Changes

In 1954 in ''Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka'' 347 US 483 that the Court under the firm guidance of Chief Justice [[Earl Warren]] unanimously held that separate facilities were inherently unequal in the area of public schools. It effectively overturning ''Plessy v. Ferguson'', and outlawing Jim Crow in other areas of society as well. A series of followup decisions slowly dismantled the state-sponsored school segregation laws, but left standing most segregation in practice.  

In 1954 in ''Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka'' 347 US 483 that the Court under the firm guidance of Chief Justice [[Earl Warren]] unanimously held that separate facilities were inherently unequal in the area of public schools. It effectively overturning ''Plessy v. Ferguson'', and outlawing Jim Crow in other areas of society as well. A series of followup decisions slowly dismantled the state-sponsored school segregation laws, but left standing most segregation in practice.  

===Informal segregation===

===Informal segregation===

Besides state laws that compelled segregation of the races, private organizations were almost wholly segregated in the South, and largely so in the North, on the basis of their own rules and traditions.  Blacks could not buy houses in certain neighborhoods, nor join labor unions that controlled access to many skileld strades. The Supreme Court undercut private discrimination in ''Shelley v. Kraemer'' 334 US 1 (1948), in which it held that "restrictive covenants" that barred sale of homes to blacks or Jews or Asians could not be enforced in courts. The restrictive covenants, however, remained in place until 1964.

Most clubs and labior unions in the North excluded blacks--not on the basis of state law but on the basis of their own rules and traditions.  Blacks could not buy houses in certain neighborhoods, nor join labor unions that controlled access to many skilled trades.

 

The Supreme Court undercut private discrimination in ''Shelley v. Kraemer'' 334 US 1 (1948), in which it held that "restrictive covenants" that barred sale of homes to blacks or Jews or Asians could not be enforced in courts. The restrictive covenants, however, remained in place until 1964.

The Supreme Court was unwilling, however, to attack other forms of de facto private discrimination; it reasoned that private parties did not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution when they discriminated, because they were not "state actors" covered by that clause.  

The Supreme Court was unwilling, however, to attack other forms of de facto private discrimination; it reasoned that private parties did not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution when they discriminated, because they were not "state actors" covered by that clause.