Changes

Richelson (2001) explains the major DS&T's achievements, especially reconnaissance airplanes and a series of increasingly sophisticated surveillance satellites, with cameras that could photograph Soviet bomber bases and missile sites with startling clarity from orbits deep in space. In 1960, the first effective satellite produced coverage of more than one million square miles, surpassing all previous U-2 photography combined. This imagery revealed that the Soviets had far fewer bombers and (later) [[ICBM|ICBMs]] than the Pentagon expected. The worst-case estimates of the U.S. Air Force proved wildly exaggerated, and the myths of the bomber and missile "gaps" were punctured by empirical data.  

Richelson (2001) explains the major DS&T's achievements, especially reconnaissance airplanes and a series of increasingly sophisticated surveillance satellites, with cameras that could photograph Soviet bomber bases and missile sites with startling clarity from orbits deep in space. In 1960, the first effective satellite produced coverage of more than one million square miles, surpassing all previous U-2 photography combined. This imagery revealed that the Soviets had far fewer bombers and (later) [[ICBM|ICBMs]] than the Pentagon expected. The worst-case estimates of the U.S. Air Force proved wildly exaggerated, and the myths of the bomber and missile "gaps" were punctured by empirical data.  

===Dulles years 1953-51===

===Dulles years 1953-51===

Dulles devoted 80% of his much enlarged budget ($82 million) to covert (secret) operations to contain Communism. On the other side was the Soviet [[KGB]]. The head of the K.G.B.'s first chief directorate, Leonid Shabarshin later explained, "The essence of the KGB's active undertakings was to inflict political and moral damage on our basic opponent, the United States. . . . [so] We compromised political figures, organs of the press, and Americans whose activities were in some way unwelcome [to the Soviets]." The KGB veteran revealed that every "active measure" against the enemies of the Soviet Union abroad was submitted by KGB to the Politburo “and was implemented only with its permission. The results of the action were also reported to the Politburo."<ref> See [http://www.iwp.edu/news/newsID.139/news_detail.asp Herbert Romerstein,  "Divide and Conquer: The KGB disinformation campaign against Ukrainians and Jews," ''Ukrainian Quarterly'' Fall 2004 online edition]</ref>  Which side performed better remains an open question. CIA money subsidized anti-communist intellectuals and strengthened liberal political parties across Europe and the Third World. Striking low-cost successes early on reinforced the CIA's mastermind image. CIA-supported parties defeated the Communists in Italy and France in the late 1940s. A handful of agents provided assistance to opposition groups which forced anti-American prime ministers out of office in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). CIA counterintelligence tried to neutralize the KGB and other hostile agencies, like the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), Communist East Germany's [[Stasi]] and Cuba's DGI.

Dulles devoted 80% of his much enlarged budget ($82 million) to covert (secret) operations to contain Communism. On the other side was the Soviet [[KGB]]. The head of the K.G.B.'s first chief directorate, Leonid Shabarshin later explained, "The essence of the KGB's active undertakings was to inflict political and moral damage on our basic opponent, the United States. . . . [so] We compromised political figures, organs of the press, and Americans whose activities were in some way unwelcome [to the Soviets]." The KGB veteran revealed that every "active measure" against the enemies of the Soviet Union abroad was submitted by KGB to the Politburo “and was implemented only with its permission. The results of the action were also reported to the Politburo."<ref> See [http://www.iwp.edu/news/newsID.139/news_detail.asp Herbert Romerstein,  "Divide and Conquer: The KGB disinformation campaign against Ukrainians and Jews," ''Ukrainian Quarterly'' Fall 2004 online edition]</ref>  Which side performed better remains an open question. CIA money subsidized anti-communist intellectuals and strengthened liberal political parties across Europe and the Third World. Striking low-cost successes early on reinforced the CIA's mastermind image. CIA-supported parties defeated the Communists in Italy and France in the late 1940s. A handful of agents provided assistance to opposition groups which forced anti-American prime ministers out of office in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). CIA counterintelligence tried to neutralize the KGB and other hostile agencies, like the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), Communist East Germany's [[Stasi]] and Cuba's DGI.

