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| | In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. He said official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the '''International Security Assistance Force''', or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal reported. | | In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. He said official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the '''International Security Assistance Force''', or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal reported. |
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| − | McChrystal told Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."<ref> [Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html ''Washington Post,'' Sept 21, 2009] </ref> | + | McChrystal told Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure." By Nove,mber no decision had been made on the urgent requet<ref> [Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html ''Washington Post,'' Sept 21, 2009] </ref>. |
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| | + | For recent American involvement see [[Afghanistan War]] |
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| − | For recent American involvement see [[Afghanistan War]]
| + | The 2009 presidential election was badly tainted by fraud. Former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, the main opponent of President [[Hamid Karzai]], pulled out of the runoff in November, and Karzai was declared reelected for another five year term. His legitimacy and support was seriously weakened by the election frauds, but the U.S., NATO, and the UN have agreed to keep him in power. |
| | ==Weaknesses== | | ==Weaknesses== |
| | The pro-Karzai Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara Shiites and Uzbeks that form the ruling coalition are not united, and the government they dominate is extremely weak and poverty-stricken. The Afghan government controls only 30% of the country. The country is resource-poor -- there is no oil--and the only rich resource is opium poppies. There is no educated base for a competent bureaucracy, and the army is little more than an amateur collection of tribal militias. 90% of the soldiers are illiterate, making them very hard to train to modern standards. | | The pro-Karzai Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara Shiites and Uzbeks that form the ruling coalition are not united, and the government they dominate is extremely weak and poverty-stricken. The Afghan government controls only 30% of the country. The country is resource-poor -- there is no oil--and the only rich resource is opium poppies. There is no educated base for a competent bureaucracy, and the army is little more than an amateur collection of tribal militias. 90% of the soldiers are illiterate, making them very hard to train to modern standards. |
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| | ==Government and Political Conditions== | | ==Government and Political Conditions== |
| | + | On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held its first national democratic presidential election. More than 8 million Afghans voted, 41% of whom were women. Hamid Karzai was the winner and was inaugurated on December 7 for a five-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president. |
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| − | | + | An election was held on September 18, 2005 for the “Wolesi Jirga” (lower house) of Afghanistan's new bicameral National Assembly and for the country's 34 provincial councils. Turnout for the election was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The first democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 was inaugurated on December 19, 2005. |
| − | On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held its first national democratic presidential election. More than 8 million Afghans voted, 41% of whom were women. Hamid Karzai was announced as the official winner on November 3 and inaugurated on December 7 for a five-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president. On December 23, 2004, President Karzai announced new cabinet appointments, naming three women as ministers.
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| − | An election was held on September 18, 2005 for the “Wolesi Jirga” (lower house) of Afghanistan's new bicameral National Assembly and for the country's 34 provincial councils. Turnout for the election was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The Afghan constitution provides for indirect election of the National Assembly's “Meshrano Jirga” (upper house) by the provincial councils and by reserved presidential appointments. The first democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 was inaugurated on December 19, 2005. | |
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| | The government's authority is weak; its ability to deliver necessary social services remains largely dependent on funds from the international donor community. Between 2001-2006, the United States committed over $12 billion to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At an international donors' conference in Berlin in April 2004, donors pledged a total of $8.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction over the three-year period 2004-2007. At the end of January 2006, the international community gathered in London and renewed its political and reconstruction support for Afghanistan in the form of the Afghanistan Compact. | | The government's authority is weak; its ability to deliver necessary social services remains largely dependent on funds from the international donor community. Between 2001-2006, the United States committed over $12 billion to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At an international donors' conference in Berlin in April 2004, donors pledged a total of $8.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction over the three-year period 2004-2007. At the end of January 2006, the international community gathered in London and renewed its political and reconstruction support for Afghanistan in the form of the Afghanistan Compact. |