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According to his [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] file, Lattimore was suspected of engaging in espionage for a foreign power as early as 1927, while in Shanghai.<ref>FBI Report, "Owen Lattimore, Internal Security - R, Espionage - R," September 8, 1949 ([http://foia.fbi.gov/owenlatt/owenlatt1a.pdf FBI file: Owen Lattimore, Section 1A]), p. 1 (PDF p. 2)</ref> [[Communist Party USA]] defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the [[Comintern]] "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character. "<ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> [[Alexander Barmine]], former Charge d'Affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Athens, Greece, advised [[FBI]] agents that then-[[GRU]] (Soviet Military Intelligence) chief General Jan Berzin informed him prior to his 1937 defection that Owen Lattimore was a Soviet agent.<ref>FBI Report, "Owen Lattimore, Internal Security - R, Espionage - R," September 8, 1949 ([http://foia.fbi.gov/owenlatt/owenlatt1a.pdf FBI File: Owen Lattimore, Part 1A]), p. 2 (PDF p. 7)</ref>  

According to his [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] file, Lattimore was suspected of engaging in espionage for a foreign power as early as 1927, while in Shanghai.<ref>FBI Report, "Owen Lattimore, Internal Security - R, Espionage - R," September 8, 1949 ([http://foia.fbi.gov/owenlatt/owenlatt1a.pdf FBI file: Owen Lattimore, Section 1A]), p. 1 (PDF p. 2)</ref> [[Communist Party USA]] defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the [[Comintern]] "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character. "<ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> [[Alexander Barmine]], former Charge d'Affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Athens, Greece, advised [[FBI]] agents that then-[[GRU]] (Soviet Military Intelligence) chief General Jan Berzin informed him prior to his 1937 defection that Owen Lattimore was a Soviet agent.<ref>FBI Report, "Owen Lattimore, Internal Security - R, Espionage - R," September 8, 1949 ([http://foia.fbi.gov/owenlatt/owenlatt1a.pdf FBI File: Owen Lattimore, Part 1A]), p. 2 (PDF p. 7)</ref>  

In May of 1941, during the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore as a suspected Communist should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.<ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref> Later the same year President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] appointed Lattimore [[U.S.]] adviser to [[Kuomintang]] Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]] on the surreptitious and out-of-process recommendation of Lattimore's personal friend and patron at the White House,<ref>Lattimore wrote that when in Washington, he used Currie’s office (“I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90”), and that when Currie was out, Lattimore handled his mail: “Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away.” Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, [http://ia341034.us.archive.org/3/items/instituteofpacif09unit/instituteofpacif09unit.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 9] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 3199-3200 (PDF pp. 311-312)</ref> Roosevelt adviser and [[NKVD]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]].<ref>“I asked who had suggested to President Roosevelt the nomination of Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Currie replied that he, Currie, had.” (Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, [http://ia341034.us.archive.org/3/items/instituteofpacif09unit/instituteofpacif09unit.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 9] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 3209-10 (PDF pp. 321-322)</ref> While serving in this capacity, according to Chinese military intelligence, Lattimore was sending coded messages to the Communist Chinese rebels.<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=vz42rDYmf3wC Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007), ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9</ref>

During the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]], Lattimore was added to Roosevelt's Custodial Detention Index (listed as "Nationalistic tendency&mdash;Communist,")<ref>Robert P. Newman, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=_3q55sf6X2UC Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China]'' (University of California Press, 1992) ISBN 0520073886, p. 52</ref> the basis for FDR's internment camps during World War II. Later the same year President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] appointed Lattimore [[U.S.]] adviser to [[Kuomintang]] Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]] on the surreptitious and out-of-process recommendation of Lattimore's personal friend and patron at the White House,<ref>Lattimore wrote that when in Washington, he used Currie’s office (“I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90”), and that when Currie was out, Lattimore handled his mail: “Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away.” Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, [http://ia341034.us.archive.org/3/items/instituteofpacif09unit/instituteofpacif09unit.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 9] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 3199-3200 (PDF pp. 311-312)</ref> Roosevelt adviser and [[NKVD]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]].<ref>“I asked who had suggested to President Roosevelt the nomination of Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Currie replied that he, Currie, had.” (Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, [http://ia341034.us.archive.org/3/items/instituteofpacif09unit/instituteofpacif09unit.pdf Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 9] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 3209-10 (PDF pp. 321-322)</ref> While serving in this capacity, according to Chinese military intelligence, Lattimore was sending coded messages to the Communist Chinese rebels.<ref>M. Stanton Evans, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=vz42rDYmf3wC Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies]'' (New York: Crown Forum, 2007), ISBN 978-1-4000-8105-9</ref>

On November 25, 1941, twelve days before Pearl Harbor, Lattimore dispatched an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan. When Congress later investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, U.S. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified that he took a tough line with the Japanese because of this cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. This cable was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the ultimatum to Japan.<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> The use of harsh, demanding language toward Japan only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Japanese Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the U.S. demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>  

On November 25, 1941, twelve days before Pearl Harbor, Lattimore dispatched an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan. When Congress later investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, U.S. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified that he took a tough line with the Japanese because of this cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. This cable was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the ultimatum to Japan.<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> The use of harsh, demanding language toward Japan only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Japanese Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the U.S. demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>