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Suharto was a close ally of the United States during the [[Cold War]].  As a result, he became a bête noire of the far left, who compared his crimes to those of Cambodia's [[Pol Pot]]--though relative to population size and percent killed, Pol Pot's were over 300 times worse.<ref>http://www.fair.org/extra/9809/suharto.html</ref><ref>Assuming that Suharto killed .75% of all Indonesians during his reign, divide that figure by 32 to get his "annual percent killed":  0 .0234375%.  Then compare this to Pol Pot's 7.5% killed annually.</ref>  In the wake of US defeat in the [[Vietnam War]], President Ford saw Indonesia as a vital American ally in Asia needed to preserve America's waning influence in that part of the world.

Suharto was a close ally of the United States during the [[Cold War]].  As a result, he became a bête noire of the far left, who compared his crimes to those of Cambodia's [[Pol Pot]]--though relative to population size and percent killed, Pol Pot's were over 300 times worse.<ref>http://www.fair.org/extra/9809/suharto.html</ref><ref>Assuming that Suharto killed .75% of all Indonesians during his reign, divide that figure by 32 to get his "annual percent killed":  0 .0234375%.  Then compare this to Pol Pot's 7.5% killed annually.</ref>  In the wake of US defeat in the [[Vietnam War]], President Ford saw Indonesia as a vital American ally in Asia needed to preserve America's waning influence in that part of the world.

==Atrocities in East Timor==

==Atrocities in East Timor==  

In 1975, Ford and Secretary of State [[Kissinger]] met with Suharto in Jakarta--as fate would have it, on the very day Indonesia decided to invade the tiny island of East Timor.  East Timor was in the midst of a low-level civil war that led to thousands of deaths and to a military takeover by a de facto Socialist dictatorship headed by the left-wing FRETILIN Party.  FRETILIN had waged a violent insurgency in East Timor to seize power and to force out Portuguese and later Indonesian "colonialists."  Widely perceived as Communist by the outside world, FRETILIN was feared in Washington and financed by Moscow.  Before FRETILIN could set up a stable government, Indonesia began preparing for non-violent solutions to the perceived problem of Timorese independence.  Indonesian leaders feared that allowing Timorese independence would inspire secessionist movements that could bring about the collapse of Indonesia.   

In 1975, Ford and Secretary of State [[Kissinger]] met with Suharto in Jakarta--as fate would have it, on the very day Indonesia decided to invade the tiny island of East Timor.  East Timor was in the midst of a low-level civil war that led to thousands of deaths and to a military takeover by a de facto Socialist dictatorship headed by the left-wing FRETILIN Party.  FRETILIN had waged a violent insurgency in East Timor to seize power and to force out Portuguese and later Indonesian "colonialists."  Widely perceived as Communist by the outside world, FRETILIN was feared in Washington and financed by Moscow.  Before FRETILIN could set up a stable government, Indonesia began preparing for non-violent solutions to the perceived problem of Timorese independence.  Indonesian leaders feared that allowing Timorese independence would inspire secessionist movements that could bring about the collapse of Indonesia.   

A Truth Commission found that 90,800-213,600 Timorese out of more than 700,000 were killed during the 24-year occupation, namely, 17,600-19,600 killings and 73,200 to 194,000 'excess' deaths from hunger and illness, although Indonesian forces were responsible for only about 3/4 of the violent killings.<ref>http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html</ref>  

A Truth Commission found that 90,800-213,600 Timorese out of more than 700,000 were killed during the 24-year occupation, namely, 17,600-19,600 killings and 73,200 to 194,000 'excess' deaths from hunger and illness, although Indonesian forces were responsible for only about 3/4 of the violent killings.<ref>http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html</ref>  

Australian Indonesia scholar Robert Cribb argues that the toll was significantly exaggerated. He argues that the 1980 census that counted 555,350 Timorese, although "the most reliable source of all," was probably a ''minimum'' rather than a maximum estimate for the total population. "It is worth recalling that hundreds of thousands of East Timorese disappeared during the violence of September 1999, only to reappear later," he writes. The 1980 census becomes more improbable in the face of the 1987 census that counted 657,411 Timorese—this would require a growth rate of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the very high growth rate in East Timor from 1970 to 1975, and a highly unlikely one given the conditions of the brutal occupation, including Indonesian efforts to discourage reproduction. This not only suggests that the 1980 count of 555,350 Timorese is far too low, but that the estimate of 425,000—which would require a 7% growth rate from 1980 to 1987—is inconceivable. Noting the relative lack of personal accounts of atrocities or of traumatized Indonesian soldiers, he further adds that East Timor "does not appear--on the basis of news reports and academic accounts--to be a society traumatized by mass death...the circumstance leading up to the Dili massacre of 1991...indicate a society which retained its vigor and indignation in a way which would probably not have been possible if it had been treated as Cambodia was treated under [[Pol Pot]]." Even Indonesian military strategy was based on winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, a fact that does not support charges of mass killing.  

