Changes

==Browderism==

==Browderism==

[[Communist Party USA]] (CPUSA) had always received directives and funds from the [[Soviet Union]] via courier. Moscow's most effective control had been through [[Comintern]] representatives.<ref>Louis Budenz, ''Men Without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the USA,'' Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948, pp. 4-5, 55, 68-69, 78-81. [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?page=usercat&catid=8&count=1 pp.15-16, 66, 79-80, 89-92 pdf]</ref> General Secretary [[Earl Browder]] from 1930 to 1945 executed [[Moscow]]'s insgtructions to steer the party from anti-Roosevelt militancy, to pro-Roosevelt [[Popular Front]], to anti-Roosevelt [[isolationism]] during the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]] and the early days of [[Lend-Lease]], and back to pro-Rooseveit war unity after the [[Soviet Union]] was attacked. During [[World War II]] there had to be greater reliance on conditioned reflexes, prodded by ''Pravda'' or ''War and the Working Class'' or Radio Moscow. Browder developed the doctrine of indefinite collaboration with capitalism and the [[Harry Bridges]] doctrine of postwar extension of the no-strike pledge.  

[[Communist Party USA]] (CPUSA) had always received directives and funds from the [[Soviet Union]] via courier. Moscow's most effective control had been through [[Comintern]] representatives.<ref>Louis Budenz, ''Men Without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the USA,'' Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948, pp. 4-5, 55, 68-69, 78-81. [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?page=usercat&catid=8&count=1 pp.15-16, 66, 79-80, 89-92 pdf]</ref>  

 

 

Browder accepted the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]] of August 1939 without hesitation.  Comintern did find it necessary to fine-tune the CPUSA’s stance.  Immediately after the Pact, [[Georgi Dimitrov]], chief of the Comintern, sent a ciphered message to Browder explaining that the CPUSA’s line supporting the Pact was not fully correct because while it broke with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]’s policy of supporting Britain, France, and [[Lend-Lease]] aid, it failed to take the additional step of breaking with FDR’s domestic policies as well.  Browder and the CPUSA immediately made the required changes in its policies, and in 1940 the CPUSA did it's best to oppose FDR’s reelection to the presidency.<ref>Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson, ''The Soviet World of American Communism,'' New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, pp. 71–84.</ref> [[World War II]] reduced the direct organization ties of CPUSA to Comintern and drastically reduced the volume of communications.  Postal communications was less reliable and often delayed and subject to government inspection.  International cable traffic was routinely reviewed by war-time security officials.  Travel to the USSR became increasingly difficult. In 1940 the Voorhis Act was passed imposing regulatory requirement on domestic American organizations with foreign government ties. To avoid the Voorhis Act, in November 1940, CPUSA, with Comintern permission, severed its official membership in the Communist International, and the last officially designated CPUSA representative in Moscow left in 1941.<ref<Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, The Soviet World, pp. 87–88.</ref>

 

Browder developed the doctrine of indefinite collaboration with capitalism and the [[Harry Bridges]] doctrine of postwar extension of the no-strike pledge.  

The wartime coalition gave Browder the vision of an Americanized Communist Party working with other American parties to solve the urgent questions facing the Nation. To this end he began a policy of naturalizing the party, relaxing its discipline, and moderating its sectarianism. He transformed the wartime tactic of national unity into a postwar strategy and argued the possibility that progressive capitalism, to save itself, would embark on policies favorable to the workers at home and to the Soviet Union abroad.  

The wartime coalition gave Browder the vision of an Americanized Communist Party working with other American parties to solve the urgent questions facing the Nation. To this end he began a policy of naturalizing the party, relaxing its discipline, and moderating its sectarianism. He transformed the wartime tactic of national unity into a postwar strategy and argued the possibility that progressive capitalism, to save itself, would embark on policies favorable to the workers at home and to the Soviet Union abroad.