Changes

Metaphysics & Mind: The materialist philosophical position is ridiculous, as the word "physical" has an unfixed meaning: what Hobbes might have called materialism would have dealt with "physical objects" like tables, chairs and persons. But is a <i>neutrino</i> (a particle with no mass and which could travel through a volume of lead equal to that of the solar system without even being deflected from its path) a physical object? As we have found that tables, chairs and persons are effectively empty space with a few point particles thrown in, I am unconvinced that "materialism" is even a position that can be expressed systematically or coherently (unless you define "physical objects" to include all those things that exist, which destroys any conceptual differences it has with, say, dualism). Thus, I favor simple naturalism: the view that whatever sorts of things turn out to exist will exist in certain causal relationships with other things. Some would call me a dualist, but nothing I believe commits me to the view that there exist two kinds of "objects" - the physical ones and the mental or nonphsysical ones.<br><br>

Metaphysics & Mind: The materialist philosophical position is ridiculous, as the word "physical" has an unfixed meaning: what Hobbes might have called materialism would have dealt with "physical objects" like tables, chairs and persons. But is a <i>neutrino</i> (a particle with no mass and which could travel through a volume of lead equal to that of the solar system without even being deflected from its path) a physical object? As we have found that tables, chairs and persons are effectively empty space with a few point particles thrown in, I am unconvinced that "materialism" is even a position that can be expressed systematically or coherently (unless you define "physical objects" to include all those things that exist, which destroys any conceptual differences it has with, say, dualism). Thus, I favor simple naturalism: the view that whatever sorts of things turn out to exist will exist in certain causal relationships with other things. Some would call me a dualist, but nothing I believe commits me to the view that there exist two kinds of "objects" - the physical ones and the mental or nonphsysical ones.<br><br>

Free Will: I might be accused of thinking we have no freedom of will, since I do think most of our actions are causally determined. But to suppose this is to make a possibly unjustified assumption that "free will is the ability to do otherwise than what one in fact does" (that's sometimes called incompatiblism). Since by this definition we'll always be analyzing these events after the fact, we are at a loss to reason about whether things might have gone another way. But let's suppose they could not have. So what? Free will is not encapsulated by the description given above: we have free will, and, intuitively, it is the ability to do as one wants to do. I act <i>freely</i> when what I do is caused by my desires and preferences, and I am <i>coerced</i> when some other person imposes his or her desires and preferences on me in some way, perhaps by use of force. In fact, if my actions <i>weren't caused</i> by my preferences and desires, then in virtue of what would they be mine? That my preferences and desires themselves are - or may be - determined by genetics, social conditions and the like is completely irrelevant. We have freedom of the will, whether we like it or not.<br><br>

Free Will: I might be accused of thinking we have no freedom of will, since I do think most of our actions are causally determined. But to suppose this is to make a possibly unjustified assumption that "free will is the ability to do otherwise than what one in fact does" (that's sometimes called incompatiblism). Since by this definition we'll always be analyzing these events after the fact, we are at a loss to reason about whether things might have gone another way. But let's suppose they could not have. So what? Free will is not encapsulated by the description given above: we have free will, and, intuitively, it is the ability to do as one wants to do. I act <i>freely</i> when what I do is caused by my desires and preferences, and I am <i>coerced</i> when some other person imposes his or her desires and preferences on me in some way, perhaps by use of force. In fact, if my actions <i>weren't caused</i> by my preferences and desires, then in virtue of what would they be mine? That my preferences and desires themselves are - or may be - determined by genetics, social conditions and the like is completely irrelevant. We have freedom of the will, whether we like it or not.<br><br>

Religion: I am not religious, as I have never found myself able to believe most religious doctrines. I do not know for sure, but I have heard from reputable biologists and psychologists that humans are predisposed to have religious beliefs. I am not suggesting that these predispositions indicate that religion must be false; to explain how one comes to believe something in no way demonstrates its falsity. It seems <i>possible</i> at any rate that we evolved a "religious faculty" that accurately forecasts, or gives us intuitions, about religious truths. It is, however, extremely unlikely because there are such widely divergent views on what is true, religiously speaking: no matter who is right (assuming anyone is), there are more people who are wrong than right, and the faculty is therefore not to be trusted if we are trying to believe what is reasonable, given both our intuitions <i>and</i> our knowledge.

Religion: I am not religious, as I have never found myself able to believe most religious doctrines. I do not know for sure, but I have heard from reputable biologists and psychologists that humans are predisposed to have religious beliefs. I am not suggesting these predispositions indicate religion must be false; to explain how one comes to believe something in no way demonstrates its falsity. It seems <i>possible</i> at any rate that we evolved a "religious faculty" - and, perhaps, it is one that accurately forecasts, or gives us intuitions, about religious truths. It is, however, extremely unlikely: there are such widely divergent views on what is true, religiously speaking, that no matter who is right (assuming anyone is), there are more people who are wrong than right The faculty is therefore not to be trusted if we are trying to believe what is reasonable, given both our intuitions <i>and</i> our knowledge.