Vassiliev Black Notebook]]: Orig. 40; Trans. 78; cf. [[#refBLH05|Bachman, Leich, Haynes 2005]]; [[#refLowCher|Lowenthal, Chervonnaya 2005]]), who is recorded in [[Venona]] giving [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1944/14oct_pazh_eleron_albert_robert.pdf information to Akhmerov] and "handing over [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1945/20mar_illegal_albert.pdf documents" to Silvermaster]. Currie later admitted having tipped off the Soviets about U.S. efforts to break the Soviet code. [[#refOlmstead02|Olmstead 2002]]: 49</ref>

On New Year's Day, 1945, [[Secretary of State]] [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stettinius-edward-reilly Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] told [[Harry Hopkins]] (whom [[Iskhak Akhmerov|Akhmerov]] called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Gordievsky)<ref>[[#refRomerstein01|Romerstein, Breindel 2001]]: 212-215; cf. Thomas Fleming, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=EyZ3AAAAMAAJ The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II]'' (Basic Books, 2001) ISBN 0465024645, pp. 320-321; [[#refSword|Andrew, Mitrokin 2000]]: 111. Upon being “purged” from AAA, Communist ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2850 [PDF 16]) lawyer [[Lee Pressman]] was immediately hired back into the government by [[Harry Hopkins|Hopkins]] ([[#refHUAC50.2|HUAC 1950, pt. 2]]: 2849 [PDF 15]), who apparently had little regard for the law: According to Pressman, Hopkins told him, “The first time you tell me I can’t do what I want to do, you’re fired. I’m going to decide what I think has to be done and it’s up to you to see to it that it’s legal.” ([[#refGall99|Gall 1999]]: 32) After carefully examining [[Venona project|Venona]], the late U.S. Air Force historian Eduard Mark identified Hopkins as Soviet agent “19.” Edward Mark, "[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface?content=a789090332&rt=0&format=pdf Venona's Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?]" ''Intelligence and National Security'', Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp.1-31</ref> that he had a meeting scheduled for the next day with [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]], to which he was to bring "people who would be involved in the forthcoming [[Yalta conference|conferences" at Yalta]], in [[Soviet]] [[Crimea]]. According to the Secretary, [[FDR]] "did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messrs. Bowman and Alger Hiss ought to go."<ref>[[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945/XL/0525.gif 439]</ref> "Bowman" was Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University [http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0900web/red.html who hired] [[Owen Lattimore]].

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a visibly haggard Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref> With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a visibly haggard Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10)</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref> With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].