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In 1975, Ford and Secretary of State [[Kissinger]] met with Suharto in Jakarta--as fate would have it, on the very day Indonesia decided to invade the tiny island of East Timor.  East Timor was in the midst of a low-level civil war that led to thousands of deaths and to a military takeover by a de facto Socialist dictatorship headed by the left-wing FRETILIN Party.  FRETILIN had waged a violent insurgency in East Timor to seize power and to force out Portuguese and later Indonesian "colonialists."  Widely perceived as Communist by the outside world, FRETILIN was feared in Washington and financed by Moscow.  Before FRETILIN could set up a stable government, Indonesia began preparing for non-violent solutions to the perceived problem of Timorese independence.  Indonesian leaders feared that allowing Timorese independence would inspire secessionist movements that could bring about the collapse of Indonesia.   

In 1975, Ford and Secretary of State [[Kissinger]] met with Suharto in Jakarta--as fate would have it, on the very day Indonesia decided to invade the tiny island of East Timor.  East Timor was in the midst of a low-level civil war that led to thousands of deaths and to a military takeover by a de facto Socialist dictatorship headed by the left-wing FRETILIN Party.  FRETILIN had waged a violent insurgency in East Timor to seize power and to force out Portuguese and later Indonesian "colonialists."  Widely perceived as Communist by the outside world, FRETILIN was feared in Washington and financed by Moscow.  Before FRETILIN could set up a stable government, Indonesia began preparing for non-violent solutions to the perceived problem of Timorese independence.  Indonesian leaders feared that allowing Timorese independence would inspire secessionist movements that could bring about the collapse of Indonesia.   

Although FRETILIN was given one last chance to avoid war, it rejected it for the sake of martyrdom.  In an attempt to negotiate a settlement to the dispute over East Timor's future, the Portuguese Decolonization Commission convened a conference in June 1975 in Macau.  Indonesia believed it could work with the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia, a Timorese political party, to negotiate with FRETILIN. FRETILIN refused to attend the meeting on the grounds that it would never talk with them.  José Manuel Ramos-Horta, the current President of East Timor and a FRETILIN leader, expressed regret for the failure to attend the meeting in his 1987 memoirs.

Although FRETILIN was given a chance to avoid war, it rejected it for the sake of martyrdom.  In an attempt to negotiate a settlement to the dispute over East Timor's future, the Portuguese Decolonization Commission convened a conference in June 1975 in Macau.  Indonesia apparently believed that it could reach a compromise with FRETILIN, and repeatedly attempted to do so.<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf</ref> FRETILIN refused to attend the meeting on the grounds that it would never negotiate with the Indonesian regime.  Suharto  was apparently shocked by their intransigence.<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf</ref> José Manuel Ramos-Horta, the current President of East Timor and a FRETILIN leader, expressed regret for this failure in his 1987 memoirs.

Many claim in retrospect that FRETILIN only sought independence for East Timor, and that the civil war was provoked by a failed coup by right-wing militarists, and not by FRETILIN.  Had FRETILIN been able to set up a stable government, some say, East Timor might have made a transition to democracy.  FRETILIN supporters would likely have been horrified had they negotiated with a party explicitly committed to the integration of East Timor into Indonesia under any circumstances, much less with a gun up against their head.  Others note that FRETILIN gained power by force and used the military to enforce its edicts, and that 40,000 Timorese fled their homes to escape them.<ref>http://www.paulbogdanor.com/chomsky/labedz.pdf</ref>  Further, during the bloody Indonesian occupation, as many as 49% of all East Timorese civilians killed at various stages in the conflict were murdered by FRETILIN, and not by Indonesia.<ref>http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/is-it-really-true-that-east-timor-was-worse-than-bosnia-or-kosovo/</ref>  FRETILIN overwhelmingly won free elections held after the Indonesian withdrawal.

Many claim in retrospect that FRETILIN only sought independence for East Timor, and that the civil war was provoked by a failed coup by right-wing militarists, and not by FRETILIN.  Others note that FRETILIN gained power by force and used the military to enforce its edicts, and that 40,000 Timorese fled their homes to escape their repression.<ref>http://www.paulbogdanor.com/chomsky/labedz.pdf</ref>  Further, during the bloody Indonesian occupation, as many as 49% of all East Timorese civilians violently killed at any given point were murdered by FRETILIN, and not by Indonesia.<ref>http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/is-it-really-true-that-east-timor-was-worse-than-bosnia-or-kosovo/</ref>   

But Ford and Kissinger believed that the Communists could not be allowed to make any further advances in the post-Vietnam War era, as they had in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, and the Middle East.  The Congress had sold out UNITA, Lon Nol, Brazil, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane, Kissinger reasoned; the US needed all the friends it could get.  If Indonesia was a blood-soaked friend, well, one should not look a gift horse in the mouth.

Ford and Kissinger believed that the Communists could not be allowed to make any further advances in the post-Vietnam War era, as they had in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, and the Middle East.  Ford gave Suharto a green-light to invade East Timor.<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/#doc4</ref>  Ford was unambiguous: "We will understand and will not press you on the issue.  We understand the problem and the intentions you have."

Kissinger and Ford gave Suharto a green-light to invade East Timor.<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/#doc4</ref>  Ford was unambiguous: “We will understand and will not press you on the issue.  We understand the problem and the intentions you have.”  A Truth Commission revealed that the subsequent 24 year occupation would cause at least 18,600 violent killings and 75-183,000 deaths from hunger and illness,<ref>http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html</ref> counting deaths at the hands of both the FRETILIN Communists and the armed forces of Indonesia. A low estimate of the East Timorese population in 1975 was 700,000.  Although censuses, especially in underdeveloped countries, are always undercounts; many leftists used this (faulty) statistic to exaggerate the scope of the crime.  In reality, if East Timor's population had only been 700,000; then it's population would have been far, far higher after the atrocities took place than it was before.<ref>http://www.paulbogdanor.com/chomsky/labedz.pdf</ref>  The overall population is thus believed to have been over one million when the killings began, with at least 10% of the population being killed.<ref>http://www.paulbogdanor.com/chomsky/labedz.pdf</ref>

A Truth Commission found that 89-214,000 Timorese out of more than 700,000 were killed during the 24-year occupation, about 3/4 of them by Indonesian forces.<ref>http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html</ref>  Portuguese authorities estimated a population of 609,000 Timorese in 1970; based on later censuses from the Catholic Church, the population grew at 3% per year (which is in line with all the other countries of South East Asia; [[Cambodia]]'s grew at a rate of 2.9% per year at the same time despite being in the midst of a bloody civil war that killed hundreds of thousands; the Church estimates actually undercounted the population size by at least 5% on average, according to the Portuguese, due to the Church's incomplete access to society).<ref>http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref>  Projecting the population size for 1975 based on these findings, we arrive at a total of roughly 700,000.  This is extrapolated from Church statistics that were, on average, 5% too low; accounting for that deficiency, we arrive at a more precise 735,368.  Since all censuses tend to be undercounts, we could, finally, raise this figure to a rough 750,000.  The mid-value of the plausible range established by the Truth Commission is 152,000 (Kiernan notes that one can "throw out" a figure of 200,000 or more, but that 150,000 "is likely close to the truth").    

 

 

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