===Iran 1953===

 

====Iran 1953====

Prime Minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] had become the de facto dictator of Iran, as he dissolved the Parliament and abolished free elections with a secret ballot, after declaring victory in a referendum where he claimed 99.9% of the vote.<ref>{{Cite news| url=http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-chapter2.html | title=Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah | work=The New York Times}}</ref>  He gained power through organized terrorism and received funding from the [[KGB]].<ref>http://jebhemelli.net/mossadegh/mossaddegh_1951m_of_y%20Page%202.htm ''Time'' article from 1951 on Mossadegh's seizure of power</ref>  Suppressing widespread discontent, as recounted in a 2003 ''Time Magazine'' report, he ordered police to violently massacre more than 300 unarmed protestors.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-1,00.html</ref>  Under his rule, Iran became the first Middle Eastern country to simply steal and nationalize Western oil fields--even though the Iranians did not know how to use them on their own.<ref>http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/index.php?news=2635</ref>  The result was the total collapse of the Iranian economy.  Iranian oil supplies were taken off the world market.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-1,00.html</ref><ref>http://jebhemelli.net/mossadegh/mossaddegh_1951m_of_y%20Page%202.htm</ref>  This doomed all future economic development in Iran, a "basket-case" nation plagued with rampant disease, illiteracy, and religious fanaticism.

Prime Minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] had become the de facto dictator of Iran, as he dissolved the Parliament and abolished free elections with a secret ballot, after declaring victory in a referendum where he claimed 99.9% of the vote.<ref>{{Cite news| url=http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-chapter2.html | title=Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah | work=The New York Times}}</ref>  He gained power through organized terrorism and received funding from the [[KGB]].<ref>http://jebhemelli.net/mossadegh/mossaddegh_1951m_of_y%20Page%202.htm ''Time'' article from 1951 on Mossadegh's seizure of power</ref>  Suppressing widespread discontent, as recounted in a 2003 ''Time Magazine'' report, he ordered police to violently massacre more than 300 unarmed protestors.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-1,00.html</ref>  Under his rule, Iran became the first Middle Eastern country to simply steal and nationalize Western oil fields--even though the Iranians did not know how to use them on their own.<ref>http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/index.php?news=2635</ref>  The result was the total collapse of the Iranian economy.  Iranian oil supplies were taken off the world market.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-1,00.html</ref><ref>http://jebhemelli.net/mossadegh/mossaddegh_1951m_of_y%20Page%202.htm</ref>  This doomed all future economic development in Iran, a "basket-case" nation plagued with rampant disease, illiteracy, and religious fanaticism.

President Truman had met with Mossadegh and pledged US support against the English, expressing admiration for his efforts at economic justice.  His administration concluded that England sought "''a rule or ruin''" policy on Iran.  The Eisenhower administration saw things rather differently.  

President Truman had met with Mossadegh and pledged US support against the English, expressing admiration for his efforts at economic justice.  His administration concluded that England sought "''a rule or ruin''" policy on Iran.  The Eisenhower administration saw things rather differently.  

Conrad Black, arguing that the CIA role was minimal as compared to the efforts of the Iranian army and the internal fighting in Iran, mocked Obama over "''his apology for President Eisenhower’s approval of the overthrow of the deranged Iranian demagogue Mohammed Mossadegh.''"<ref>http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227855/zeal-zelaya/conrad-black</ref>

Conrad Black, arguing that the CIA role was minimal as compared to the efforts of the Iranian army and the internal fighting in Iran, mocked Obama over "''his apology for President Eisenhower’s approval of the overthrow of the deranged Iranian demagogue Mohammed Mossadegh.''"<ref>http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227855/zeal-zelaya/conrad-black</ref>

===Guatemala 1954===

====Guatemala 1954====

The CIA helped overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in [[Guatemala]] in 1954.  This was one of its most controversial operations, its model for subsequent covert action against countries like [[Cuba]], and its first attempt at regime change in Latin America.

