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According to a State Department [[#refCapshaw07|internal security probe]] of Hiss ordered by Byrnes (and made public in 1993),<ref>Sam Tanenhaus, "New Reasons to Doubt Hiss," ''Wall Street Journal'', November 18, 1993</ref> in February 1945, Hiss requested top-secret files from the [[OSS]] on British, Soviet, French and Chinese internal security policies, as well as Far East policy.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 361-362</ref> FBI surveillance at this time found that Hiss also developed "a keen interest in atomic energy," and other matters relating to military intelligence,<ref>[[#refTanenhaus97|Tanenhaus 1997]]: 519; [[#refHK99|Haynes, Klehr 1999]]: 172; [[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 321-322.</ref>&mdash;all of which was [[#refFoote|well outside]] the purview of his office.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 363</ref> Loy Henderson, director of the State Department Office of Near East Affairs (NEA), quietly ordered members of NEA to keep confidential materials and information from Hiss.<ref>H. W. Brands, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=L6V4AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961]'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) ISBN 0-19-506707-X, pp. 297-298</ref>

According to a State Department [[#refCapshaw07|internal security probe]] of Hiss ordered by Byrnes (and made public in 1993),<ref>Sam Tanenhaus, "New Reasons to Doubt Hiss," ''Wall Street Journal'', November 18, 1993</ref> in February 1945, Hiss requested top-secret files from the [[OSS]] on British, Soviet, French and Chinese internal security policies, as well as Far East policy.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 361-362</ref> FBI surveillance at this time found that Hiss also developed "a keen interest in atomic energy," and other matters relating to military intelligence,<ref>[[#refTanenhaus97|Tanenhaus 1997]]: 519; [[#refHK99|Haynes, Klehr 1999]]: 172; [[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 321-322.</ref>&mdash;all of which was [[#refFoote|well outside]] the purview of his office.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 363</ref> Loy Henderson, director of the State Department Office of Near East Affairs (NEA), quietly ordered members of NEA to keep confidential materials and information from Hiss.<ref>H. W. Brands, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=L6V4AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961]'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) ISBN 0-19-506707-X, pp. 297-298</ref>

The first breakthrough in decrypting the Soviet code had come in 1943,<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> after which “decrypts of messages were shown to President Roosevelt by a United States Naval Officer whose duty it was to take the decrypts to the White House.”<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: p. 38</ref> But several months before the war would end on August 14, 1945, Brigadier General Carter Clarke of Army G-2 (Intelligence) would notify the Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) that he had received instructions from the [[White House]] to "cease any effort against the [[Soviet]] problem."<ref>[[#refNSA95|NSA 1995]]: 159 (PDF 172) This report goes on to say that it was later discovered that the [[White House]] staff had been infiltrated by a [[Communist]] or "[[fellow traveller|fellow traveler]]."</ref> On June 4, 1945, six weeks after becoming [[President]], [[Harry Truman]] was briefed about [[Venona project|Venona]], according to former [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) officer Oliver Kirby, deputy director of the [[Russian]] code-breaking project.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 147</ref> Based on notes Kirby made at the time, Jerrold Schecter, former National Security Council spokesman for the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, reported that Clarke, chief of the then-new Army Security Agency (precursor of the NSA), advised President Truman that the code-breakers were decrypting messages that revealed massive [[Soviet]] intelligence operations in the [[United States]], though it was too early to identify operatives or operations.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 110. Truman's appointment calendar [http://trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1945&currMonth=6&currDay=4 confirms the meeting] with Clarke.</ref> According to Kirby, Clarke described this meeting as [[#refNovak03|"NDG" (no damn good)]], the president telling the general that his account of code-breaking sounded "[[#refRusher04|like a fairy story]]."

