| | According to a State Department [[#refCapshaw07|internal security probe]] of Hiss ordered by Byrnes (and made public in 1993),<ref>Sam Tanenhaus, "New Reasons to Doubt Hiss," ''Wall Street Journal'', November 18, 1993</ref> in February 1945, Hiss requested top-secret files from the [[OSS]] on British, Soviet, French and Chinese internal security policies, as well as Far East policy.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 361-362</ref> FBI surveillance at this time found that Hiss also developed "a keen interest in atomic energy" and other matters relating to military intelligence<ref>[[#refTanenhaus97|Tanenhaus 1997]]: 519; [[#refHK99|Haynes, Klehr 1999]]: 172; [[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 321-322.</ref>—all of which was [[#refFoote|well outside]] the purview of his office.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 363</ref> This finding was congruent with a [[Venona]] cable dated the [[#refVenona1822|following month]], in which [[Anatoly Gorsky|Gorsky]] reported that "Ales" and his group were "working on obtaining only military information," since [[GRU|Soviet military intelligence]] "allegedly are not very interested" in "materials about the Bank [United States Department of State]."<ref>[[#refBenson95|Benson 1995]]</ref> Loy Henderson, director of the State Department Office of Near East Affairs (NEA), quietly ordered members of NEA to keep confidential materials and information from Hiss.<ref>H. W. Brands, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=L6V4AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961]'' (Oxford University Press, 1991) ISBN 0-19-506707-X, pp. 297-298</ref> | | According to a State Department [[#refCapshaw07|internal security probe]] of Hiss ordered by Byrnes (and made public in 1993),<ref>Sam Tanenhaus, "New Reasons to Doubt Hiss," ''Wall Street Journal'', November 18, 1993</ref> in February 1945, Hiss requested top-secret files from the [[OSS]] on British, Soviet, French and Chinese internal security policies, as well as Far East policy.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 361-362</ref> FBI surveillance at this time found that Hiss also developed "a keen interest in atomic energy" and other matters relating to military intelligence<ref>[[#refTanenhaus97|Tanenhaus 1997]]: 519; [[#refHK99|Haynes, Klehr 1999]]: 172; [[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 321-322.</ref>—all of which was [[#refFoote|well outside]] the purview of his office.<ref>[[#refWeinstein78|Weinstein 1978]]: 363</ref> This finding was congruent with a [[Venona]] cable dated the [[#refVenona1822|following month]], in which [[Anatoly Gorsky|Gorsky]] reported that "Ales" and his group were "working on obtaining only military information," since [[GRU|Soviet military intelligence]] "allegedly are not very interested" in "materials about the Bank [United States Department of State]."<ref>[[#refBenson95|Benson 1995]]</ref> Loy Henderson, director of the State Department Office of Near East Affairs (NEA), quietly ordered members of NEA to keep confidential materials and information from Hiss.<ref>H. W. Brands, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=L6V4AAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961]'' (Oxford University Press, 1991) ISBN 0-19-506707-X, pp. 297-298</ref> |
| | The first breakthrough in decrypting the [[USSR|Soviet]] code had come in 1943.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> In November 1944, the [[OSS]] mission in Stockholm was approached by Finnish intelligence officers with an offer to sell some 1,500 pages of material relating to Soviet codes, including a code used by the [[NKVD]].<ref>[[#refPowers04|Powers 2004]]: 15</ref> Finnish troops had found the scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in June 1941, in the [[USSR]]'s consulate at Petsamo.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> Stettinius told OSS Director [[William J. Donovan|Donovan]] to reject the offer on the grounds that [[Russia]] was an ally, but the OSS purchased the material anyway. At the instigation of the [[State Department]], [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ordered Donovan to return the material to the Soviets forthwith. After a failed attempt to deliver it to [[Pavel Fitin]], head of NKVD foreign intelligence, the material was finally handed over to Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Andrei Gromyko.<ref>[[#refPowers04|Powers 2004]]: 15-16</ref> As a result, the application of this material to decrypting the Venona traffic would be delayed until 1953.<ref>National Security Agency, [http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations]</ref> | | The first breakthrough in decrypting the [[USSR|Soviet]] code had come in 1943.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> In November 1944, the [[OSS]] mission in Stockholm was approached by Finnish intelligence officers with an offer to sell some 1,500 pages of material relating to Soviet codes, including a code used by the [[NKVD]].<ref>[[#refPowers04|Powers 2004]]: 15</ref> Finnish troops had found the scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in June 1941, in the [[USSR]]'s consulate at Petsamo.<ref>[[#refPrefaceBW96|Preface, NSA/CIA 1996]]</ref> Stettinius told OSS Director [[William J. Donovan|Donovan]] to reject the offer on the grounds that [[Russia]] was an ally, but the OSS purchased the material anyway. At the instigation of the [[State Department]], [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ordered Donovan to return the material to the Soviets forthwith. After a failed attempt to deliver it to [[Pavel Fitin]], head of NKVD foreign intelligence, the material was finally handed over to Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Andrei Gromyko.<ref>[[#refPowers04|Powers 2004]]: 15-16</ref> As a result, the application of this material to decrypting the Venona traffic would be delayed until 1953.<ref>National Security Agency, [http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations]</ref> |