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Americans had no inkling that a war was approaching in 1914. Over 100,000 were caught unawares when the war started, having traveled to Europe for tourism, business or to visit relatives. Their repatriation was handled by [[Herbert Hoover]], an American private citizen based in London.  The U.S. government, under the firm control of President [[Woodrow Wilson]], called for neutrality "in thought and deed."  Apart from an Anglophile element supporting Britain, public opinion went along at first.  Wilson kept the economy on a peacetime basis, and made no preparations or plans for the war. He insisted on keeping the army and navy on its small peacetime bases. Indeed, Washington refused even to study the lessons of military or economic mobilization that had been learned so painfully across the sea.

Americans had no inkling that a war was approaching in 1914. Over 100,000 were caught unawares when the war started, having traveled to Europe for tourism, business or to visit relatives. Their repatriation was handled by [[Herbert Hoover]], an American private citizen based in London.  The U.S. government, under the firm control of President [[Woodrow Wilson]], called for neutrality "in thought and deed."  Apart from an Anglophile element supporting Britain, public opinion went along at first.  Wilson kept the economy on a peacetime basis, and made no preparations or plans for the war. He insisted on keeping the army and navy on its small peacetime bases. Indeed, Washington refused even to study the lessons of military or economic mobilization that had been learned so painfully across the sea.

==Submarine issue==

==Submarine issue==

The most important indirect strategy used by the belligerents was the blockade: starve the enemy of food and the military machine will be crippled and perhaps the civilians will demand an end to the war. The Royal Navy successfully stopped the shipment of most war supplies and food to Germany. Neutral American ships that tried to trade with Germany (which international law clearly allowed), were seized or turned back. The strangulation came about very slowly, because Germany and its allies controlled extensive farmlands and raw materials, but it eventually worked because Germany and Austria took so many farmers into their armies. By 1918 the German cities were on the verge of starvation; the front-line soldiers were on short rations and were running out of essential supplies. The Allied blockade had done its job. The Germans also considered a blockade. "England wants to starve us," said Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]], the man who built the German fleet and who remained a key advisor to the Kaiser. "We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and destroy every ship that endeavors to break the blockade."<ref> Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917'' p.115 quote from Dec 1914</ref>  Unable to challenge the more powerful Royal Navy on the surface, Tirpitz wanted to scare off merchant and passenger ships en route to Britain. He knew from his close reading of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] that a blockade would not itself win the war. But he reasoned that since the island of Britain depended on imports of food, raw materials and manufactured goods, scaring off even half the ships would effectively undercut its long-term ability to maintain an army on the Western Front. While Germany only had nine long-range U-boats at the start of the war, it had ample shipyard capacity to build the hundreds that would be needed. The problem was that the U.S. demanded Germany respect international law, which protected neutral American ships on the high seas from seizure or sinking by either belligerent. (Other neutral nations made the same point; Berlin was probably more solicitous of Italy in than the US because Italy had an army.) Furthermore, Americans insisted that the drowning of innocent civilians was barbaric and grounds for a declaration of war. The British frequently violated America's neutral rights by seizing ships, but they did not drown anyone.<ref>Charles Cruttwell, '' A history of the great war, 1914-1918‎'' (1940) p 191 </ref>  As Wilson's top advisor, [[Colonel House]] commented, "The British have gone as far as they possibly could in violating neutral rights, though they have done it in the most courteous way." When Wilson exploded in protest at British violations of American neutrality, the British backed down (or the American ambassador, notoriously biased toward Britain, softened his chief's angry words.) German submarines torpedoed ships without warning, and some sailors and passengers drowned. Berlin explained that submarines were so vulnerable that they dare not surface near merchant ships that might be carrying guns, and anyway the subs were so small they could not rescue crews. Military "necessity" again.  

