Changes

1952-1954 (Stanford University Press, 1999) pp24-7, based on the CIA archives</ref>

1952-1954 (Stanford University Press, 1999) pp24-7, based on the CIA archives</ref>

The Truman administration began developing contingency plans to remove Arbenz in 1952, in the event that he became a threat to American interests in the region.  In the face of widespread popular discontent in Guatemala and mass protests organized by the Catholic Church, the CIA used black propaganda to spread panic among the population.  In the midst of a low-level internal civil war, the Eisenhower administration mobilized disaffected Guatemalan exiles to invade the country from neighboring [[Honduras]].  Arbenz, a fighter until the end, donned his colonel's uniform and prepared himself for war with the United States.  Ultimately, however, there was very little fighting at all; the military failed to support Arbenz due to its own concerns over his percieved radicalism.  The US-armed rebellion quickly took over the country, to the surprise of the CIA, which had expected much fiercer resistance.  With the army promptly joining the revolt, Arbenz fled the country in a panic.  He was allowed exile by the new regime.

The Truman administration began developing contingency plans to remove Arbenz in 1952, in the event that he became a threat to American interests in the region.  In the face of widespread popular discontent in Guatemala and mass protests organized by the Catholic Church, the CIA used black propaganda to spread panic among the population.  In the midst of a low-level internal civil war, the Eisenhower administration mobilized disaffected Guatemalan exiles to invade the country from neighboring [[Honduras]].  Arbenz, a fighter until the end, donned his colonel's uniform and prepared himself for war with the United States.  Ultimately, however, there was very little fighting at all; the military failed to support Arbenz due to its own concerns over his perceived radicalism.  The US-armed rebellion quickly took over the country, to the surprise of the CIA, which had expected much fiercer resistance.  With the army promptly joining the revolt, Arbenz fled the country in a panic.  He was allowed exile by the new regime.

Vice-President [[Richard Nixon]] praised the new elections held by the military regime, declaring that Guatemala represented "the first time in history that a Communist government has ever been overthrown and replaced by a free one."  However, Guatemala would be plagued with instability for decades.  A series of military coups rocked the country, as Soviet and Cuban support for Communist violence caused bloody civil strife.  After a 1982 coup, Guatemala was placed under a US arms embargo imposed on human rights grounds.  A vicious genocide reminiscent of the mass killing of the Hmong in [[Laos]] was then carried out against the Mayan Indians, in which scores of thousands were massacred.

Vice-President [[Richard Nixon]] praised the new elections held by the military regime, declaring that Guatemala represented "the first time in history that a Communist government has ever been overthrown and replaced by a free one."  However, Guatemala would be plagued with instability for decades.  A series of military coups rocked the country, as Soviet and Cuban support for Communist violence caused bloody civil strife.  After a 1982 coup, Guatemala was placed under a US arms embargo imposed on human rights grounds.  A vicious genocide reminiscent of the mass killing of the Hmong in [[Laos]] was then carried out against the Mayan Indians, in which scores of thousands were massacred.

In Guatamala in 1954, the CIA operation was marked by chronic lapses in security, the failure to plan beyond the operation's first stages, the Agency's poor understanding of the intentions of the Guatemalan Army, the local communist party (the Guatemalan Labor Party), and the government, the hopeless weakness of invasion leader Carlos Castillo Armas's troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility of defeat. Just as the entire operation seemed hopeless, and before there were any significant violent attacks against it, the leftist Guatemalan government suddenly, inexplicably collapsed and a pro-American government took over.<ref> Nick Cullather, ''Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954.'' (1999)</ref>

In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA operation was marked by chronic lapses in security, the failure to plan beyond the operation's first stages, the Agency's poor understanding of the intentions of the Guatemalan Army, the local communist party (the Guatemalan Labor Party), and the government, the hopeless weakness of invasion leader Carlos Castillo Armas's troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility of defeat. Just as the entire operation seemed hopeless, and before there were any significant violent attacks against it, the leftist Guatemalan government suddenly, inexplicably collapsed and a pro-American government took over.<ref> Nick Cullather, ''Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954.'' (1999)</ref>

===Assassinations===

===Assassinations===