The CIA helped overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in [[Guatemala]] in 1954.  This was one of its most controversial operations, its model for subsequent covert action against countries like [[Cuba]], and its first attempt at regime change in Latin America.

In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA operation was marked by chronic lapses in security, the failure to plan beyond the operation's first stages, the Agency's poor understanding of the intentions of the Guatemalan Army, the local communist party (the Guatemalan Labor Party), and the government, the hopeless weakness of invasion leader Carlos Castillo Armas's troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility of defeat. Just as the entire operation seemed hopeless, and before there were any significant violent attacks against it, the leftist Guatemalan government suddenly, inexplicably collapsed and a pro-American government took over.<ref> Nick Cullather, ''Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954.'' (1999)</ref>

In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA operation was marked by chronic lapses in security, the failure to plan beyond the operation's first stages, the Agency's poor understanding of the intentions of the Guatemalan Army, the local communist party (the Guatemalan Labor Party), and the government, the hopeless weakness of invasion leader Carlos Castillo Armas's troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility of defeat. Just as the entire operation seemed hopeless, and before there were any significant violent attacks against it, the leftist Guatemalan government suddenly, inexplicably collapsed and a pro-American government took over.<ref> Nick Cullather, ''Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954.'' (1999)</ref>

===Brazil 1964===

====Brazil 1964====

On March 30, the American military attaché in Brazil, Colonel Vernon A. Walters, telegraphed the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]. In that telegraph, he confirmed that Brazilian army generals, independently of the US, had committed themselves to acting against President João Goulart within a week of the meeting, but no date was set.<ref>[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36291.htm 192. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Brazil (Walters) to the Department of the Army] United States State Department. March 30, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.</ref>

On March 30, the American military attaché in Brazil, Colonel Vernon A. Walters, telegraphed the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]. In that telegraph, he confirmed that Brazilian army generals, independently of the US, had committed themselves to acting against President João Goulart within a week of the meeting, but no date was set.<ref>[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36291.htm 192. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Brazil (Walters) to the Department of the Army] United States State Department. March 30, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.</ref>

In the telegraphs, Gordon also acknowledges US involvement in "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business" and that he "may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future."<ref>[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36291.htm 187.  Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State] Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007</ref>

In the telegraphs, Gordon also acknowledges US involvement in "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business" and that he "may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future."<ref>[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36291.htm 187.  Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State] Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007</ref>

===Chile 1970-3===

====Chile 1970-3====

The CIA opposed the Communist regime of [[Salvador Allende]] in Chile, which was originally elected with a minority of the vote and subsequently achieved dictatorial powers.

The CIA opposed the Communist regime of [[Salvador Allende]] in Chile, which was originally elected with a minority of the vote and subsequently achieved dictatorial powers.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the matter, concluded that since the machine guns supplied to Valenzuela had not actually been employed in the killing, and since General Viaux had been officially discouraged by the CIA a few days before the murder, there was therefore "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction."  This view has been disputed by writer [[Christopher Hitchens]].<ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/feb/24/features.weekend</ref>

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the matter, concluded that since the machine guns supplied to Valenzuela had not actually been employed in the killing, and since General Viaux had been officially discouraged by the CIA a few days before the murder, there was therefore "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction."  This view has been disputed by writer [[Christopher Hitchens]].<ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/feb/24/features.weekend</ref>

===Iraq 1958-63 and 1973-5===

====Iraq 1958-63 and 1973-5====

The US-backed Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958, an event which shocked President Eisenhower.  Worse, the new regime was led by a de facto [[Communist]] dictator, General Abdel Karrim Qassem.  Qassem was far bloodier than his predecessor.  Further, he withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, an agreement between Iraq, [[Iran]], [[Pakistan]] and other countries in the Middle East intended to deter the Soviets from intruding in the affairs of the region.  Openly admiring of the USSR, Qassem repeatedly threatened his neighbors, including Iran, where a CIA-sponsored counter-coup had saved the Shah's regime from collapse in 1953.  He publicly declared that Khuzestan province in northern Iran was really a part of Iraq, and allegedly armed secessionist revolts from the Arabs who lived there.  He amassed troops to invade Kuwait, a move that nearly led to war between Iraq and [[England]] (which was committed by treaty to defend Kuwait).   