The most important indirect strategy used by the belligerents was the blockade: starve the enemy of food and the military machine will be crippled and perhaps the civilians will demand an end to the war. The Royal Navy successfully stopped the shipment of most war supplies and food to Germany. Neutral American ships that tried to trade with Germany (which international law clearly allowed), were seized or turned back. The strangulation came about very slowly, because Germany and its allies controlled extensive farmlands and raw materials, but it eventually worked because Germany and Austria took so many farmers into their armies. By 1918 the German cities were on the verge of starvation; the front-line soldiers were on short rations and were running out of essential supplies. The Allied blockade had done its job. The Germans also considered a blockade. "England wants to starve us," said Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]], the man who built the German fleet and who remained a key advisor to the Kaiser. "We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and destroy every ship that endeavors to break the blockade."<ref> Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917'' p.115 quote from Dec 1914</ref>  Unable to challenge the more powerful Royal Navy on the surface, Tirpitz wanted to scare off merchant and passenger ships en route to Britain. He knew from his close reading of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] that a blockade would not itself win the war. But he reasoned that since the island of Britain depended on imports of food, raw materials and manufactured goods, scaring off even half the ships would effectively undercut its long-term ability to maintain an army on the Western Front. While Germany only had nine long-range U-boats at the start of the war, it had ample shipyard capacity to build the hundreds that would be needed. The problem was that the U.S. demanded Germany respect international law, which protected neutral American ships on the high seas from seizure or sinking by either belligerent. (Other neutral nations made the same point; Berlin was probably more solicitous of Italy in than the US because Italy had an army.) Furthermore, Americans insisted that the drowning of innocent civilians was barbaric and grounds for a declaration of war. The British frequently violated America's neutral rights by seizing ships, but they did not drown anyone.<ref>Charles Cruttwell, '' A history of the great war, 1914-1918‎'' (1940) p 191 </ref>  As Wilson's top advisor, [[Colonel House]] commented, "The British have gone as far as they possibly could in violating neutral rights, though they have done it in the most courteous way." When Wilson exploded in protest at British violations of American neutrality, the British backed down (or the American ambassador, notoriously biased toward Britain, softened his chief's angry words.) German submarines torpedoed ships without warning, and some sailors and passengers drowned. Berlin explained that submarines were so vulnerable that they dare not surface near merchant ships that might be carrying guns, and anyway the subs were so small they could not rescue crews. Military "necessity" again. Britain armed most of its merchant ships with medium calibre guns that could sink a submarine, making an above-water attacks too risky.  

 

Britain armed most of its merchant ships with medium calibre guns that could sink a submarine, making an above-water attacks too risky. In February, 1915, the U.S. sharply warned Germany about misuse of submarines but on May 7, the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was torpedoed with the loss of 1,198 civilians, including 128 Americans. The American outcry was far more intense than would accompany the deliberate shooting down or sabotage of a civilian airliner in the 1980s or 1990s, but not as sharp as the response to the [[9-11 Attack]] in 2001. The ''Lusitania'' sinking was the event that decisively swung American opinion. Washington gave Berlin an ultimatum--never do that again! Berlin acquiesced, ordering its submarines to avoid passenger ships. But by January 1917 Generals [[Hindenburg]] and [[Ludendorff]] decided that unrestricted submarine blockade was the only way to break the stalemate on the Western Front. They demanded that Kaiser [[Wilhelm II]] order unrestricted submarine warfare be resumed. Berlin knew that meant war with the United States, but they gambled that they could win before America's potential strength could be mobilized. They vastly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and how much that would weaken Britain; they did not figure out that convoys would defeat their efforts. They were correct in seeing that the United States was so weak militarily that it could not be a factor on the Western Front for more than a year. The civilian government in Berlin objected, but the Kaiser sided with the military.<ref>  Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917''  p 414</ref>   

In February, 1915, the U.S. sharply warned Germany about misuse of submarines but on May 7, the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was torpedoed with the loss of 1,198 civilians, including 128 Americans. The American outcry was far more intense than would accompany the deliberate shooting down or sabotage of a civilian airliner in the 1980s or 1990s, but not as sharp as the response to the [[9-11 Attack]] in 2001. The ''Lusitania'' sinking was the event that decisively swung American opinion. Washington gave Berlin an ultimatum--never do that again! Berlin acquiesced, ordering its submarines to avoid passenger ships. But by January 1917 Generals [[Hindenburg]] and [[Ludendorff]] decided that unrestricted submarine blockade was the only way to break the stalemate on the Western Front. They demanded that Kaiser [[Wilhelm II]] order unrestricted submarine warfare be resumed. Berlin knew that meant war with the United States, but they gambled that they could win before America's potential strength could be mobilized. They vastly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and how much that would weaken Britain; they did not figure out that convoys would defeat their efforts. They were correct in seeing that the United States was so weak militarily that it could not be a factor on the Western Front for more than a year. The civilian government in Berlin objected, but the Kaiser was controlled by the military and ordered the attacks to begin.<ref>  Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917''  p 414</ref>   

 

