| − | Since November 1587 the English and the Dutch had been aware of Philip's intentions. To prevent a juncture of Parma's army with the Armada, Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham, the Lord Admiral, had sent small squadrons to patrol the Dutch coast. After much debate, Howard accepted Drake's advice to use 54 of the Queen's best ships then anchored at Plymouth on the English Channel, to blockade and destroy the Armada before it left the Spanish coast. But on July 29, 1588, after the winds had changed and made this venture impossible, the Armada was sighted off the Scilly Isles, near the coast of Cornwall in southwestern England. | + | Since November 1587 the English and the Dutch had been aware of Philip's intentions. To prevent a juncture of Parma's army with the Armada, Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham, the Lord Admiral, had sent small squadrons to patrol the Dutch coast. After much debate, Howard accepted Drake's advice to use 54 of the Queen's best ships then anchored at Plymouth on the English Channel, to blockade and destroy the Armada before it left the Spanish coast. But on July 29, 1588, after the winds had changed and made this venture impossible, the Armada was sighted off the Sicily Isles, near the coast of Cornwall in southwestern England. |
| | The Armada was the victim of the poor mix of its ships and armament, of its ill-trained and undermanned crews, and of the dissension and division in its incompetent command. Spanish guns were inferior to the long-range cannon of the English, whose galleons proved faster, more maneuverable, and more weatherly than the bulky Spanish vessels. Parker (1988) say Philip II caused the failure because his strategy required a synchronization between the invasion fleet and Parma's army barges that his tactics could not guarantee because the design of his cannons' carriages prevented rapid reloading in a close-range cannonade, thereby allowing England to control the Channel.<ref> Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed." ''History Today'' 1988 38(may): 26-33. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | | The Armada was the victim of the poor mix of its ships and armament, of its ill-trained and undermanned crews, and of the dissension and division in its incompetent command. Spanish guns were inferior to the long-range cannon of the English, whose galleons proved faster, more maneuverable, and more weatherly than the bulky Spanish vessels. Parker (1988) say Philip II caused the failure because his strategy required a synchronization between the invasion fleet and Parma's army barges that his tactics could not guarantee because the design of his cannons' carriages prevented rapid reloading in a close-range cannonade, thereby allowing England to control the Channel.<ref> Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed." ''History Today'' 1988 38(may): 26-33. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
| − | Added to the problems of logistics, and the prevailing winds and currents in the English Channel, the liabilities proved proved devastating for the Spanish, whose basic strategy was inherently flawed. A Spanish victory was highly improbable. There were six naval encounters, but none were decisive. What destroyed the Armada was stormy weather and disease. The defeat of the Armada was not decisive militarily but it did encourage English morale for Protestantism had survived its worst threat. Protestants felt divinely favored and believed that the fortunes of Spain and Catholicism had turned. Spanish morale was undermined; it fatally weakened the Catholic League, and in reduced the respect of neutrals for Spain. The Spanish spent heavily to rebuild the fleet and lost no territory to England immediately; and the revenue from the silver mines in the Spanish Indies continued to increase and staved off bankruptcy. However, the armada's failure effectively ceded supremacy over the seas to the English, who continued to harrass Spanish shipping and develop their overseas empire. | + | Added to the problems of logistics, and the prevailing winds and currents in the English Channel, the liabilities proved proved devastating for the Spanish, whose basic strategy was inherently flawed. A Spanish victory was highly improbable. There were six naval encounters, but none were decisive. What destroyed the Armada was stormy weather and disease. The defeat of the Armada was not decisive militarily but it did encourage English morale for Protestantism had survived its worst threat. Protestants felt divinely favored and believed that the fortunes of Spain and Catholicism had turned. Spanish morale was undermined; it fatally weakened the Catholic League, and in reduced the respect of neutrals for Spain. The Spanish spent heavily to rebuild the fleet and lost no territory to England immediately; and the revenue from the silver mines in the Spanish Indies continued to increase and staved off bankruptcy. However, the armada's failure effectively ceded supremacy over the seas to the English, who continued to harass Spanish shipping and develop their overseas empire. |