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Unitary Executive Theory (view source)
Revision as of 05:54, December 21, 2009
, 05:54, December 21, 2009expand & add cites
'''Unitary executive theory''' is a model of executive power proposed by constitutional law experts and neoconservative intellectuals such as John Yoo and Harvey C. Mansfield. It argues that all executive power is derived from the presidency and thus that all executive action must be consistent with the power of the office of the unitary executive.
'''Unitary executive theory''' is a model of executive power proposed by constitutional law experts and neoconservative intellectuals such as John Yoo and Harvey C. Mansfield. It argues that all executive power is derived from the presidency and thus that all executive action must be consistent with the power of the office of the unitary executive.
Calabresi and Yoo (2008) argue that all presidents have viewed the power to supervise and remove subordinates as central to the very meaning of "executive power" in Article II of the Constitution. Without such an ability, presidents would be unable to execute the law effectively and place their stamp on the administration. They demonstrate that every president has embraced a conception of the unitary executive that at least encompasses the powers to remove and supervise their subordinates' exercise of delegated authority so as to create one centralized executive branch. They attack the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson<ref> It was a 1988 decision by Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]], with only Justice Scalia dissenting, ruling that the Independent Counsel Act was constitutional. The decision still stands.</ref> for permitting Congress to limit the executive's removal authority over agency officials, saying the existence of independent agencies cannot be squared with the historical recognition of the importance of the president's removal authority.
==The theory==
==The theory==
==Criticism==
==Criticism==
Critics contend that the founding fathers' "original intent" provides no clear evidence for a "unitary executive" whose decisions necessarily trump those of the other branches.
During the Presidency of [[George W. Bush]] (2001-09) critics sais the unitary model gave the presidency more power than it should have according to the Founding Fathers, and that it was leading to what they termed an '''imperial presidency.''' However [[neoconservative]] intellectual and Harvard professor Harvey Mansfield one of the chief proponents of the theory pointed out why such a criticism does not make sense:
During the Presidency of [[George W. Bush]] (2001-09) critics said the unitary model gave the presidency more power than it should have according to the Founding Fathers, and that it was leading to what they termed an '''imperial presidency.''' However [[neoconservative]] intellectual and Harvard professor Harvey Mansfield one of the chief proponents of the theory pointed out why such a criticism does not make sense:
“If the executive is an adversary of the law, how can he carry out the function of enforcing it?” <ref>http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110010014</ref>
“If the executive is an adversary of the law, how can he carry out the function of enforcing it?” <ref>http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110010014</ref>
==Further reading==
==Further reading==
===Advocates===
* Calabresi, Steven G. and Christopher S. Yoo. ''The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush'' (2008)
** Calabresi, Steven G. and Christopher S. Yoo. "The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century." Case Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997): 1451–1561.
** Calabresi, Steven G. and Christopher S. Yoo. "The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century." Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 26 (2003): 667–801.
**Yoo, Christopher, Steven G. Calabresi, and Laurence D. Nee. "The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945." ''Notre Dame Law Review'' 80 (2004): 1–109.
** Yoo, Christopher, Steven G. Calabresi and Anthony J. Colangelo. "The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004." ''Iowa Law Review'' 90 (2005): 601–731.
* Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr. ''Taming the Sovereign: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power'' (1993).
* Calabresi, Steven G. and Christopher S. Yoo. "The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century." Case Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997): 1451–1561.
===Critics===
* Krent, Harold J. "The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush," ''Constitutional Commentary'' v. 25 #3 2009 pp 489+. in [[Questia]], criticism of Calabresi and Yoo (2008)
* Waterman, Richard W. "The Administrative Presidency, Unilateral Power, and the Unitary Executive Theory," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2009 39(1): 5-9 in [[Questia]]
* Yoo, Christopher, Steven G. Calabresi and Anthony J. Colangelo. "The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004." ''Iowa Law Review'' 90 (2005): 601–731.
====references====
<references/>
[[Category:United States Constitution]]
[[Category:United States Constitution]]