| | In [[Poland]] after 1945 modernization was accompanied by demands for more meat instead of bread by workers and in time also by the peasants. The new demands on meat production could not be met because of the government's policy of investing in factories, not farms. Increasing the performance of the government was measured by the availability of meat, and the performance was poor. Fearing mass protests, the Communist party did not balance the market by raising prices but instead spent its money on growing subsidies to keep food prices low. Every attempt to raise price caused grumbling; twice (1970, 1976) the government had to reverse the increases. By 1980 the scale of the imbalance of demand and supply led to the introduction of controls of meat and processed meat products, a system that broke down in 1989, when in view of roundtable talks and rumors about anticipated price increases, the farmers simply ceased selling meat. The final solution was introducing market prices in the summer of 1989. The chronic imbalance of supply and demand can be related to the coexistence of a system of trading and distributing food products that from 1948 was state-owned and subjected to the directives of the Communist ideologues and an agricultural sector comprising private farms and reacted to market stimuli.<ref> Jerzy Kochanowski, "'Jestesmy Juz Przyzwyczajeni' Prolegomena Do Spoleczno - Modernizacyjnych Kulis 'Problemu Miesnego' W Prl," ["We've Become Accustomed": Prolegomena to the Social Modernization Background of the "Meat Problem" in the People's Republic of Poland]. ''Przeglad Historyczny'' 2005 96(4): 587-605. Issn: 0033-2186 </ref> | | In [[Poland]] after 1945 modernization was accompanied by demands for more meat instead of bread by workers and in time also by the peasants. The new demands on meat production could not be met because of the government's policy of investing in factories, not farms. Increasing the performance of the government was measured by the availability of meat, and the performance was poor. Fearing mass protests, the Communist party did not balance the market by raising prices but instead spent its money on growing subsidies to keep food prices low. Every attempt to raise price caused grumbling; twice (1970, 1976) the government had to reverse the increases. By 1980 the scale of the imbalance of demand and supply led to the introduction of controls of meat and processed meat products, a system that broke down in 1989, when in view of roundtable talks and rumors about anticipated price increases, the farmers simply ceased selling meat. The final solution was introducing market prices in the summer of 1989. The chronic imbalance of supply and demand can be related to the coexistence of a system of trading and distributing food products that from 1948 was state-owned and subjected to the directives of the Communist ideologues and an agricultural sector comprising private farms and reacted to market stimuli.<ref> Jerzy Kochanowski, "'Jestesmy Juz Przyzwyczajeni' Prolegomena Do Spoleczno - Modernizacyjnych Kulis 'Problemu Miesnego' W Prl," ["We've Become Accustomed": Prolegomena to the Social Modernization Background of the "Meat Problem" in the People's Republic of Poland]. ''Przeglad Historyczny'' 2005 96(4): 587-605. Issn: 0033-2186 </ref> |
| − | After [[Mao Zedong]]'s Communists came to power in 1949 in [[China]], they planned to provide industrial regions with a steady food supply, so they began compulsory delivery of agricultural products in 1953. In 1955-56 collectivization was accelerated. Dissatisfied with the achievements of agriculture, the Chinese leadership endeavored to catch up with the most developed countries. This resulted in the "[[Great Leap Forward]]" in 1958, which created large people's communes in the countryside. Home kitchens and utensils were destroyed to force families to eat in communal dining halls. The result was an unparalleled famine; upwards of thirty million died.<ref>Gene Hsin Chang, and Guanzhong James Wen, "Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958-1961." ''Economic Development and Cultural Change'' 1997 46(1): 1-34. Issn: 0013-0079 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0079%28199710%2946%3A1%3C1%3ACDATCF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in JSTOR]] </ref> Mao Zedong finally change methods and by 1965 the level of agricultural production reached that of the years prior to the "great leap," but the country's population had by then increased by another eighty million. The upheavals of the [[Cultural Revolution]] of 1966-76 further damaged agricultural efficiency. The economic reforms initiated by [[Deng Xiaoping]] in 1978 were first introduced in agriculture. The return to family-based agriculture greatly increased peasant productivity.
| + | Corrected by anon |