Wilson believed that peace would never come to a world that contained aggressive, powerful, non-democratic militaristic states. Peace required a world based on free democracies. There was never a possibility for compromise between these polar situations. America had to fight for democracy, or it would be fighting perpetually against ever-stronger evil enemies (stronger because they would gobble up weak neighbors whenever they could.)  Was the American dedication to neutral rights and opposition to submarines sincere? In the 1920s and 1930s the world repeatedly condemned unrestricted submarine warfare. After [[Pearl Harbor]] in 1941, however, President [[Franklin Roosevelt]], who held the key role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy throughout the first war, did not recognize any neutrality. He ordered his submarines to sink on sight all ships in Japanese waters, with no regard to passengers. (Indeed, thousands of American prisoners of war were drowned.) Despite this later reversal, in 1915-1917 Washington and the American people were dead serious about their opposition to unrestricted submarine attacks on neutral ships. They clearly told Germany they would fight for the principle.

Wilson believed that peace would never come to a world that contained aggressive, powerful, non-democratic militaristic states. Peace required a world based on free democracies. There was never a possibility for compromise between these polar situations. America had to fight for democracy, or it would be fighting perpetually against ever-stronger evil enemies (stronger because they would gobble up weak neighbors whenever they could.)  Was the American dedication to neutral rights and opposition to submarines sincere? In the 1920s and 1930s the world repeatedly condemned unrestricted submarine warfare. After [[Pearl Harbor]] in 1941, however, President [[Franklin Roosevelt]], who held the key role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy throughout the first war, did not recognize any neutrality. He ordered his submarines to sink on sight all ships in Japanese waters, with no regard to passengers. (Indeed, thousands of American prisoners of war were drowned.) Despite this later reversal, in 1915-1917 Washington and the American people were dead serious about their opposition to unrestricted submarine attacks on neutral ships. They clearly told Germany they would fight for the principle.

==Development of Public Opinion==

==Development of Public Opinion==

A surprising factor in the development of American public opinion was how little the political parties became involved. They seemed fearful that discussion of war-related issues would distract the electorate from their tried-and-true platforms focused on economic issues. The Socialist party, which won 2% of the 1916 vote for [[Eugene V. Debs]], blamed the war on capitalism and pledged total opposition. "A bayonet," it said, "was a weapon with a worker at each end." When war began, however half the Socialists supported it; the rest, led by Debs, became die-hard opponents.<ref> Nick Salvatore, ''Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist'' (2007) ch 9</ref>

A surprising factor in the development of American public opinion was how little the political parties became involved. They seemed fearful that discussion of war-related issues would distract the electorate from their tried-and-true platforms focused on economic issues.  

 

Upwards of four-fifths of America's social, political, and economic leaders were of English or Scottish descent (usually Episcopalian or Presbyterian); they clearly wanted Britain to win, though at first not to the point of American entry. Magazine editors, newspaper reporters, book publishers, college professors, intellectuals, artists, and writers were overwhelmingly pro- British. [[Samuel Insull]], one of Chicago's richest and most influential industrialists, had been born in England. He organized publicity, propaganda, and relief work, and assisted young men to join the Canadian army to go and fight.<ref> Forrest McDonald, ''Insull'' (2004)</ref>  Chicago and the Midwest generally was isolationist and opposed to war, primarily because the large German and Scandinavian populations were strongly opposed to American entry. (Almost no one proposed the U.S. enter the war on Germany's side.)

Upwards of four-fifths of America's social, political, and economic leaders were of English or Scottish descent (usually Episcopalian or Presbyterian); these elites clearly wanted Britain to win, though at first not to the point of American entry. Magazine editors, newspaper reporters, book publishers, college professors, intellectuals, artists, and writers were overwhelmingly pro- British. [[Samuel Insull]], one of Chicago's richest and most influential industrialists, had been born in England. He organized publicity, propaganda, and relief work, and assisted young men to join the Canadian army to go and fight.<ref> Forrest McDonald, ''Insull'' (2004)</ref>   

The working class was relatively quiet, and tended to divide along ethnic lines; farmers generally ignored the war. A cosmopolitan group of upper and upper-middle class businessmen based in the largest cities took the lead in promoting military preparedness and in defining how far America could be pushed around before it would fight back.   

The working class was relatively quiet, and tended to divide along ethnic lines; farmers generally ignored the war. A cosmopolitan group of upper and upper-middle class businessmen based in the largest cities took the lead in promoting military preparedness and in defining how far America could be pushed around before it would fight back.   

