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:"American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal."<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>
 
:"American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal."<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>
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Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of bailing wire.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>
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Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of baling wire.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>
    
[[Comintern]] propagandist [[Owen Lattimore]] writing in the [[leftist]] ''New York Compass'' said that the U.S. should give Korea a "parting grant" of $150,000,000 and "let [[South Korea]] fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."<ref>''New York Compass'', Jan. 17, 1949.</ref><!-- when was it accessed? -->
 
[[Comintern]] propagandist [[Owen Lattimore]] writing in the [[leftist]] ''New York Compass'' said that the U.S. should give Korea a "parting grant" of $150,000,000 and "let [[South Korea]] fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."<ref>''New York Compass'', Jan. 17, 1949.</ref><!-- when was it accessed? -->
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