The US-backed Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958, an event which shocked President Eisenhower.  Worse, the new regime was led by a de facto [[Communist]] dictator, General Abdel Karrim Qassem.  Qassem was far bloodier than his predecessor.  Further, he withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, an agreement between Iraq, [[Iran]], [[Pakistan]] and other countries in the Middle East intended to deter the Soviets from intruding in the affairs of the region.  Openly admiring of the USSR, Qassem repeatedly threatened his neighbors, including Iran, where a CIA-sponsored counter-coup had saved the Shah's regime from collapse in 1953.  He publicly declared that Khuzestan province in northern Iran was really a part of Iraq, and allegedly armed secessionist revolts from the Arabs who lived there.  He amassed troops to invade Kuwait, a move that nearly led to war between Iraq and [[England]] (which was committed by treaty to defend Kuwait).   

Thus, when former CIA Near East Division Chief James Chritchfield claims the 1968 coup was a "radical" "counter-coup," perhaps his language reflects the reality that it overthrew a government the US covertly helped bring to power.

Thus, when former CIA Near East Division Chief James Chritchfield claims the 1968 coup was a "radical" "counter-coup," perhaps his language reflects the reality that it overthrew a government the US covertly helped bring to power.

===Angola 1975-92===

====Angola 1975-92====

In the Angolan Civil War, the Communist MPLA (''People's Movement for the Liberation of [[Angola]]'') government was pitted against various right-wing insurgencies as well as an invasion from [[South Africa]]. The CIA covertly attempted to overthrow the MPLA dictatorship in 1975,<ref>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c35COXObeo8&feature=fvw Former CIA head in Angola discusses the operation on CNN</ref> but Cuba militarily intervened to save the regime from certain collapse. The Communist government subsequently killed up to one million people through massacre and forced starvation.<ref>Médecins Sans Frontières, “Angola: An Alarming Nutritional Situation,” August 1999</ref>  The U.S., advised by Kissinger, supported the rebels FNLA (''National Front for the Liberation of Angola''), led by Holden Roberto, and UNITA (''National Union for the Total Independence of Angola''), led by [[Jonas Savimbi]], as well as the ''Mozambican National Resistance'' (RENAMO), and the invasion of Angola by South African troops. The FNLA was defeated and UNITA was forced to take its fight into the bush. Only under Reagan's presidency would U.S. support for UNITA return. (See [[Reagan Doctrine]])

In the Angolan Civil War, the Communist MPLA (''People's Movement for the Liberation of [[Angola]]'') government was pitted against various right-wing insurgencies as well as an invasion from [[South Africa]]. The CIA covertly attempted to overthrow the MPLA dictatorship in 1975,<ref>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c35COXObeo8&feature=fvw Former CIA head in Angola discusses the operation on CNN</ref> but Cuba militarily intervened to save the regime from certain collapse. The Communist government subsequently killed up to one million people through massacre and forced starvation.<ref>Médecins Sans Frontières, “Angola: An Alarming Nutritional Situation,” August 1999</ref>  The U.S., advised by Kissinger, supported the rebels FNLA (''National Front for the Liberation of Angola''), led by Holden Roberto, and UNITA (''National Union for the Total Independence of Angola''), led by [[Jonas Savimbi]], as well as the ''Mozambican National Resistance'' (RENAMO), and the invasion of Angola by South African troops. The FNLA was defeated and UNITA was forced to take its fight into the bush. Only under Reagan's presidency would U.S. support for UNITA return. (See [[Reagan Doctrine]])