==Opponents of American Entry==

==Opponents of American Entry==

American cities were polyglot concentrations of ethnic groups--in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and other great cities three-fourths or more of the voters were immigrants or sons of immigrants (women did not vote). Some British immigrants worked actively for intervention. London-born Samuel Insull, Chicago's leading industrialist, for example, enthusiastically provided money, propaganda, and means for volunteers to enter the British or Canadian armies. After US entry, Insull directed the Illinois State Council of Defense, with responsibility for organizing the state's mobilization. Immigrants from eastern Europe usually cared more about politics in their homeland than politics in the U.S. Slavic immigrants hoped that an Allied victory would bring independence for their homelands. The millions of German-Americans were ambiguous in their position. They called for neutrality, and spoke of the superiority of German culture. Increasingly, however, they spoke only to themselves, and by 1917 no one else listened.<ref>  Frederick C. Luebke, ''Bonds of loyalty: German-Americans and World War I‎'' (1974)</ref>

American cities were polyglot concentrations of ethnic groups--in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and other great cities three-fourths or more of the voters were immigrants or sons of immigrants (women did not vote). Some British immigrants worked actively for intervention. London-born Samuel Insull, Chicago's leading industrialist, for example, enthusiastically provided money, propaganda, and means for volunteers to enter the British or Canadian armies. After US entry, Insull directed the Illinois State Council of Defense, with responsibility for organizing the state's mobilization. Immigrants from eastern Europe usually cared more about politics in their homeland than politics in the U.S. Slavic immigrants hoped that an Allied victory would bring independence for their homelands. The millions of German-Americans were ambiguous in their position. They called for neutrality, and spoke of the superiority of German culture. Increasingly, however, they spoke only to themselves, and by 1917 no one else listened.<ref>  Frederick C. Luebke, ''Bonds of loyalty: German-Americans and World War I‎'' (1974)</ref>

 

The most effective opponents of the war were the Irish Catholics. They had little interest in the continent, but were adamant against helping the British Empire, because it continued to reject independence for Ireland. (The [[Easter Uprising]] in Dublin, 1916, was stamped out, its leaders hung.) The Irish-Americans dominated the Democratic party in most large cities, so Wilson had to take account of their views in his definition of the nation's goals. They did not prevent him from being hostile to Germany, but they did force him to keep his distance from Britain. Indeed, Irish pressure guaranteed that the US would not become a full-fledged ally of Britain, and would not be pledged to Britain's war aims, but would try to restructure the world in a liberal democratic fashion after the war was won.<ref>William M. Leary, Jr. "Woodrow Wilson, Irish Americans, and the Election of 1916." ''Journal of American History'' 1967 54(1): 57-72 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1900319  in JSTOR]</ref>   

The most effective opponents of the war were the Irish Catholics. They had little interest in the continent, but were adamant against helping the British Empire, because it continued to reject independence for Ireland. (The [[Easter Uprising]] in Dublin, 1916, was stamped out, its leaders hung.) The Irish-Americans dominated the Democratic party in most large cities, so Wilson had to take account of their views in his definition of the nation's goals. They did not prevent him from being hostile to Germany, but they did force him to keep his distance from Britain. Indeed, Irish pressure guaranteed that the US would not become a full-fledged ally of Britain, and would not be pledged to Britain's war aims, but would try to restructure the world in a liberal democratic fashion after the war was won.<ref>William M. Leary, Jr. "Woodrow Wilson, Irish Americans, and the Election of 1916." ''Journal of American History'' 1967 54(1): 57-72 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1900319  in JSTOR]</ref>   

==Preparedness Movement==

==Preparedness Movement==

see [[Preparedness Movement]]

see [[Preparedness Movement]]

* Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 34:1 (2004). pp 62+. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5006516101 online edition]

* Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 34:1 (2004). pp 62+. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5006516101 online edition]

* Clifford, J. Garry. ''Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburgh Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920'' (1972)  

* Clifford, J. Garry. ''Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburgh Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920'' (1972)  

* Costrell, Edwin. ''How Maine viewed the war, 1914-1917,'' (1940)

* Costrell, Edwin. ''How Maine viewed the war, 1914-1917,'' (1940)

*  Crighton, John C. ''Missouri and the World War, 1914-1917: a study in public opinion'' (1947)

*  Crighton, John C. ''Missouri and the World War, 1914-1917: a study in public opinion'' (1947)