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Kissinger has also been accused of an alleged lack of transparency.  He has responded by donating all of his personal papers to the [[Library of Congress]] for posterity.  He recently released some 20,000 pages of transcripts of his private conversations with various world leaders.<ref>http://staff.lib.msu.edu/harris23/red_tape/o&e0404.htm#kissenger</ref>  Such transcripts were the basis for his 2003 book on foreign policy, ''Crisis.''

Kissinger has also been accused of an alleged lack of transparency.  He has responded by donating all of his personal papers to the [[Library of Congress]] for posterity.  He recently released some 20,000 pages of transcripts of his private conversations with various world leaders.<ref>http://staff.lib.msu.edu/harris23/red_tape/o&e0404.htm#kissenger</ref>  Such transcripts were the basis for his 2003 book on foreign policy, ''Crisis.''

Chilean author Joaquín Fermandois, noting the meetings with Chilean generals in which the US encouraged a potential coup, concluded that the US "wanted Allende out" and that the notion of free elections being held subsequently was not a prerequisite, but simply one possible outcome (i.e., if the Allessandri plot worked).  He wrote:  "What they wanted was to prevent Allende from coming to power, if necessary by the intervention of the military."<ref>www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_3236_1698/r92_fermandois_ing.pdf Translated from Spanish; ''Commentary'' accepts at face value the idea that an "interim junta" would have voluntarily stepped down and held new elections after a few days if the military had intervened; but Fermandois points out that "few believe this to be so" and expresses his own doubts about the thesis; Fermandois writes that the Americans did ''not'' "see all this as a way towards a new election"--but obviously, the attempts to influence the 1970 election and the aid to Chilean dissidents in its aftermath could not have served another purpose, and the attempt to buy off the Congress so that it would vote differently could not have imposed dictatorship (indeed, it would have saved Chilean democracy along with thousands of Chilean lives).  However, the CIA's encouragement of a military coup, he is right to say, could not have served the purpose of holding elections, except in that it would remove Allende.  But Fermandois acknowledges that despite the repeated encouragement, the US steadfastly refused any material support of its own for such a scheme.  His point is far from profound:  When the CIA sends messages like "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup," it is not referring merely to a constitutional coup.  However, it does make a moral difference if the US is only encouraging such a coup as a last resort, and against a Communist dictator, and without offering the plotters material aid.<ref>  However, considering the involvement of Cuba, Russia, Brazil and other powers at the same time, he discusses whether or not this support was "moral, immoral, or amoral," concluding that the CIA was unable to make a serious difference and that Chile illustrates the tragic irony of "the myth of American omnipotence."  The conflict was an internal civil war, and one should not be surprised to see foreign powers involve themselves in it; the notion that "the CIA was behind everything," he says, is simply a myth.  (While he condemns the violence perpetrated by the Allende regime, including the illegal armed regiment from Cuba, he argues that it is as mythical to assert that it justified Pinochet's excesses as it is to call Allende a typical democratic leftist.)<ref>Ibid.</ref>  One supposes that the ''realist'' response would be that if they're planning a coup either way; we might as well intervene against our possible foes and encourage our potential friends, as long as we don't materially assist the gambit (especially if one has already tried and failed to remove the de facto dictator through democratic means).  Kissinger simply recognized the possibility that a military coup might be the ''least bad'' outcome; as a bad outcome, the United States could not play a role in the plot.

