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''KAL 007, a Boeing 747 carrying 269 passengers and crew,  was shot down by the [[Soviet]]s on Sept. 1, 1983, just west of [[Sakhalin Island]], after having entered twice into Soviet [[airspace]] due to a navigational error <ref>ICAO '93,Conclusions, 3.18, pg.59</ref>. This is the a summarizing of  the International Civil Aviation Organization's analysis and  presentation of that error.''  

''KAL 007, a Boeing 747 carrying 269 passengers and crew,  was shot down by the [[Soviet]]s on Sept. 1, 1983, just west of [[Sakhalin Island]], after having entered twice into Soviet [[airspace]] due to a navigational error <ref>ICAO '93,Conclusions, 3.18, pg.59</ref>. This is the a summarizing of  the International Civil Aviation Organization's analysis and  presentation of that error.''  

Transoceanic passenger planes, such as KAL 007, use a number of [[navigational aids]], the primary one at the time being the [[Inertial Navigation System]] (INS).  The INS employs navigational "landmarks" called "[[way point]]s." Up to nine way point co-ordinates are inserted into the three electrically linked INS units (one in front of the Pilot, one in front of the Co-pilot and one a "hot spare). The first two way points (after Anchorage) on KAL 007's flight from Anchorage to Seoul were Cairn Mountain (28 minutes into the flight) and Bethel (50 minutes into the flight).  Along the route is a range of permissible deviation from the planned route termed the "Desired Track Capture Envelope."  As long as the flight stays within this envelope, the autopilot can be captured and controlled by the INS when the pilot switches from Magnetic Heading to INS, and the plane can be brought back on track if it has strayed.

Transoceanic passenger planes, such as KAL 007, use a number of [[navigational aids]], the primary one at the time being the [[Inertial Navigation System]] (INS).  The INS employs navigational "landmarks" called "way points." Up to nine way point co-ordinates are inserted into the three electrically linked INS units (one in front of the Pilot, one in front of the Co-pilot and one a "hot spare). The first two way points (after Anchorage) on KAL 007's flight from Anchorage to Seoul were Cairn Mountain (28 minutes into the flight) and Bethel (50 minutes into the flight).  Along the route is a range of permissible deviation from the planned route termed the "Desired Track Capture Envelope."  As long as the flight stays within this envelope, the autopilot can be captured and controlled by the INS when the pilot switches from Magnetic Heading to INS, and the plane can be brought back on track if it has strayed.

The plane was put on [[autopilot]] shortly after take-off and the "NAV Mode" set to "Magnetic Heading" (determined by the [[magnetic North Pole]] in northeast Canada, some 1,300 miles from true north).  The plane began to deviate from its planned course about ten minutes into the flight and while navigated in Magnetic Heading mode.  No reason is given in the ICAO report for this. The pilots were to switch the mode from Heading to INS prior to leaving the last U.S. continental way point - which was Bethel at the tip of Alaska. But the INS did not successfully engage the autopilot.*  

The plane was put on autopilot shortly after take-off and the "NAV Mode" set to "Magnetic Heading" (determined by the [[magnetic North Pole]] in northeast Canada, some 1,300 miles from true north).  The plane began to deviate from its planned course about ten minutes into the flight and while navigated in Magnetic Heading mode.  No reason is given in the ICAO report for this. The pilots were to switch the mode from Heading to INS prior to leaving the last U.S. continental way point - which was Bethel at the tip of Alaska. But the INS did not successfully engage the autopilot.*  

There are two possible reasons why the INS had not captured the autopilot <ref>ICAO '93. conclusions, 3.11, pg. 59</ref>

There are two possible reasons why the INS had not captured the autopilot <ref>ICAO '93. conclusions, 3.11, pg. 59</ref>

At 49 minutes after take-off, the pilot was reporting to be on course and at Bethel, "007, Bethel at forty-niner." But, in reality, they were far off course.  For at 50 minutes after take-off, U.S. Air Force radar at King Salmon, Alaska had tracked KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical miles north of where it should have been (Bethel)--exceeding by more than six times, its permissible "leeway" drift from the course set by the INS.

At 49 minutes after take-off, the pilot was reporting to be on course and at Bethel, "007, Bethel at forty-niner." But, in reality, they were far off course.  For at 50 minutes after take-off, U.S. Air Force radar at King Salmon, Alaska had tracked KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical miles north of where it should have been (Bethel)--exceeding by more than six times, its permissible "leeway" drift from the course set by the INS.

The pilots could also have been apprised of their being off course by their [[Horizontal Situation Indicator]] (HSI), one in front of each pilot. The HSI, whose primary function was to show the aircraft's position with respect to the horizon, would also have shown that the aircraft was more than 8 miles deviated, as at 12.6 miles deviated, the indicator needle would be pegged all the way to the side to its 8 mile indication limitation. This not being noticed, was one of the indications to the ICAO analysts that the flight crew of KAL 007 displayed a "lack of [[situational awareness]] and [[flight deck]] coordination".<ref name="ICAO 2"/>

The pilots could also have been apprised of their being off course by their [[Horizontal Situation Indicator]] (HSI), one in front of each pilot. The HSI, whose primary function was to show the aircraft's position with respect to the horizon, would also have shown that the aircraft was more than 8 miles deviated, as at 12.6 miles deviated, the indicator needle would be pegged all the way to the side to its 8 mile indication limitation. This not being noticed, was one of the indications to the ICAO analysts that the flight crew of KAL 007 displayed a "lack of [[situational awareness]] and flight deck coordination".

   

   

*(In order for the INS (calibrated to [[true north]]) to capture the autopilot and keep it on the desired track, the autopilot had to be set to "INS."  The [[Digital Flight Data Recorder]] (DFDR) shows that the INS never captured the autopilot.  KAL 007 flew at a "constant magnetic heading" of 245 or 246 degrees for the entire flight.  If the INS had captured the autopilot, the magnetic heading would not have been ''constant '' but would have changed with each leg of the desired track since the waypoints were not in a straight line)

*(In order for the INS (calibrated to [[true north]]) to capture the autopilot and keep it on the desired track, the autopilot had to be set to "INS."  The [[Digital Flight Data Recorder]] (DFDR) shows that the INS never captured the autopilot.  KAL 007 flew at a "constant magnetic heading" of 245 or 246 degrees for the entire flight.  If the INS had captured the autopilot, the magnetic heading would not have been ''constant '' but would have changed with each leg of the desired track since the waypoints were not in a straight line)