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→‎Prelude: link Halleck
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In June 1862 President [[Abraham Lincoln]] and Secretary of War [[Edwin M. Stanton]] were searching for a solution to an embarrassing deadlock in Virginia. Federal operations in the trans-Allegheny west had gone relatively well with the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the standoff at the [[Battle of Shiloh]]. By comparison, in the east, Northern units had experienced a chain of defeats at the hands of [[Stonewall Jackson]] in the Shenandoah Valley. The superbly equipped and trained Army of the Potomac from which so much had been expected was in an apparent stalemate before attempting to seize Richmond after inching its way for months up the Peninsula. The two civilian leaders brought two western generals to Virginia in the hope of reviving the situation.  
 
In June 1862 President [[Abraham Lincoln]] and Secretary of War [[Edwin M. Stanton]] were searching for a solution to an embarrassing deadlock in Virginia. Federal operations in the trans-Allegheny west had gone relatively well with the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the standoff at the [[Battle of Shiloh]]. By comparison, in the east, Northern units had experienced a chain of defeats at the hands of [[Stonewall Jackson]] in the Shenandoah Valley. The superbly equipped and trained Army of the Potomac from which so much had been expected was in an apparent stalemate before attempting to seize Richmond after inching its way for months up the Peninsula. The two civilian leaders brought two western generals to Virginia in the hope of reviving the situation.  
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The first to arrive was Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was appointed on 26 June 1862 to command a new creation, the Army of Virginia. This force was composed of the various hitherto-independent commands that had operated to such little effect in Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley that spring. Many of the units collectively had experienced a severe hammering from Stonewall Jackson while others were suffering from lack of discipline and poor leadership. General Pope was followed on 11 July by Maj. Gen. [[Henry W. Halleck]], who was appointed General in Chief with directing authority over both Pope and Maj. Gen. [[George B. McClellan]], commanding the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula.  
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The first to arrive was Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was appointed on 26 June 1862 to command a new creation, the Army of Virginia. This force was composed of the various hitherto-independent commands that had operated to such little effect in Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley that spring. Many of the units collectively had experienced a severe hammering from Stonewall Jackson while others were suffering from lack of discipline and poor leadership. General Pope was followed on 11 July by Maj. Gen. [[Henry Wager Halleck|Henry W. Halleck]], who was appointed General in Chief with directing authority over both Pope and Maj. Gen. [[George B. McClellan]], commanding the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula.  
    
The 26 June orders creating the Army of Virginia specified that it should "operate in such manner as while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel force under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville and render the most effective aid to relieve Gen. McClellan and capture [[Richmond]]."  
 
The 26 June orders creating the Army of Virginia specified that it should "operate in such manner as while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel force under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville and render the most effective aid to relieve Gen. McClellan and capture [[Richmond]]."  
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Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly before he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen river were well covered, with most of Pope's army concentrated between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. The Federal fight was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation, "If one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages." He thus split his forces and sent Jackson's force completely around Pope's northern flank. His objective was to bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be his, forcing Pope to fight on his terms. He knew from the captured papers that Pope was being controlled from Washington, which control required him to keep links to Aquia and along the river line, thus impairing his initiative and freedom of action. Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in Pope's army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. Jackson's move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, thus spreading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms favorable to the Confederates.  
 
Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly before he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen river were well covered, with most of Pope's army concentrated between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. The Federal fight was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation, "If one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages." He thus split his forces and sent Jackson's force completely around Pope's northern flank. His objective was to bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be his, forcing Pope to fight on his terms. He knew from the captured papers that Pope was being controlled from Washington, which control required him to keep links to Aquia and along the river line, thus impairing his initiative and freedom of action. Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in Pope's army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. Jackson's move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, thus spreading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms favorable to the Confederates.  
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Jackson did not tell his senior commanders his plans, but merely started his corps moving after a conference with Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart. He left behind his quartermaster and subsistence trains, but brought along his cattle herd, ordnance, and ambulance trains. The men were ordered to carry three days' rations and foraging was allowed. The route to be followed was selected by Jackson's chief engineer Capt. J. Keith Boswell and screened by cavalry raised in the region.  
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Jackson did not tell his senior commanders his plans, but merely started his corps moving after a conference with Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart. He left behind his quartermaster and subsistence trains, but brought along his cattle herd, ordnance, and ambulance trains. The men were ordered to carry three days' rations and foraging was allowed. The route to be followed was selected by Jackson's chief engineer Capt. J. Keith Boswell and screened by cavalry raised in the region.
    
==The March Around Pope==
 
==The March Around Pope==
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