Changes

During the South Asian crisis in 1971, the White House, stood firmly behind Pakistani president Yahya Khan and demonstrated a disdain for India and particularly its leader, [[Indira Gandhi]] because of India's tilt or favoritism toward the Soviet Union. Kissinger had disdain for India and was using Pakistan as a tool to reach China, which he considered much more important to the U.S.

During the South Asian crisis in 1971, the White House, stood firmly behind Pakistani president Yahya Khan and demonstrated a disdain for India and particularly its leader, [[Indira Gandhi]] because of India's tilt or favoritism toward the Soviet Union. Kissinger had disdain for India and was using Pakistan as a tool to reach China, which he considered much more important to the U.S.

Nixon relayed messages to Yahya, urging him to restrain Pakistani forces.<ref>Black, Conrad, Richard Nixon:  A Life in Full (2007), p. 751.</ref> His objective was to prevent a war and safeguard Pakistan's interests, though he feared an Indian invasion of West Pakistan that would lead to Indian domination of [[Indian subcontinent|the sub-continent]] and strengthen the position of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877618-2,00.html</ref>  Similarly, Yahya Khan feared that an independent Bangladesh could lead to the disintegration of Pakistan.  Indian military support for Bengali guerillas led to war between India and Pakistan.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878408,00.html</ref>

Nixon relayed messages to Yahya, urging him to restrain Pakistani forces.<ref>Black, Conrad, Richard Nixon:  A Life in Full (2007), p. 751.</ref> His objective was to prevent a war and safeguard Pakistan's interests, though he feared an Indian invasion of West Pakistan that would lead to Indian domination of the sub-continent and strengthen the position of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877618-2,00.html</ref>  Similarly, Yahya Khan feared that an independent Bangladesh could lead to the disintegration of Pakistan.  Indian military support for Bengali guerillas led to war between India and Pakistan.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878408,00.html</ref>

Nixon met with Indian Prime Minister [[Indira Gandhi]] and did not believe her assertion that she would not invade Pakistan;<ref>Black, Conrad (2007), p. 752</ref> he did not trust her and once referred to her as an "old witch".  Kissinger maintained that Nixon made specific proposals to Gandhi on a solution for the crisis, some of which she heard for the first time; for example, mutual withdrawal of troops from the Indo-East Pakistan borders. Nixon also expressed a wish to fix a time limit with Yahya for political accommodation in East Pakistan. Nixon asserted that India could count on US endeavors to ease the crisis within a short time. But, both Kissinger and Gandhi aide Jayakar maintained, Gandhi did not respond to these proposals. Kissinger noted that she “listened to what was in fact one of Nixon's better presentations with aloof indifference” but “took up none of the points.” Jayakar pointed out that Gandhi listened to Nixon “without a single comment, creating an impregnable space so that no real contact was possible.” She also refrained from assuring that India would follow Pakistan's suit if it withdrew from India's borders.  As a result, the main agenda was “dropped altogether.”<ref>Jayakar, Indira Gandhi, p. 232; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 878 & 881-82.

Nixon met with Indian Prime Minister [[Indira Gandhi]] and did not believe her assertion that she would not invade Pakistan;<ref>Black, Conrad (2007), p. 752</ref> he did not trust her and once referred to her as an "old witch".  Kissinger maintained that Nixon made specific proposals to Gandhi on a solution for the crisis, some of which she heard for the first time; for example, mutual withdrawal of troops from the Indo-East Pakistan borders. Nixon also expressed a wish to fix a time limit with Yahya for political accommodation in East Pakistan. Nixon asserted that India could count on US endeavors to ease the crisis within a short time. But, both Kissinger and Gandhi aide Jayakar maintained, Gandhi did not respond to these proposals. Kissinger noted that she “listened to what was in fact one of Nixon's better presentations with aloof indifference” but “took up none of the points.” Jayakar pointed out that Gandhi listened to Nixon “without a single comment, creating an impregnable space so that no real contact was possible.” She also refrained from assuring that India would follow Pakistan's suit if it withdrew from India's borders.  As a result, the main agenda was “dropped altogether.”<ref>Jayakar, Indira Gandhi, p. 232; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 878 & 881-82.