Australian Indonesia scholar Robert Cribb argues that the toll was significantly exaggerated. He argues that the 1980 census that counted 555,350 Timorese, although "the most reliable source of all," was probably a ''minimum'' rather than a maximum estimate for the total population. "It is worth recalling that hundreds of thousands of East Timorese disappeared during the violence of September 1999, only to reappear later," he writes. The 1980 census becomes more improbable in the face of the 1987 census that counted 657,411 Timorese--this would require a growth rate of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the very high growth rate in East Timor from 1970 to 1975, and a highly unlikely one given the conditions of the brutal occupation, including Indonesian efforts to discourage reproduction. This not only suggests that the 1980 count of 555,350 Timorese is far too low, but that the estimate of 425,000--which would require a 7% growth rate from 1980 to 1987--is inconceivable. Noting the relative lack of personal accounts of atrocities or of traumatized Indonesian soldiers, he further adds that East Timor "does not appear--on the basis of news reports and academic accounts--to be a society traumatized by mass death...the circumstance leading up to the Dili massacre of 1991...indicate a society which retained its vigor and indignation in a way which would probably not have been possible if it had been treated as Cambodia was treated under [[Pol Pot]]." Even Indonesian military strategy was based on winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, a fact that does not support charges of mass killing.

Kiernan, starting from a base population of 700,000 Timorese in 1975 (based on the 1974 Catholic Church census) calculated an expected 1980 population of 735,000 Timorese (assuming a growth rate of only 1% per year as a result of the occupation). Accepting the 1980 count that Cribb regards as at least 10% (55,000) too low, Kiernan concluded that as many as 180,000 may have died in the war.<ref name="yale-university.org">http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref> Cribb argued that the 3% growth rate suggested by the 1974 census was too high, citing the fact that the church had previously postulated a growth rate of 1.8%, which would have produced a figure in line with the Portuguese population estimate of 635,000 for 1974. Although Cribb maintained that the Portuguese census was almost certainly an underestimate,<ref name="yale-university.org"/> he believed it to be more likely correct than the church census, due to the fact that any church attempt to extrapolate the size of the total population "must be seen in light of its incomplete access to society" (less than half of Timorese were Catholic). Assuming a growth rate in line with the other nations of South East Asia, then, would yield a more accurate figure of 680,000 for 1975, and an expected 1980 population of slightly over 750,000 (without accounting for the decline in the birth rate resulting from the Indonesian occupation).<ref name="yale-university.org"/> The deficit remaining would be almost exactly 200,000. According to Cribb, Indonesian policies restricted the birth rate by 25-50%, thus up to 65,000 of these were not born rather than killed; another 55,000 were "missing" as a result of the Timorese evading the Indonesian authorities who conducted the 1980 census.<ref name="ReferenceA">http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=robert_cribb</ref> A variety of factors—the exodus of tens of thousands from their homes to escape FRETELIN in 1974-5; the deaths of thousands in the civil war; the deaths of combatants during the occupation; killings by FRETELIN; and natural disasters—diminish further still the civilian toll attributable to Indonesian forces during this time.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Considering all this data, Cribb argues for a much lower toll of 100,000 or less, with an absolute minimum of 60,000, and a mere tenth of the civilian population dying unnaturally, for the years 1975-80.<ref name="works.bepress.com"/>   Based on the findings of the UN, Cribb was actually ''overestimating'' the death toll from violence; however, the UN's less precise figures for "excess deaths"--73,200 or more—are either in line with or notably higher than Cribb's. Cribb's research, then, supports the UN's low estimate of 90,000 dead, counting several thousand killed by FRETELIN. Finally, accepting the lowest UN figures based on his arguments would not be sufficient to derive a conservative total. For example, FRETELIN was responsible for almost 30% of the violent killings; if we assume that Indonesia was responsible for less than 100% of the "excess" deaths, then to the extent we reduce their responsibility, the toll declines accordingly. Likewise, author Marko Attila Hoare has suggested that it is dishonest to attribute all of the deaths in the war to Indonesia, and to imply that all those killed in the war were civilians.<ref>http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/is-it-really-true-that-east-timor-was-worse-than-bosnia-or-kosovo/</ref> Kiernan responded, however, by asserting that the influx of migrant workers during the occupation and the increase in the population growth rate typical of a mortality crisis justifies accepting the 1980 census as valid despite the 1987 estimate, and that the 1974 church census—though a "possible maximum"—cannot be discounted because the church's lack of access to society might well have resulted in an undercount.<ref name="yale-university.org"/> He concluded that, even in light of Cribb's arguments, it would be safe to assume that at least 116,000 combatants and civilians were killed by all sides or died "unnatural" deaths from 1975–80 (if true, this would yield the result that about 15% of the civilian population of East Timor was killed by Indonesia from 1975–80).<ref name="yale-university.org"/>  F. Hiorth separately estimated that slightly less than 14% of the civilian population (95,000) died at the hands of Indonesian forces over the course of this period.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>  