Chilean author Joaquín Fermandois, noting the meetings with Chilean generals in which the US encouraged a potential coup, concluded that the US "wanted Allende out" and that the notion of free elections being held subsequently was not a prerequisite, but simply one possible outcome (i.e., if the Allessandri plot worked).  He wrote:  "What they wanted was to prevent Allende from coming to power, if necessary by the intervention of the military."<ref>www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_3236_1698/r92_fermandois_ing.pdf Translated from Spanish; ''Commentary'' accepts at face value the idea that an "interim junta" would have voluntarily stepped down and held new elections after a few days if the military had intervened; but Fermandois points out that "few believe this to be so" and expresses his own doubts about the thesis; Fermandois writes that the Americans did ''not'' "see all this as a way towards a new election"--but obviously, the attempts to influence the 1970 election and the aid to Chilean dissidents in its aftermath could not have served another purpose, and the attempt to buy off the Congress so that it would vote differently could not have imposed dictatorship (indeed, it would have saved Chilean democracy along with thousands of Chilean lives).  However, the CIA's encouragement of a military coup, he is right to say, could not have served the purpose of holding elections, except in that it would remove Allende.  But Fermandois acknowledges that despite the repeated encouragement, the US steadfastly refused any material support of its own for such a scheme.  His point is far from profound:  When the CIA sends messages like "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup," it is not referring merely to a constitutional coup.  However, it does make a moral difference if the US is only encouraging such a coup as a last resort, and against a Communist dictator, and without offering the plotters material aid.</ref>  However, considering the involvement of Cuba, Russia, Brazil and other powers at the same time, he discusses whether or not this support was "moral, immoral, or amoral," concluding that the CIA was unable to make a serious difference and that Chile illustrates the tragic irony of "the myth of American omnipotence."  The conflict was an internal civil war, and one should not be surprised to see foreign powers involve themselves in it; the notion that "the CIA was behind everything," he says, is simply a myth.  (While he condemns the violence perpetrated by the Allende regime, including the illegal armed regiment from Cuba, he argues that it is as mythical to assert that it justified Pinochet's excesses as it is to call Allende a typical democratic leftist.)<ref>Ibid.</ref>  One supposes that the ''realist'' response would be that if they're planning a coup either way; we might as well intervene against our possible foes and encourage our potential friends, as long as we don't materially assist the gambit (especially if one has already tried and failed to remove the de facto dictator through democratic means).  Kissinger simply recognized the possibility that a military coup might be the ''least bad'' outcome; as a bad outcome, the United States could not play a role in the plot.

In 1976, Kissinger "declined to approve" that a letter be sent to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>  In an Aug. 30, 1976 memo, Shlaudeman discussed the possibility that the U.S. ambassador in Uruguay might be endangered by delivering a warning against assassination. The U.S. ambassador to Chile said that Pinochet might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with assassination plots.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>  When the CIA learned about the Chilean plan to set up a covert office in Miami as part of Chile's overseas operations in 1974, however, Kissinger did authorize the CIA to send the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) a warning not to go ahead with the plan.  He rejected the State Department's proposal to publicly rebuke Chile on the matter.  As a result, the Chileans backed down.<ref>http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Kissinger+DECLASSIFIED.(document+shows+Secretary+of+State+supported...-a054468923</ref>  Kissinger's decision not to send the letter is considered a subject of controversy because Chile was engaging in a spree of international murders at the time (the day the letter was to be sent, a Pinochet critic was assassinated in [[Washington, D.C.]]).<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>

In 1976, Kissinger "declined to approve" that a letter be sent to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>  In an Aug. 30, 1976 memo, Shlaudeman discussed the possibility that the U.S. ambassador in Uruguay might be endangered by delivering a warning against assassination. The U.S. ambassador to Chile said that Pinochet might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with assassination plots.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>  When the CIA learned about the Chilean plan to set up a covert office in Miami as part of Chile's overseas operations in 1974, however, Kissinger did authorize the CIA to send the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) a warning not to go ahead with the plan.  He rejected the State Department's proposal to publicly rebuke Chile on the matter.  As a result, the Chileans backed down.<ref>http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Kissinger+DECLASSIFIED.(document+shows+Secretary+of+State+supported...-a054468923</ref>  Kissinger's decision not to send the letter is considered a subject of controversy because Chile was engaging in a spree of international murders at the time (the day the letter was to be sent, a Pinochet critic was assassinated in [[Washington, D.C.]]).<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>