The first breakthrough in decrypting the [[USSR|Soviet]] code had come in 1943.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> In November 1944, the [[OSS]] mission in Stockholm was approached by Finnish intelligence officers with an offer to sell some 1,500 pages of material relating to Soviet codes, including a code used by the [[NKVD]]. Finnish troops had found the scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in June 1941, in the [[USSR]]'s consulate at Petsamo.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> Stettinius told OSS Director [[William J. Donovan|Donovan]] to reject the offer on the grounds that [[Russia]] was an ally, but the OSS purchased the material anyway. At the instigation of the [[State Department]], [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ordered Donovan to return the material to the Soviets forthwith. After a failed attempt to deliver it to [[Pavel Fitin]], head of NKVD foreign intelligence, the material was finally handed over to Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Andrei Gromyko.<ref>[[#refPowers04|Powers 2004]]: 15-16</ref> As a result, the application of this material to decrypting the Venona traffic would be delayed until 1953.<ref>National Security Agency, [http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations]</ref>

 

After November 1944, “decrypts of messages were shown to President Roosevelt by a United States Naval Officer whose duty it was to take the decrypts to the White House.”<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: p. 38</ref> In May 1945 a U.S. Army intelligence team discovered a second codebook at a German signals intelligence archive in Saxony, in territory assigned to the Soviet zone of occupation. Only a day or so prior to Soviet occupation of the area, the team removed the material, which then made its way to the Army's Signals Intelligence Service (SIS).<ref>John Earl Haynes, [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0305&week=c&msg=22Pqnm844qaMxYtDmAjBPg&user=&pw=Venona Codebooks], H-DIPLO Discussion Logs, May 19, 2003</ref> But several months before the war would end on August 14, 1945, Brigadier General Carter Clarke of Army G-2 (Intelligence) would notify SIS that he had received instructions from the [[White House]] to "cease any effort against the [[Soviet]] problem."<ref>[[#refNSA95|NSA 1995]]: 159 (PDF 172) This report goes on to say that it was later discovered that the [[White House]] staff had been infiltrated by a [[Communist]] or "[[fellow traveller|fellow traveler]]."</ref>

 

On June 4, 1945, six weeks after becoming [[President]], [[Harry Truman]] was briefed about [[Venona project|Venona]], according to former [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) officer Oliver Kirby, deputy director of the [[Russian]] code-breaking project.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 147</ref> Based on notes Kirby made at the time, Jerrold Schecter, former National Security Council spokesman for the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, reported that Clarke, chief of the then-new Army Security Agency (precursor of the NSA), advised President Truman that the code-breakers were decrypting messages that revealed massive [[Soviet]] intelligence operations in the [[United States]], though it was too early to identify operatives or operations.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 110. Truman's appointment calendar [http://trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1945&currMonth=6&currDay=4 confirms the meeting] with Clarke.</ref> According to Kirby, Clarke described this meeting as [[#refNovak03|"NDG" (no damn good)]], the president telling the general that his account of code-breaking sounded "[[#refRusher04|like a fairy story]]."

[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono On June 26], The [http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml UN Charter] [http://zombietime.com/un60/IMG_1710.JPG was signed] in [[San Francisco]]. Two days later, State Department liaison Lt. [[Andrew Roth]] of the Office of Naval Intelligence was arrested in the ''[[Amerasia]]'' spy case. [[Communist Party]] General Secretary [[Eugene Dennis]] told [[CPUSA]] National Committee member Jack Stachel<ref>[[#refKHA98|Klehr, Haynes, Anderson 1998]]: 45</ref> that Roth suggested that Alger Hiss might be used to quash the case, according to former CPUSA Politburo member Louis Budenz.<ref>FBI memorandum: Ladd to Hoover, January 28, 1949 (FBI file: Hiss-Chambers, Vol. 44), p. 30. See also FBI Report: (REDACTED), Security Matter&mdash;C, June 8, 1950, p. 9 ([http://www.education-research.org/PDFs/IPR29.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol 29], PDF p. 16)</ref>

[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono On June 26], The [http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml UN Charter] [http://zombietime.com/un60/IMG_1710.JPG was signed] in [[San Francisco]]. Two days later, State Department liaison Lt. [[Andrew Roth]] of the Office of Naval Intelligence was arrested in the ''[[Amerasia]]'' spy case. [[Communist Party]] General Secretary [[Eugene Dennis]] told [[CPUSA]] National Committee member Jack Stachel<ref>[[#refKHA98|Klehr, Haynes, Anderson 1998]]: 45</ref> that Roth suggested that Alger Hiss might be used to quash the case, according to former CPUSA Politburo member Louis Budenz.<ref>FBI memorandum: Ladd to Hoover, January 28, 1949 (FBI file: Hiss-Chambers, Vol. 44), p. 30. See also FBI Report: (REDACTED), Security Matter&mdash;C, June 8, 1950, p. 9 ([http://www.education-research.org/PDFs/IPR29.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Vol 29], PDF p. 16)</ref>