Kiernan, starting from a base population of 700,000 Timorese in 1975 (based on the 1974 Catholic Church census) calculated an expected 1980 population of 735,000 Timorese (assuming a growth rate of only 1% per year as a result of the occupation). Accepting the 1980 count that Cribb regards as at least 10% (55,000) too low, Kiernan concluded that as many as 180,000 may have died in the war.<ref>http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref> Cribb argued that the 3% growth rate suggested by the 1974 census was too high, citing the fact that the church had previously postulated a growth rate of 1.8%, which would have produced a figure in line with the Portuguese population estimate of 635,000 for 1974. Although Cribb maintained that the Portuguese census was almost certainly an underestimate,<ref>http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref> he believed it to be more likely correct than the church census, due to the fact that any church attempt to extrapolate the size of the total population "must be seen in light of its incomplete access to society" (less than half of Timorese were Catholic). Assuming a growth rate in line with the other nations of South East Asia, then, would yield a more accurate figure of 680,000 for 1975, and an expected 1980 population of slightly over 750,000 (without accounting for the decline in the birth rate resulting from the Indonesian occupation).<ref>http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref> The deficit remaining would be almost exactly 200,000. According to Cribb, Indonesian policies restricted the birth rate by 25-50%, thus up to 65,000 of these were not born rather than killed; another 55,000 were "missing" as a result of the Timorese evading the Indonesian authorities who conducted the 1980 census.<ref>http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=robert_cribb</ref> A variety of factors--the exodus of tens of thousands from their homes to escape FRETELIN in 1974-5; the deaths of thousands in the civil war; the deaths of combatants during the occupation; killings by FRETELIN; and natural disasters--diminish further still the civilian toll attributable to Indonesian forces during this time.<ref>http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=robert_cribb</ref> Considering all this data, Cribb argues for a much lower toll of 100,000 or less, with an absolute minimum of 60,000, and a mere tenth of the civilian population dying unnaturally, for the years 1975-80.<ref>http://works.bepress.com/robert_cribb/2/</ref> Based on the findings of the UN, Cribb was actually ''overestimating'' the death toll from violence; however, the UN's less precise figures for "excess deaths"--73,200 or more--are either in line with or notably higher than Cribb's. Cribb's research, then, supports the UN's low estimate of 90,000 dead, counting several thousand killed by FRETELIN. Finally, accepting the lowest UN figures based on his arguments would not be sufficient to derive a conservative total. For example, FRETELIN was responsible for almost 30% of the violent killings; if we assume that Indonesia was responsible for less than 100% of the "excess" deaths, then to the extent we reduce their responsibility, the toll declines accordingly. Likewise, author Marko Attila Hoare has suggested that it is dishonest to attribute all of the deaths in the war to Indonesia, and to imply that all those killed in the war were civilians.<ref>http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/is-it-really-true-that-east-timor-was-worse-than-bosnia-or-kosovo/</ref> Kiernan responded, however, by asserting that the influx of migrant workers during the occupation and the increase in the population growth rate typical of a mortality crisis justifies accepting the 1980 census as valid despite the 1987 estimate, and that the 1974 church census--though a "possible maximum"--cannot be discounted because the church's lack of access to society might well have resulted in an undercount.<ref>http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref> He concluded that, even in light of Cribb's arguments, it would be safe to assume that at least 116,000 combatants and civilians were killed by all sides or died "unnatural" deaths from 1975-80 (if true, this would yield the result that about 15% of the civilian population of East Timor was killed by Indonesia from 1975-80).<ref>http://www.yale-university.org/gsp/publications/KiernanRevised1.pdf</ref>  F. Hiorth separately estimated that slightly less than 14% of the civilian population died at the hands of Indonesian forces over the course of this period.<ref>http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=robert_cribb</ref>  

Far-leftists would later inflate the figure to 150,000, then 200,000, then 250,000, then 300,000, then 400,000--with no regard to basic demographic realities!

Far-leftists would later inflate the figure to 150,000, then 200,000, then 250,000, then 300,000, then 400,000--with no regard to basic demographic realities!