| | More recently historians have challenged Williams. They have shown that slavery remained profitable in the 1830s because of innovations in agriculture, so the profit motive was not central to abolition.<ref> J.R. Ward, "The British West Indies in the Age of Abolition," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 415-39.</ref> Richardson (1998) finds Williams's claims regarding the Industrial Revolution are greatly exaggerated, for profits from the slave trade amounted to less than 1% of total domestic investment in Britain. Richardson further challenges claims (by African scholars) that the slave trade caused widespread depopulation and economic distress in Africa--indeed that it caused the "underdevelopment" of Africa. Admitting the horrible suffering of the slaves themselves, he notes that many Africans benefited directly, because the first stage of the trade was always firmly in the hands of Africans. European slave ships waited at ports to purchase cargoes of people who were captured in the hinterland by African dealers and tribal leaders. Richardson finds that the "terms of trade" (how much the ship owners paid for the slave cargo) moved heavily in favor of the Africans after about 1750. That is, indigenous elites inside West and Central Africa made large and growing profits from slavery, thus increasing their wealth and power.<ref> David Richardson, "The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 440-64.</ref> | | More recently historians have challenged Williams. They have shown that slavery remained profitable in the 1830s because of innovations in agriculture, so the profit motive was not central to abolition.<ref> J.R. Ward, "The British West Indies in the Age of Abolition," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 415-39.</ref> Richardson (1998) finds Williams's claims regarding the Industrial Revolution are greatly exaggerated, for profits from the slave trade amounted to less than 1% of total domestic investment in Britain. Richardson further challenges claims (by African scholars) that the slave trade caused widespread depopulation and economic distress in Africa--indeed that it caused the "underdevelopment" of Africa. Admitting the horrible suffering of the slaves themselves, he notes that many Africans benefited directly, because the first stage of the trade was always firmly in the hands of Africans. European slave ships waited at ports to purchase cargoes of people who were captured in the hinterland by African dealers and tribal leaders. Richardson finds that the "terms of trade" (how much the ship owners paid for the slave cargo) moved heavily in favor of the Africans after about 1750. That is, indigenous elites inside West and Central Africa made large and growing profits from slavery, thus increasing their wealth and power.<ref> David Richardson, "The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807," in P.J. Marshall, ed. ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century'' (1998) pp 440-64.</ref> |
| − | The term "British Empire" was used by historians as early as 1708.<ref> John Oldmixon, ''The British Empire in America, Containing the History of the Discovery, Settlement, Progress and Present State of All the British Colonies, on the Continent and Islands of America'' (London, 1708))</ref> before that the usual term was "English Empire."<ref>As in Nathaniel Crouch, ''The English Empire in America: Or a Prospect of His Majesties Dominions in the West-Indies'' (London, 1685).'' Armitage pp 174-5</ref>
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